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ABSTRACT
The Spanish-American War changed the course of
American history.

In a few months the United States

acquired a colonial empire and adopted a policy of
overseas involvement that greatly altered future world
events. The political victory of a few military reformers
and politicians, who endorsed Social Darwinism,

over those

who upheld the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson, destroyed
the international isolation of the American republic.

No

matter what successive political administrations claimed,
they inherited substantial overseas commitments.
The group that engineered this profound change in
American foreign and defence policy were led by Elihu
Root,

John Hay, Leonard Wood, Alfred Thayer Mahan and

Theodore Roosevelt. These men were convinced that American
economic prosperity and political independence depended
upon exerting influence overseas. The creation of Englishspeaking democracies world-wide, which endorsed free
trade, would guarantee American prosperity and peace.
Josiah Strong's evangelism, which claimed advanced nations
had a duty to help the less fortunate,

provided American

imperialists with moral legitimacy. American expansion
required both allies and an efficient military.

During the

late nineteenth century top-ranking British officials
decided that Britain could not maintain its industrial and

naval preeminence. An informal alliance between the United
States and Great Britain became increasingly attractive to
key decision-makers in both countries. This decision led
to poorer relations with Germany and Japan because these
states resented Anglo-American imperialism and its
industrial power.
The American army highlighted these changes. The
Spanish-American War had displayed deficiencies of
command, training, and equipment that proved unacceptable
to politicians wishing to influence the world. Army reform
provoked political debate. Supporters of local control,
volunteerism,

and the ideologies of Jefferson and Jackson

opposed military reform. Led by William Jennings Bryan,
they challenged the view that national efficiency required
a professional civil service, army, and navy responsible
to federal authority.

Ideas from Germany, Britain,

France,

and Switzerland were used to construct the new army.
American business organisation, partly responsible for
unparalleled economic growth,

influenced the rhetoric of

reform and new command structure of the army. The reforms
included a General Staff structure, War College,

and

closer national guard-regular army cooperation; creating
the basis for today's American army.

CHAPTER ONE
TOWARDS A NEW CENTURY
In 1883 the novelist Henry James left America for
Europe. He left a country of thirty-nine states and fifty
million people living in a largely rural environment.
Chester A. Arthur was president. He presided over a
country with rural values, with government that was
primarily local, controlled by amateurs. The political
economist William Graham Sumner had published a book
entitled, What the Social Classes Owe to Each O t h e r , which
upheld class distinctions, upper-class superiority, and
rural stability. On August 30, 1904 James returned to
America on the S.S. Kaiser Wilhelm II. His native land had
greatly changed. The population was now seventy-six
million and over percent of people lived in towns of 2,500
people or more. Theodore Roosevelt was president. He led a
country transformed. The rural Republic was now an
industrial and colonial world power. James quickly
discovered a preeminence of business ideas and values in
America which deeply depressed him. A year later,
thoroughly sickened by the dominance of commercialism in
his own land, he returned to Europe.1
James could not adapt to the momentous social and
economic change in America. Railroads had destroyed the
old frontier and allowed substantial urbanisation.

Big
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business advocated professionalism and efficiency as
essential to develop new markets at home and abroad.
These ideas challenged the old Jacksonian and Jeffersonian
notions of local political control, relative international
isolation,

agrarian economy, and individual amateurism.

Alexander Hamilton's concept of a strong centralised
state,

expanded federal agencies, and a professionally

advised executive dominated American politics.

Economic

necessity and moral obligation had created an American
Empire. The essence of government was strong central
authority advised by professionals.

Supporters of this

philosophy were frequently referred to as "Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans." Concerned at the increasing complexity of
society,

they argued that government must place authority

in the hands of a body which had the confidence of the
majority: professionals who could ensure efficiency in an
age of increasing complexity.

Such government was

essential to ensure continued economic growth and
political independence in a competitive international
world. American success in a such a world depended not
only on efficient government but also on a strong
military. The debate over military reform reflected these
national political and economic changes. Military
efficiency required a new command system and a
professional officer corps. The struggle over army reform
highlighted the political divide within America between
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Neo-Hamiltonian Federalists and Jacksonian-Jeffersonian
localists.
Between 1870 and 1900, the United States enjoyed both
remarkable economic expansion and considerable Federal
government growth. National income increased from $7
billion in 1870 to $17 billion by 1900. Foreign
investment,

only $684 million in 1897, reached $2 billion

by the early twentieth century.

Economic development

created new economic trusts and corporations with an
annual 300 corporate mergers between 1895-1914 creating
American Tobacco, U.S.

Steel, DuPont, and other corporate

empires.2 The Federal Government underwent profound
change.

In 1871 the civilian pay-roll of Federal employees

numbered only 53,000; yet by 1901 there were 256,000
employees. The federal budget,
1871,

set at $292 million in

increased to $1 billion by 1891. Thomas Jenckes

advocated civil service reform in the 1860's based on the
principle of merit. He attacked provincial patronage and
helped promote the professionalism in government
established in 1883 with the Pendleton Civil Service Act.
In 1895, the Dockery-Cockrell Congressional Commission
undertook one of several comprehensive reviews of
government administration.

The apparent successes of

commerce and industry led to interviews with business
managers on the latest management techniques.3

4

Unlike industry and the Federal Government, the
American army was in decline in the late nineteenth
century. The effective army created during the Civil War
was rapidly disbanded at its end. By July,

1868 the army's

strength was set at 54,302 officers and men,

an enormous

reduction from Civil War enrollment.4 Peacetime limited
the army's role to pacifying fewer than 100,000 hostile
Indians in the West and to upholding Reconstruction in the
South.5 Further reductions in army enrollment took place
on March 3, 1869 and July 15, 1870, when Congress reduced
the army to 30,000 officers and men and the number of
regiments from forty-five to twenty-five.6 By March,

1898

the army numbered fewer than 25,000 men in a country with
a population of over 73 million people. Throughout the
nineteenth century, with the exception of the Civil War,
the United States had a lower ratio of military personnel
to population than Japan or any European power.7
At the same time as the army grew smaller,

business,

particularly railroads were developing new management
techniques that would soon have an impact on the army. The
completion of the great East-West rail lines created the
largest companies of the mid-nineteenth century.

The

Illinois Central, Baltimore and Ohio, Michigan Central,
and other railroads, undermined provincial economics and
politics in America. As David C. McCallum,

General

Superintendent of the Erie Railroad pointed out in 1855:
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A Superintendent of a road fifty miles in length can
give his personal attention in the direction of
details; each person is personally known to him, and
all questions in relation to its business are at once
presented and acted upon.8
This economic system preserved the local control so
important to Jefferson and Jackson. The emergence of
larger railroads, however,

overturned local control and

produced regional, divisional, and finally national
management.

In the 18 60s and 1870s managers in the

Pennsylvania Railroad pioneered a new departmental system
reporting to a divisional and headquarters structure.

The

new central office consisted of departmental heads who
worked with the president to coordinate, assess,

and plan

the goals of each department in relation to the company's
interests.
Throughout the 1880s and particularly during the
depression of the 1890s the consolidation and amalgamation
of American business was promoted by ideas for national
management.

Business expanded,

and by 1900 agricultural

income was estimated at only $3 billion out of a total
production income of over $14 billion.9 Between 1888 and
1892 Gustavus and Edwin Swift created a national
distribution, marketing,
products.

and processing company for beef

In 1895, James B. Duke created American Tobacco

for purchasing, manufacturing,
world-wide.
made by U.S.

and marketing tobacco

By 1900 similar organisational advances were
Steel, U.S. Rubber,

National Biscuit,

DuPont. No longer local in character,

and

these new companies
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gave America the largest industrial capacity in the
world.10 The economy was increasingly based upon business
technology,

business management,

and science.

Philosopher

John Dewey,

supported by Henry James, criticised

nineteenth-century individualism. Americans were
encouraged to support government bureaucracy and business
based upon administrative efficiency and scientific
management.11
Jacksonian and Jeffersonian supporters were not the
only Americans alarmed by the emergence of big business
and urbanisation.

In 1883, John Hay,

later secretary of

state, published a novel entitled The Bread W i n n e r s . He
attacked the rural egalitarian society upheld by
Jeffersonians and created heroes who accepted their social
position in life. He portrayed industrialists as
Philistines.12 Elihu Root,

later secretary of war,

Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge, and author Henry Adams shared this
ambivalence to the impact of business on society; they saw
in Britain an ideal alliance between corporate wealth and
social position which maintained stability.
Business expansion encouraged urbanisation.

Between

1880 and 1900 the number of Americans living in towns more
than doubled.

Urbanisation threatened rural American

values and alarmed even active supporters of industrial
expansion.

Hamlin Garland and later Henry Nash Smith

continued to chronicle the homestead and rugged
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individualism. William Graham Sumner, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Leonard Wood all endorsed the "strenuous life concept"
of intense physical activity as an antidote to industrial
and urban weakness.13
Despite the reduction in the size of the American
army,

its officer corps maintained its continuity. Between

1871 and 1898 the corps varied little more than 100 from a
figure of 2,100 officers;14 the highest number of
resignations was just twenty-eight in 1889.15 This
continuity within the officer corps was reinforced by the
continuity of ethnic origin and education within this
relatively small body of men. The majority of senior
officers were Protestant and came from North-eastern
states.

Such ethnic,

regional,

and religious cohesion

within the officer corps was reinforced by a common
educational experience:

between 1898 and 1940, over sixty-

eight percent of top military men graduated from West
Point while many of the remainder had some college
education.16 The social profiles of army officers were
similar to those of the new business leaders. The demands
of army life, however,

removed most officers from the

influence of corporate ideals of efficiency,

organisation,

and specialisation emerging in business and the civil
service. Most officers lived on the frontier far from
cities,

industry,

North-east.

and the new commercial ideas of the

Colonel Stephen C. Mills summed up the life of
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most when he wrote:
You were wet, and cold, and hungry; or dry, and
hot, and thirsty, according to your geographical
location. You chased elusive Indians over routes of
alkali, rock and sage, they usually got away from you
and all you got in return were the jeers of the
fellows who didn't happen to be out that trip.... You
were always behind on your paper work, and when you
got the chance to make papers, it was usually done
with the paucity of detail only equalled by Mark
Twain's boyhood diary. A months hard scouting was
dismissed by the entry "Distance marched during
month, 360 miles.".... These were the good old days
when one drill a day, five days in a week, comprised
military training. Target practice was practically
unknown. I think the allowance of ammunition was
twenty rounds a year, and by custom of the service
it went in hunting.17
During the Indian wars some seventy-five military posts
were operational in prairie and mountain states alone,
often located in rugged and inhospitable terrain.18
Despite the reduction in the number of posts by the 1890s
only sixteen of eighty posts were occupied by a regiment
or more in 1894.19 Small military commands occupied the
largely undeveloped West far from North-eastern corporate
expansion and its new ideas. The lack of recreational,

or

educational facilities encouraged boredom not military
reform.
The declining size of the army and promotion based
upon seniority created few promotion opportunities which
in turn discouraged interest in new ideas. By the 1890s
many officers were often too old for the promotions they
held,

(see Table 1).
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TABLE 1
THE AVERAGE AGE OF BOTH STAFF AMD LINE OFFICERS WHEN THEY
RECEIVED PROMOTION TO A SPECIFIC G R A D E .
RANK
Lieutenant
Captain
Major

at
at
at

AGE
31.1
43.5
57.1

RANK
Lieut. Colonel
Colonel
General

at
at
at

AGE
60.9
62.25
58.25

Source: Captain, later Brigd. General Wm. C r o z i e r ’s report
on the 1901 Peking Relief Expedition to China.
The North
American R e v i e w . (Boston, Feb., 1901).
Major General Johnson Hagood described the army as an
aging, well-trained fire department with no fires, and the
firemen sitting around playing chequers. Promotion among
army officers had practically stopped. Generals of the
Civil War, demoted to captain and major, remained
common.20 According to General Nelson A. Miles,

in 1889

110 officers in 1889 had not received a promotion for two
decades, while even in 1895,

279 officers were still Civil

War veterans.21 In 1890, the senior lieutenant of
artillery had twenty-eight years of service, with twentythree years as a lieutenant, while the senior infantry
subaltern had yet to be promoted after nineteen years of
experience at the same grade.22 Slow promotion discouraged
interest in military innovations. An officer gained no
advantage by studying new military methods,

since all

officers were promoted solely on the basis of seniority.
Recognising the problems caused by long-delayed promotion,
Congress passed a law in June,

1882 requiring mandatory

retirement at sixty-four years of age, or after forty
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years of service. This failed to alleviate the problem,
with most officers between forty-one and fifty-one years
of age, and only fifty-two officers sixty-one years old or
over by 1885.23 The problem remained throughout the 1890s
and early 1900s. Disenchanted and time-worn, most officers
cared little for civil service, business,

or military

reform. The scattered army provided little opportunity to
practice handling larger numbers of troops at divisional,
brigade,

or even regimental levels. Confronted with slow

promotion and tedious assignments to small Western
outposts, many line officers sought staff bureau
assignments, which, when made were permanent,

usually

involved promotion by one grade and allowed an officer to
work regular office hours in one of the larger American
cities.

Senator Redfield Proctor graphically outlined the

scramble to get a staff position while debating a bill to
increase the size of the army in 1900:
Permit me to state the common method, when there is a
vacancy, or is to be one in the Quartermaster's
Department. The scramble for the place commences
months before it actually occurs. There are about six
hundred first lieutenants in the line ... sometimes
three hundred I am informed are applicants for the
place .... The applicants file briefs giving their
records, with letters from military officers,
personal and political friends. These briefs are
often printed pamphlets of many pages. The wives,
mothers, and sisters of the applicants in personal
interviews appeal to the President and the Secretary.
The scramble to get out of the fighting branch of the
army is at least unseemly. Of course but little
consideration is given to most applicants, Senator A
or Representative B has a relative or a constituent
with powerful influence behind him and he demands it.
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Such a system of political patronage,

combined with poor

prospects for promotion and the dispersed state of the
army,

led Senator Proctor to conclude that:

"No system

could be better calculated to kill ambition.1,24 The lack
of opportunity,

however, was not the

only problem which

confronted army

officers in the late nineteenth century.

The end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the decline in
Indian hostilities gave the army only a ceremonial and
police role in a society safe from European imperial
encroachments. A cultured Eastern woman underlined the
apparent irrelevance of the army when,
appearance of an army colonel,

surprised by the

she exclaimed:

"What a

colonel of the army ? Why I supposed the army was all
disbanded at the close of the War!"25 Industrial unrest
including the strikes of 1877 and the Pullman Strike of
May 1894, which

involved more than 16,000 troops,

gave the army a

new role in society.

briefly

This role, however,

hardly justified the armies existence to Congressional
critics keen to cut expenditure. William T. Sherman,
commanding general of the army from 1869 to 1883,
unconvincingly concluded that the army's peacetime role
was to prepare for wa r . 26 In the late nineteenth century a
new justification for maintaining a standing army emerged,
based upon international economic competition and the
intellectual ideas of Social Darwinism.
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In 1870, Britain dominated the industrial world. This
position of preeminence was rapidly undermined by Germany,
America,

France and Japan. America exceeded British steel

production in 1890, and by 1905 America produced four
times and Germany twice the steel produced in Britain.
American coal production exceeded that of Britain in
1900.27 The industrial dominance of Britain was replaced
by commercial competition among several powers

(see Table

2 ).
TABLE 2
WORLD PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL AMD
FOREIGN TRADE 1870 -1910.
YEAR
COUNTRY
Great Britain
United States
Germany
France
Russia

1870

1885

1900

1910

31.8
23 .3
13.2
10. 3
3.7

26.6
28.6
13.9
8.6
3.4

19.5
30.1
16. 6
7.1
5.0

14.7
35.5
15.9
6.4
5.0

League of Nations Report, Industrialization and Foreign
T r a d e , cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary T i t a n , p . 26.
The emergence of new economic powers caused an undignified
scramble for world-wide colonial Empire as Britain,
Germany,

France,

and Belgium attempted to secure sole

access to raw materials and new markets at the expense of
competitors. The creation of formal empire alarmed
American businessmen convinced that prosperity depended on
free trade and expanding markets. The interrelationship
between continued economic growth and overseas trade
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interested politicians. Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay,
Theodore Roosevelt, Whitelaw Reid and other prominent
North-eastern Republicans,

reasoned that American wealth

and continued economic growth required an assertive
American foreign policy.
International relations between Great Britain and the
United States in the mid-nineteenth century were poor. The
location of the Alaskan-Canadian boundary,

fishing rights,

and claims for damages inflicted by British-built
Confederate ships in the Civil War
strained relations.

contributed to

Initally British economic superiority

produced little inclination to settle such matters,

but

the disintegration of British economic superiority led to
a friendlier attitude towards America among members of the
British establishment.

In the 1880s prominent Members of

Parliement Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilk widened
their definition of upright Anglo-Saxon powers to include
America.28 British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice
emphasised increasingly cordial Anglo-American relations
when he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge in July 1890,
expressing delight at the U.S. decision to annex Hawaii:
I can't tell you with what a pleasure I see that
Hawaii is at length to be annexed. The pleasure is
selfish and has nothing to do with the real or
permanent advantages to America which I believe
will result from the step. I think there can be no
doubt that there is an intention, (and a natural
o n e ) , to depose English civilization, (I mean
yours as much as mine) from the Pacific .... I
need not say how excited we all are at the very

14

welcome proof that you have given that people who
talk English can still fight . ...29
The effects of industrialisation which threatened to
undermine American social status by creating a new wider
middle class alarmed John Hay, Henry Adams,
Cabot Lodge.

and Henry

Increasingly they sought to emulate British

aristocrats, who had successfully preserved class
distinction despite industrialisation and emerging middle
class democracy. These Neo-Hamiltonian or Federalist
Republicans enjoyed cordial links with British
imperialists such as Rudyard Kipling,
Sir Andrew Clark,

James Bryce, General

and Arthur Balfour. A typical week for

Hay in Britain often included dinner with Lady Metcalf on
Monday, dinner with the Gladstones and John Morley on
Tuesday, Wednesday dinner at the Foreign Office with Sir
John Pauleston,
Rice,

Thursday dinner with Sir Cecil Spring-

and a weekend at the Joseph Chamberlains with Mrs

Robert Peel and Sir Henry Drummond.30 These extensive
social contacts with British society imbued Hay, Whitelaw
Reid and other Republican supporters, with ideas of empire
and Social Darwinism.
In America,

British author Herbert Spencer,

outlined

a human hierachy dominated by Anglo-Saxon Protestants, to
accompany the publication of Charles Darwin's,

Origin of

the Species. He argued that advanced and progressive
society was based upon technology and science.

Since

Britain and America were the most technologically
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advanced,
others.

their societies were obviously superior to all

Spencer's work sold over 350,000 copies in America

and popularised Social Darwinism. William Graham Sumner,
an influential Yale Professor,

became a leading disciple

of Social Darwinism in America.31 In the 1890s, Hay was
appointed ambassador to Great Britain. He regularly
forwarded to Washington D.C. material describing the
advantages of imperial rule.

In July 1898 he forwarded a

pamphlet by General Clarke on the experiences of the
pioneering British Imperialist Sir Stamford Raffles in the
Malay peninsula. Hay drew attention to the expansion of
trade in the region, to new civil administration,

and to

civil works implemented by British imperialists.32
Hamiltonian Republicans readily accepted the argument that
colonial rule benefited both the natives and the colonial
power.
In America important religious leaders and
influential economists also began to conclude American
involvement overseas would be beneficial.

Josiah Strong, a

Protestant minister and reformer, published Our C o u n t r y ,
which challenged the church to concern itself with social
problems.

In 1893 he published The New Era, which aroused

spiritual idealism among American Protestants and
encouraged support for social reform and paternalism
abroad by describing disease,

illiteracy,

foreign lands as an unacceptable evil.

and poverty in

In economics the
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ideas of Brooks Adams and other Neo-Hamiltonians attracted
considerable attention during the American economic slump
of the 1890s.

Startled businessmen believed that the

American home market was saturated and that expansion
overseas was required for economic recovery. Lodge and
other Neo-Hamiltonian Imperialists supported the
evangelical and economic call for a policy of "wise
aggressiveness," which had allowed Britain to secure raw
materials and new markets.33 As Roosevelt wrote to an
agreeing Lodge:
The useful member of the brotherhood of nations is
that nation which is most thoroughly saturated
with the national idea, and which realizes most
fully its rights as a nation and its duties to its
own citizens .... As yet no nation can hold its
place in the world or can do any work really worth
doing unless it stands ready to guard its rights
with an armed hand.34
Increasingly the Neo-Hamiltonians envisaged an army that
was not merely useful but essential in a competitive
world.
Traditional U.S.

foreign policy based upon the tenets

of avoiding alliances, maintaining freedom of the seas,
and upholding an open door policy on trade
by Britain,

(all endorsed

the premier naval power in the world)

did

little to encourage the demand for a strong military.
However, military and foreign policy was refashioned by
the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed European encroachment
upon the Americas; American territorial expansion into
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Hawaii, Midway, Johnson Island, and Samoa by the 1890s,
and the development of formal European colonial empires.
In the 1880s the navy began a limited building program. A
naval war college was established,

and William C. Endicott

chaired a board which considered coastal defence.

In the

army, Adjutant General Richard C. Drum ordered Major
William J. Volkmar to organise a Division of Military
Information, which established a military attache service.
Congress authorised money for the appointment of officers
overseas in 1888 and in 1889, military attaches were
assigned to Berlin, London, Paris,

St Petersburg,

and

Vienna. By the early 1890s most European capitals had an
American military attache. These officers forwarded large
numbers of pamphlets,

articles,

and other material on

military systems. Many officers later influential in
modifying the American army served as attaches including;
Major William Ludlow,
John J. Pershing,

Captain Tasker H. Bliss, Captain

and Captain Peyton C. March.35

Technological breakthroughs in steam power,
and the telegraph,

electricity,

coupled with American imperial

expansion, reduced the effectiveness of America's barriers
for isolationism: the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These
changes further convinced Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans of
the need for military reform. Most Americans, however,
rejected the Federalist view of the world and endorsed the
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideals of strong state
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politics,

provincial economic control, and national

defence based upon a locally organised,

amateur National

Guard.36
A four-year economic depression beginning in 1893
undermined the position of the incumbent President, Grover
Cleveland.

The following year the Republican Party gained

117 seats in the House of Representatives, which created a
Republican majority lasting until 1910.37 In 1896 at the
Republican Party Convention in St. Louis, William McKinley
was selected to run for president.
he was a Civil War veteran,
congressman,

Born in Ohio in 1843,

a lawyer,

a former Republican

and a former governor of Ohio. McKinley

supported big business and the gold standard. He was
cautious about further expansion overseas. Nominated with
the help of Senator Mark Hanna, McKinley was not from the
Neo-Hamiltonian wing of the Republican Party.38
McKinley was opposed by Democrat William Jennings
Bryan. Bryan was of English and Irish descent and was the
second of six children born on a 500-acre farm in Salem,
Illinois. He grew up in the rural Midwest, where he led a
tough farming life. He was profoundly influenced by the
moral evangelism in the speeches and writings of Wendell
Phillips.39 Phillips assailed the "money power" in America
as a menace to republican government and freedom. Like his
father and like Phillips,

Bryan endorsed Jeffersonian and

Jacksonian opposition to policies supporting corporate
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power,

a unified banking system, centralised government,

and a larger professional military. A gifted orator, he
was elected to Congress in 1891. He led the Democratic
Party and Populists against big business and NeoHamiltonians.40 The depression helped McKinley to victory
in the Presidential election; he polled over 7,000,000
votes and carried twenty-three states,

against 6,500,000

votes and twenty-two states for Bryan.

Electoral chicanery

deprived Bryan of precious votes in West Virginia,

Ohio,

and Kentucky which might have altered the election
result.41 The close election, despite a depression, both
underscored the appeal of democratic ideals among the
electorate,

and emphasised the relative weakness of

business and Social Darwinian theories, which promoted
overseas expansion and strong central government.
McKinley attached little importance to the army and
appointed Russell A. Alger as secretary of war. Alger,
born in 1836, was the son of a pioneer couple both of whom
died when he was 11 years old. He raised two younger
children,

put himself through the local academy,

passed the Ohio Bar in 1857.

and

In 1859 he moved to Grand

Rapids, Michigan and married into a prominent local
family. He served throughout the Civil War in the
volunteer cavalry and saw action at Gettysburg,
Wilderness,

the

and in the Shenandoah Valley. After the Civil

War he became a timber millionaire with interests in
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Canada,

California,

and Michigan. He was ambitious but

politically naive.42
Alger encountered an army frustrated and divided.
These problems were exacerbated by a command system which
promoted bitterness between staff and line officers. The
administrative system also created resentment between the
top ranking soldier in the army, the commanding general,
and the secretary of war and staff officers. Army
management departed from planned organisation through the
Revolutionary and Jacksonian Periods and had been
finalised by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, and the
U.S. Senate in March 1821. The structure upheld the
president's role as commander-in-chief but did not clarify
the limits of command assigned to the commanding general
of the army. The commanding general was allotted control
over military discipline and military operations with all
orders relating to these issues transmitted through his
office. The secretary of war retained financial control
over the army, under the president,
charge of the staff bureaus,

and was directly in

(see Appendix l).43 Such a

system appalled Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who endorsed
the idea of a strong central government,
professionals,

served by

with clear lines of communication to the

executive.
Staff bureaus were composed of officers with
permanent appointments,

responsible directly to the
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secretary of war. These officers paid scant attention to
requests from officers in the field or orders issued by
the commanding general of the army. Such a confused
system, with no clear delineation of control led to
constant friction between the commanding general and
secretary of war. Prussian military success increased the
frustration felt by the few officers interested in
reforming the ineffective American system. Prussia had
created a highly successful army, while the American army
suffered dismal promotion prospects, divided command,

and

congressional enmity.
Defeated at Jena in 1806 by Napoleonic France,
Prussia soon set about rebuilding its military reputation.
Gerhard Scharnhorst, Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von
Moltke, Albrecht von Roon and others produced a military
system that was,

in terms of organisation,

the most

advanced in the world.44 These reformers established a war
college for advanced education and a general staff to
command the army. By 1821 Prussia possessed all the basic
elements of a modern command structure.45 Unfortunately,
political upheaval in Europe in the 1820s, which caused
fear of revolution,

led the King of Prussia to rely on his

army officers for political support. This decision by the
king undermined civilian control of the army. The powers
of the elected war minister were reduced and the
organisational structure envisaged by Scharnhorst,
Clausewitz,

and other army reformers was overturned.
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In America the frustration and competition between
the secretary of war and commanding general over who
controlled the army led Winfield Scott to write to the
secretary of war in 1849:

"It is in my opinion,

indispensable that the movements of all staff officers
immediately connected with the troops, as well as the
number required at particular stations should be regulated
by my orders."46 This friction continued throughout the
early years of the Civil War, with poor command relations
between General George B. McClellan and Secretaries of War
Edwin Staunton and Simon Cameron,

symptomatic of the poor

command structure of the army. President Lincoln
eventually solved this problem by promoting his most
successful general, Ulysess S. Grant, to general-in-chief
and giving him complete control of the army.
however,

In 1865,

the Civil War ended, and control of the army

reverted to the secretary of war. Grant found his
authority undercut as staff bureaus re-asserted their
independence from the commanding general,

and re 

established their allegiance to the secretary of war.
The politics of President Andrew Johnson's
administration,

and Grant's own presidential plans

prevented any concerted attempt to stop this erosion of
power.

In 1868 Grant was elected president and General

William T. Sherman became the new commanding general of
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the army. Grant attempted to solve command problems in the
army by ordering the secretary of war and staff bureaus to
transmit orders through the offices of the commanding
general.47 Grant and Sherman’s reforms were attacked by
important members of the Republican Party,

including

Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Opposition to placing
considerable military power in the hands of a military man
could not be overcome. Grant revoked the proposed reforms,
and the role of the commanding general returned to that of
military figurehead. The divided army command structure
remained.48 Sherman continued to advocate reform despite
this set-back, and bitter exchanges with Secretary of War
William Worth Belknap ultimately induced Sherman to move
his headquarters out of Washington to St. Louis.
Traditionally, American soldiers had regarded the
French army as a model worthy of emulation.

Sylvanus

Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan used French military ideas
when they reformed West Point, while the strategic and
tactical concepts of Jomini were used in American military
manuals.49 The quick military victories by Prussia over
Denmark, Austria,

and France in successive wars alerted

those few officers interested in reform to the potential
of the new German military structure.

General Philip H.

Sheridan who replaced Sherman on November 1, 1883,
observed the rapid Prussian victory over France while on a
seven-month trip to Europe. The mobilisation plans of
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Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke impressed
Sheridan, who concluded that the American army required a
war planning agency. Sheridan missed the bitter struggle
between Chancellor Bismarck and von Moltke over political
objectives in the Franco-Prussian War, which highlighted
the increasing power of the German General Staff.
Impressed with Prussian military success, most nineteenthcentury American military reformers failed to realise that
the political freedom given to the Prussian army was
unacceptable in the American democratic political
tradition.
Hazen,

Sheridan was accompanied by Colonel William B.

a former Civil War major general, who investigated

the Franco-German military education systems.

In his

report published in 1872, he praised the German system
while criticising the American army for its arrogant staff
departments and confused command structure. Returning to
America, both officers gave enthusiastic reports to
General Sherman, with Sheridan declaring that the Germans
had built a "perfect military system."50 Sherman spent
several months observing European armies and continued to
promote military reform.

In June 1870 he appointed

Lieutenant-Colonel Emory Upton commandant of cadets at
West Point.
Upton,

from Batvia,

New York, was the tenth child of

a zealous Methodist family that embraced temperance and
abolitionism.

He entered West Point in 1856,

studied
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science and mathematics,

and developed a professional

contempt for civilian soldiers. A successful cadet, he had
his choice of appointments and joined the 5th U.S.
Artillery on May 14,

1861.51 Upton served with all three

arms during the Civil War, was wounded twice,

and was

promoted rapidly from 1st lieutenant in 1861 to brigadier
general United States army and major general of volunteers
by 1865. His views on an army necessary for the republic
were profoundly influenced by his participation in some of
the most ferocious fighting of the war at Antietam,
Fredericksburg,

Chancellorsville,

and the Bloody Angle at

Spotsylvania Court House. He had seen militiamen run at
Bull Run, had seen volunteers refuse to fight because
their contracts had been violated,

and had seen state

governors who manipulate promotions,

including his own,

for personal political gain.52 Upton was reduced in rank
to lieutenant-colonel with the rapid demobilisation at the
end of the war. After the war he served in the West.

In

1870 his wife died, and he turned his full attention to
military reform.53 By 1875 he had established himself as a
prominent military theorist.

Sherman convinced Secretary

of War Belknap to give Upton and two other officers cavalryman Brigadier General "Sandy" Forsyth and
artilleryman Major Joseph P. Sanger the world to analyise military systems.

permission to tour
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The three officers sailed from San Francisco in late
1875, returning to New York in 1876, having visited Japan,
China,

India, The Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Western

European States.54 On his return Upton recommended that a
war school be established at Fort Leavenworth and began
work on his report entitled, The Armies of Asia and
E u ro p e . published in 1878.
Upton's ideas quickly became popular in reformist
circles in the army. He proposed a new three-battalion
structure for regiments,

staff appointments for fixed

terms, promotion based on merit, a system of advanced
military education including a war college, and a general
staff system created by the amalgamation of the Adjutant
General's Office and Inspector General's Department.55
Upton did not outline the powers of the commanding general
or those of the secretary of war in his new system. His
praise for the Prussian system implied the commanding
general would be chief of the general staff with
considerable independence from civilian control.

In

Prussia von Moltke operated increasingly without civilian
control, despite the presence of the able Chancellor
Bismarck. The inability of Upton and other nineteenthcentury reformers to define the relationship of the
secretary of war to the commanding general within the army
command structure and their failure to recognise that the
freedom given to the Prussian army would be unacceptable
in America limited their contribution to later reforms.
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In 1865 the only national institutions for military
education were the military and naval academies at West
Point and Annapolis.

Under the command of the chief of

engineers, West Point was largely a technical school.
1866, however,

In

it was given independent status and a

broader curriculum was implemented. General Sherman
encouraged educational reform while commanding general.

In

1868 an artillery school was established at Fort Monroe to
give the first post-graduate training for West Point
officers.

In 1881 similar advanced schools for the other

two branches of the army were established with the School
of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort
Leavenworth.56 This school attempted to provide some form
of post-commission training for isolated field officers
accustomed to commanding small garrisons. Though only
partially successful,

the school became influential

through two of its instructors; Captain Arthur Wagner and
Captain Eben Swift.
Wagner was an influential reform-minded officer.

Born

in Chicago on March 16, 1853, he graduated from West Point
in 1875. He spent his early years in the army fighting
Indians in the Dakota Territory.

In 1881 he became

professor of military science at Louisiana State
University,

later moving to the Florida Seminary in

Gainesville to hold a similar post.

In the late 1880s he

was appointed lecturer in military art at Fort Leavenworth
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and was soon promoted to head of department.
visited Europe,

In 1888 he

on leave of absence, to study the

organisation and methods of the German army. He visited
the war college in Berlin and war schools at Potsdam and
Metz. Wagner toured European battlefields and studied the
Austro-Prussian conflict in the light of the Civil War;
the published result was the highly acclaimed Campaign for
K o ni qg ra tz . In 1893 he published The Service of Security
and Information, which became the textbook at the three
service schools,

and in 1895 he published Organisation and

T a c t i c s . which was authorised as the standard text for all
officer examinations.57 In 1893 Eben Swift joined Wagner
on the faculty at Fort Leavenworth.

Unlike Wagner, he was

concerned with the methods of teaching military
instruction,

and both men complemented each other.58

In 1878 the military reform proposals advocated by
Upton were introduced to the House of Representatives.
Sherman,

Hazen,

and Upton prevailed upon House minority

leader James A. Garfield and Senate Military Affairs
Chairman Ambrose E. Burnside to support reform. A product
of German military thinking the bill was defeated in
Congress,

by those opposed to political freedom for the

army.59 Sherman,

Sheridan, Upton and Hazen were influenced

both by the military success of Grant when freed from
political control and the easy victories achieved by
Prussia in Europe. These men wanted the general-in-chief
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to have absolute authority over the army. The belief that
Grant and von Moltke succeeded due to freedom from
political constraints challenged the deeply held AngloAmerican distrust of autonomous standing armies at a time
when the need for an army was not apparent. Not
surprisingly, proposals for reform under these conditions
invariably failed.60
The emerging concept of professionalism affected the
army with the creation of new expert associations.

In

1885, the U.S. Cavalry Association was established,
followed by an Infantry Association in 1892 and an
Artillery Association in 1893. All three associations
produced their own journals.61
On August 14, 1888 Lieutenant General John McAllister
Schofield replaced Philip Sheridan as commanding general
of the army. Schofield,

like Sherman and Sheridan,

promoted military reform,

but, unlike the previous

commanding generals, he understood the limitations of his
office. Born in New York in 1831, he graduated from the
military academy in 1853 and was appointed assistant
professor of natural philosophy at West Point in 1856.

In

1861 he was appointed a major of volunteers and served on
the staff of General Lyon.

In November 1861 he rose to

brigadier general of volunteers. A divisional commander in
the western theatre during the Civil War, he later
commanded the Army of the Ohio under General Sherman. On
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November 30, 1864 he was promoted to brigadier general in
the regular army. After the war he served as secretary of
war in Andrew Johnson's administration, held various
departmental commands,
1876 and 1881.

and

commanded West Point between

In 1866 and 1881 he toured Europe to

evaluate various military systems. During his tenure at
West Point and throughout his military life, Schofield
took an interest in military reform and in young, reformminded officers.
Tasker H. Bliss, William H. Carter,

and William M.

Wherry all served under Schofield.62 Bliss in particular
served extensively as his aide and secretary.

In 1879

Colonel Wherry, while serving on Schofield's staff,
published an article entitled "The Command of the Army,"
which explained the problems of a divided military command
and advocated a new centralised command structure.63
Unlike previous commanding generals,

Schofield in

particular stressed that any military reform that
threatened civilian political control would always be
unacceptable in America.

Schofield proposed a centralised

command structure which retained the political control so
badly undermined in Germany. On February 23,

1889 he

outlined his ideas in a memo to President Grover
Cleveland:
In time of peace it is neither necessary, nor
proper, that the commanding generals be clothed
with the supreme authority of the Commander-in-
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Chief, nor that the staff be exempted from the
responsibility to their staff superiors. But the
commanding generals are, no less in peace than in
war, the representatives of the Commander-inChief, and delegated in part by him to his
subordinates .... All this does not involve any
possible distinction between the President's
authority and that of the Secretary of War. So far
as concerns or is known to the Army, of the line,
staff, and generals, alike. He is responsible
alike for the military and fiscal affairs of his
department. He is an impartial judge between those
of his subordinates, who are charged with
different often conflicting interests .... The
function of the staff in this regard, is to watch,
to inspect, to inquire, to investigate and to
report to their chief, all the things that require
correction; but not to decide nor command except
their own subordinates .... it would be
destructive to the efficiency of any military system
... to permit a staff officer to overrule the
decision of his superior in rank. If there were a
"Chief of Staff," superior in rank to all, that
difficulty would be overcome by his action in
cases of contest.
Schofield continued his discussion by describing the
limited functions of the commanding general while the
secretary of war was so over-worked that he required an
assistant. The commanding general was virtually isolated.
Schofield revealed he only saw orders issued
if they were submitted

to him. Frequently

in his name

he only knew of

orders when they appeared in the morning papers. The
General concluded:
....The solution to all these difficulties seems to
lie in the simple recognition of the principle
that the General Commanding the Army is subordinate,
in all things to the Secretary of War, no less than
the President, and that he and his subordinate
commanders of divisions and departments are the
assistants of the Secretary and President in the
military administration, no less than in the command.
In accordance with this principle, the General-inChief would be in effect, though not
in name, the
Chief of Staff of

the Army.6^
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Schofield deplored the lack of further education and
planning in the army. As commanding general, he acted as a
de facto chief of staff,

sparing the War Department the

bitter squabbling which had plagued it throughout the
century.65 Schofield also encouraged younger officers
interested in reform,

including Tasker Bliss.

Bliss was not a typical army officer. His father was
an eminent language professor at Lewisburg College, the
forerunner to Bucknell University, while his mother was
the daughter of the dean of Vassar College. He spoke six
languages,

including French, German,

and Spanish, and

enjoyed translating Latin during his time off. One of
thirteen children, he tried to enter the navy after two
years at Bucknell. He failed to gain a place,

and entered

West Point in 1871. Graduating near the top of his class
in 1875, he had the choice of any arm of the army.
Initially he elected to join the cavalry, but a classmate
named Sturgis persuaded him to select the artillery. The
following summer,

Sturgis died while serving with General

George A. Custer's 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn.
Bliss was one of a small group of reform-minded officers
at West Point, all of whom graduated in either 1875 or
1876. The group included William H. Carter, William
Crozier, Arthur L. Wagner, J. Franklin Bell and William
Wotherspoon. These officers were influenced by the reform
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proposals of Upton, Hazen,

Sherman and Schofield.66 Bliss

served for one year with his regiment,
the Military Academy,
languages.

then was posted to

as assistant professor of modern

Schofield was school commandant.

In the early

1880s he was posted to the Artillery School, where he
graduated at the top of his class and was appointed
adjutant at the school.

In 1885 he worked on the Endicott

Board for coastal defence,

and then was assigned to the

new Naval War College.67
On October 6, 1884 William E. Chandler,

secretary of

the navy, approved the creation of the Naval War College
under the command of Commodore Stephen B. Luce. Luce
became convinced of the value of staff work while
commanding the monitor Pontiac, which supported Sherman's
army crossing the Savannah River in early 1865. The
briefing by Sherman before the attack convinced Luce that
staff work and planning were invaluable.

Captain Alfred

Thayer Mahan became the college's first historian,

and

Lieutenant Bliss the first lecturer in military science.68
In 1885 Bliss visited Europe to study teaching methods in
military science. He visited France, Great Britain and
Germany,

but like Upton was most impressed with the war

college in Berlin. On his return from Europe Bliss was
appointed aide-de-camp and then private secretary to
General Schofield.
officers,

Bliss was distinct from most army

who were ageing Civil War veterans,

and like
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most reformers he was regarded as an outsider by the
officer corps.69
On October 5, 1895 Major General Nelson A. Miles
replaced Schofield as commanding general. Born in
Westminster, Massachusetts in 1839, he volunteered for
Civil War service in 1861. Appointed first as captain he
rose in rank to major general by 1865 and received the
Congressional Medal of Honour for bravery in action at
Chancellorsville. After the war he remained in the army,
and became a colonel in the infantry in July 1866. Miles
spent the next fifteen years in the West,
reputation as an Indian fighter.

acquiring a

In 1880 he was promoted

to brigadier general and ten years later became once more
Major General Miles. Unlike Bliss and other army
reformers,

Miles was a decorated Civil War veteran and

Indian fighter and was not viewed as an "academic" who
merely wrote books about others'

exploits.70

An

exceptionally fine regimental commander, Miles had no
respect for civilians, was brave, ambitious, vain, and
blunt. He never attended West Point or any service school
and had no interest in the military ideas of Germany or
France which he regarded as irrelevant to the unique
American experience.

Intensely proud of his promotion to

commanding general - a post held by George Washington,
Ulysess S. Grant, William T. Sherman and others - he had
no intention

of supporting any military reform which
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placed the commanding general under the secretary of
war.71 Relations between the commanding general and the
secretary of war and staff bureaus returned to acrimonious
bickering and divisiveness.
Unlike Miles, many army officers had no faith in the
state militias or hastily organised volunteers as
effective fighting forces. Schofield, Hazen, and Upton
remembered the combat failures of such forces in the Civil
War. Younger officers such as Carter, Bliss, and Wagner,
graduates of West Point,

increasingly regarded the army as

a "profession" and opposed "volunteerism." The National
Guard, however, remained fundamental to Democrats faithful
to the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson. The Guard
represented provincial volunteerism as opposed to central
control and professionalism.

It also provided state

political officials, who often appointed senior officers,
with powers of patronage.

In 1879 the National Guard

Association was created; throughout the 1880s and 1890s it
portrayed the militia as a popular West Point,

able to

counter professional regulars who might usurp the
government.

The argument proved popular and found sympathy

in Congress, which doubled Federal appropriations for the
Guard while questioning the very need for a standing
a r m y .72
'*
Regular army officers v/ere appalled at the support
given to the Guard, which they regarded as an
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unprofessional and inefficient organisation. Colonel J. P.
Sanger, who had accompanied Upton on his world tour,
summed up the condition of the militia when he wrote:
.... In none of the states are there schools for
officers and non-commissioned officers .... In
forty-two states, the company officers are elected
by the men; in Connecticut, "on the recommendation
of the company," in West Virginia, Montana, and
Wisconsin, the second lieutenants are elected by the
men; in New Hampshire, company officers are nominated
by field officers; in Washington, upon petition of
the majority. In thirty-five states, company officers
were examined for appointment; in ten, they are not
Sanger continued:

"cognizant of the practice of electing

militia officers

... then it is not worth while to expect

good discipline,

or instruction,

in the National Guard."

He further criticised the lack of drill,

target practice,

and standardised equipment, concluding that the volunteer
system was a "broken reed."73 Despite these failings the
National Guard,

and the concept of a volunteer army in

times of national emergency, retained the powerful
ideological and political backing of the Democratic Party
and state politicians.
By 1898 most officers still failed to recognise the
significance of the technological,

professional and

managerial revolutions at home or the importance of the
new commercial competition abroad. The creation of
professional associations,

new service schools and a

Military Information Division with military attaches
around the world, had little effect on aging Civil War
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veterans in far-flung Western outposts.

Younger officers,

imbued with new ideas of professionalism had no authority
to reform the army. The efforts of Sherman,
Schofield,

Sheridan,

and Upton had failed; as the Spring of 1898

arrived, with the possibility of war, the army remained
weak and divided.
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CHAPTER TWO
"NO END OF A LESSON;88 AMERICA AND THE
SPANISH - AMERICAN WAR
On April 25, 1898 the United States declared war on
Spain. By the end of August, America had defeated Spain
and acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii,

Guam, and Manila

in the Philippines. Despite the previous expansion of
American commercial interests into Hawaii and some
enthusiasm for acquiring Samoa, these overseas
acquisitions marked a radical departure from the American
past. The United States was transformed from a continental
state,

stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific,

into a

country with new responsibilities far overseas.
President McKinley only reluctantly agreed to war.
The civil war in Cuba, which provoked an inept Spanish
reaction,

compelled the President to demand that Spain

vacate the island.1 Unsuccessful rebellions against
Spanish rule had occurred in 1868,
February 24,

1878, and again on

1895. The underlying cause remained the same:

poverty created by Spanish corruption and mismanagement.
Throughout the late 1890s Cuban rebels like Thomas Estrada
visited America to raise money and support for the
insurgents. These men claimed the war as their American
revolution and struggle for freedom.2 Spain responded by
mobilising several hundred thousand troops, who failed to
defeat Cuban forces,

and suffered 100,000 casualties.
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Dysentery,

typhoid, and malaria incapacitated 50,000 men,

while 50,000 more were battlefield casualties.3 In January
1896, General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, was appointed as
the new Spanish commander.
The policies implemented by Weyler prevented McKinley
from following the policy of strict neutrality adopted by
his predecessor Grover Cleveland.4 General Weyler ordered
the construction of elaborate lines of barbed wire and
guard houses across Cuba to prevent rebel movement. His
most controversial policy, however, was "Reconcentration,"
which involved the forced removal of rural populations
into armed camps. Weyler ordered anyone found outside the
camps to be considered hostile and shot. Weyler's troops
systematically destroyed Cuban agriculture and village
life. The overcrowded camps housing the displaced
population lacked food and water.

Extensively reported in

America, Weyler's exploits earned him the titles,

"Human

Hyena" and "The Butcher," in the national and local
press.5 Thousands died in General Weyler's camps; his
policy created famine, yet failed to break the rebels or
produce peace.

In sparsely populated, mountainous eastern

Cuba, guerrilla forces moved freely in substantial
numbers. Only around Havana did Spanish troops exert any
control. Weyler's strategy scattered his forces throughout
Cuba, destroyed local agriculture,

and made his forces

dependent upon supplies from Spain and alienated American
public opinion.6
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In America, despite the deterioration in U.S.Spanish relations, the army failed to plan for any
conflict. The army remained at its lowest numerical level
since before the Civil War and Secretary of War Russell
Alger and Commanding General Nelson Miles paralysed army
command with their struggle over its control.

In 1897

Alger, thoroughly sick of Miles, ordered him to observe
the Greco-Turkish War and attend Queen Victoria's Jubilee
•

•

7

just to get him out of W ashington . ' In contrast, the Naval
War College planned for war with Spain in 1895, encouraged
by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.

By

1898 the navy, unlike the army, had detailed plans for
operations against Spain in the Pacific, Atlantic and
Caribbean.8 Under increasing domestic pressure to respond
to events in Cuba, McKinley demanded that Spain enter into
negotiations with the guerrillas and create a time-table
for Cuban independence.
Germany was irritated by this new American interest
in the Caribbean. Already at odds with the Anglo-Americans
over control of Samoa in the Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm II
threatened:
It is high time that we other monarchies ... agree
jointly to offer help to the Queen, [of Spain],
.... in case the American-British Society for
International Theft and Warmongering looks as if it
seriously intends to snatch Cuba from Spain.^
In November,

1897 British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice,
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warned Theodore Roosevelt of the German wish to expand
commercially in the Caribbean and the unenthusiastic
response in Berlin to any suggested American involvement
in Cuba.10 In the spring of 1898, civil war broke out in
Samoa, between the Anglo-American and German backed
natives, which underlined an increasing Anglo-American
understanding.

The tripartite agreement over the islands,

established in the Berlin Act of 1889, was broken. A new
agreement was proposed: Germany gained Samoa, America
received the islands of Pago Pago, and the British took
Tonga and the Solomon Islands.11
In mid-January 1898, supporters of Spanish colonial
rule and General Weyler rioted in Havana, wrecking Cuban
newspapers and businesses that supported the American
reform process. The incident angered McKinley and
Congress, with the result that the battleship U.S.S. Maine
was dispatched to Havana on January 25, 1898 to prevent
further lawlessness. On February 9, the New York Journal
published a personal letter intercepted by Cuban rebels
from the Spanish premiere, Dupuy de Lome, to a friend in
Cuba. The letter criticised American interference in Cuba,
and described McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the
admiration of the crowd, besides being a would be
politician who tries to leave the door open behind himself
while keeping on good terms with the jingoes."12 Many
Americans,

furious at this insult to the President,
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demanded an immediate apology. The late and half-hearted
nature of the Spanish response only caused more resentment
towards Spain. The U.S.S. Maine arrived in Havana and
anchored inside the harbour. On the night of February 16,
1898, the Maine blew up; 262 officers and men were killed.
American public opinion was shocked, while American
newspapers speculated the U.S.S. Maine had been
deliberately sunk.13 Congress,

infuriated by the "McKinley

letter" and the destruction of the Maine,

listened angrily

to Senator Redfield Proctor denounce Spanish tyranny on
his return from a visit to Cuba.

In a moving speech,

Proctor described the conditions in Cuba and the shame
inflicted on American people for permitting such
atrocities so close to home.14
Congress unanimously increased defence expenditure by
$50 million and called on McKinley to take stronger action
against Spain.15 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who endorsed
a Darwinian model - of inevitable world competition and
conflict over limited resources - joined those imbued with
Josiah Strong's missionary zeal in sweeping aside
McKinley's caution.

Even William Jennings Bryan approved

the Congressional defence appropriation on the basis of
protecting American honour and Cuban welfare.16 Bryan
claimed that America was helping a friend in need, but he
warned Republicans, who favoured overseas expansion,
history would only vindicate America if it upheld the

that
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principles of freedom and self- determination.

It would be

hypocritical and greedy if a war justified on the basis of
humanity became a war of conquest.

In a clear warning to

Neo-Hamiltonian supporters such as Hay and Lodge, he
attacked those who dreamed of empire around the globe and
claimed enduring happiness was based upon a homogeneous
people with free and democratic government.17
On April 22, 1898, the United States implemented a
naval blockade on Cuba and two days later formally
declared war on Spain. The demand for war swept aside any
protest.

In the House of Representatives Speaker Thomas B.

Reed, who opposed war,

summed up the feelings among

congressmen, when asked by Vice-President Hobart why he
had not dissuaded his colleagues. He responded,
them!

"Dissuade

.... He might as well ask me to stand out in a

Kansas waste and dissuade a cyclone." Such was the desire
for w a r . 18 The United States army of 24,000 regulars
confronted a Spanish army in Cuba of 150,000 men supported
by 80,000 Cuban loyalists. The Spanish forces, however,
were demoralised by three years of guerrilla warfare and
tropical disease.

In these years 13,000 troops died from

yellow fever, and by 1898 one quarter of all troops were
hospitalised with dysentery, typhoid,
Despite these problems,

and yellow fever.

Spanish forces in Cuba heavily

outnumbered American land forces.19
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The navy, unlike the army, had planned for war. On
April 30, 1898, Commodore Dewey, commander of the American
Asiatic Squadron,

entered Manila Bay and sank the entire

Spanish pacific fleet. Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant
secretary of the navy, encouraged this prompt action.
Sympathetic to Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he supported the
view that American victory in the Philippines would
encourage U.S.-Asiatic trade. American control of the
archipelago would provide new markets,

raw materials,

and

a base to exploit the increasing weakness of China
regarded as an important future market.

In the late 1890s

large areas of China had been seized by foreign powers:
Japan acquired Formosa; Russia seized the Liaotung
Peninsula and Port Arthur; France took Kwangchow Bay;
Germany occupied Kiaochow; and Great Britain seized Weihai-wei.20 America,

through Roosevelt's action,

now

claimed the Philippines. The rapid action in the
Philippines circumvented the Teller Amendment, designed by
Bryan and other anti-imperialists to prevent America
claiming sovereignty overseas. Added to an army
appropriation bill, the Teller Amendment applied only to
Cuba, not to the Philippines, which now could be legally
seized by American forces.
Initially,

the army expected the war to be a naval

contest, with only small invasions to aid rebel forces in
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. However,

even this

limited role exposed the complacency and inefficiency of
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the post-Civil War army. Despite the naval victory by
Dewey, many Americans in coastal cities feared Spanish
naval shelling of their homes.

Congressmen demanding

protection for their constituents discovered that the
recommendations of the Endicott Board, and young reformminded officers like Bliss had been largely ignored.
According to one artillery officer, only 151 heavy guns
and mortars were mounted and ready for action, out of the
2,000 recommended by Endicott,
Miles,

Bliss and others. General

an early critic of the war, proclaimed Washington

D.C. defenceless, while the Ordnance Department informed
Congress that each coastal gun had only twenty rounds of
ammunition.21 Congress responded quickly to public
pressure from coastal communities and approved an
ambitious coastal defence scheme.
The proposal by McKinley for a larger standing army,
received less support in Congress. The National Guard,
state politicians,

and congressional Democrats combined to

defeat plans for a larger professional army. The
traditions of volunteerism, provincial political control
and local identity remained strong. Representative George
B. McClellan and General Miles both introduced plans to
expand the professional army. McKinley's administration,
however,

supported legislation proposed by House Military

Affairs Committee Chairman, John A . T . Hull.
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Hull, a Republican from Iowa, was a powerful member
of the House of Representatives who chaired the military
affairs committee for ten years.22 The "Hull Bill"
proposed an army of 27,000 men, arranged to expand quickly
to a force of 104,000 regulars, organised in threebattalion regiments as recommended by Emory Upton. The
bill ignored controversial organisational reforms and was
supported by all segments of the professional army
including Secretary of War Alger, Commanding General
Miles,

and Adjutant General Henry Corbin. Despite this

rare unanimity in the professional army, Hull's
legislation was defeated in the House by 155 votes to
61.23 The National Guard,
Congress,

state politicians,

and most of

continued to support the locally controlled

volunteer against the federal professional. The principle
of a volunteer army was reaffirmed and in the words of
Representative Hull:
The opinions of Grant, Sherman, Schofield and Miles
did not have the slightest weight when put in the
balance against an officer in the state militia. The
great generals had no votes, the militia officers had
votes back of him with which to enforce his
d e mands.24
The failure of the bill reflected the antipathy of
many Americans to a standing army.

Indeed the minority

report by the House Military Affairs Committee, which
represented the views of Democratic members,

bluntly

asserted:
Such an army is not necessary to be maintained in
the country now, neither because of our relations
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to the islands [Cuba and Puerto Rico] nor because
of any necessity which has arisen in the country
itself.
The report reminded Americans that "the” dangers and evils
of
"the

a standing army are many and well recognised" and that
one proposed in the Hull Bill would in time of peace

be

a menace to the liberty of the citizen." The hostility

to

a professional army even produced claims

that it would

"desecrate the ballot box." The report by four Democrats
concluded by recommending a standing army of under 30,000
men. 25
On April 22,

1898 a compromise bill was signed into

law. The President was authorised to raise an army of
120,000

men.

In a major concession to the National Guard

half of the newly created force would be local militia.26
The legislation endorsed none of the changes suggested by
nineteenth-century army reformers,

and Congress limited

the duration of the proposed increase by requiring all
volunteers to be released in 1899.

Ideas of provincial

independence had defeated the attempt to create a
professional army controlled by a central authority.
National Guard units continued to elect junior officers
while state governors asserted their patronage by
appointing middle-ranking and senior militia officers.
Many Civil War veterans,

including Schofield,

pressed

McKinley not to repeat Abraham Lincoln's mistake of
mobilising too few men early in the war. National Guard
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officers warned the President that they would not act
unless all units were mobilised in any state called for
volunteers. On April 23, McKinley yielded to this advice
and,

ignoring the terms of the Hull Bill, called for

60,000 regulars and 125,000 volunteers.27
Many army officers became increasingly hostile to the
assertive and politically powerful National Guard, a body
they regarded as unprofessional and ineffective.

Comments

made by Captain R.K. Evans reflected the antagonism in the
regular army towards the militia.

In a prize-winning

essay, he described the Battle of Bladensburg in the
Revolutionary War, when a small British force of regulars
routed a large American volunteer force in good defensive
positions. He brusquely concluded:

"this incident shows

that no reliance can be placed on raw levies, hastily
assembled, without time to acquire discipline or learn
their duties as soldiers."28 The conflict with Spain fully
justified such concerns.
In the army, relations between Miles and Alger
continued to deteriorate. Miles was appalled at the rapid
increase in the size of the army and continued to voice
opposition to the war. Alger was increasingly confident in
the army's ability to succeed and so enthusiastically
endorsed proposed invasion plans.

In the tradition of von

Moltke in Germany and of Grant in the Civil War, Miles
asserted his right to unrestricted army command free from
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political control,

a demand dismissed by McKinley. His

abrasive manner and ambition for high political office
increasingly isolated him in the War Department. As early
as 1895, the then secretary of war Daniel Lamont was
obliged to remind Miles of his position in the
administration:
To the many newspaper correspondents who have
called on me today to inquire concerning a reported
interview with you which appears in the Tribune of
today and a statement printed in the Mail and Express
each evening I have been obliged to decline to make
any expression and I write to suggest you follow the
same course.
I think I explained to you that no order can
be made until I hear further from the President and
it has not been his habit to announce his purpose to
the press in advance of action itself....^9
The ambitions of the commanding general and his
opposition to the war left him isolated and frustrated
within the administration.

In April 1898 he issued sound

military advice on the problems of invading Cuba: the
dangers of disease,

the task of maintaining naval

supremacy around Cuba, and the difficulties in supplying
the army overseas.30 McKinley was greatly disappointed in
Miles.

Under domestic political pressure to act decisively

and aware of the possibility of European intervention, he
wanted a plan of action,

not reasons for inaction. The

administration ignored Miles and his advice. Neither
"Major" McKinley nor Alger knew enough about the army to
direct it without advice.

Increasingly,

they relied on

Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, who controlled the
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bureau which issued army orders. The Adjutant General
became a de facto chief

of staff.

Corbin was born in Ohio in 1842. He volunteered for
combat in the Civil War and fought with the Army of the
Cumberland in Tennessee, Georgia,

and Alabama.

By 1866 he

was a colonel of volunteers and regular army captain.
Appointed a company commander he spent the next ten years
on garrison duty in the

South-West.

In 1880 he was

promoted to major in the adjutant general's office in
Washington D.C.31 In Washington he soon became friends
with the influential Ohio lobby and profited from its
political connections, which included President Rutherford
B. Hayes,

future President James A. Garfield,

and

McKinley. All three men liked Corbin, relied upon his
advice,

and took an active interest in his military

career.32 In February 1898 after serving eighteen years in
the adjutant general's office he was appointed adjutant
general. A domineering figure,

six feet two in height,

solidly built, with a full moustache, he was an impeccable
professional, who detested the amateur soldier and
political opportunist.

He faced an arduous task in

mobilising the army for war.
In the words of Alger:

"After 33 years of peace,

during the greater part of which the army did not exceed
26,000 men,

it suddenly became necessary to arm,

feed, and

equip more than a quarter of a million men . " 33 The demands
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of war quickly overwhelmed the War Department and its
bureaus,

and exposed the lack of Army intelligence,

or

staff system. The army had no pre-planned campaign of
military action,

and little intelligence on the Spanish

army.
Major General Arthur MacArthur,

a divisional

commander in Major General Wesley Merritt's force to
invade the Philippines, described the woeful intelligence:
It was my privilege to join Eighth Corps at San
Francisco in June 1898, and on the 27th of that
month I started for Manila in command of the third
detachment of the Corps, consisting of five ships
and approximately 5,000 men. Aside from the high
spirits and feelings of self-confidence which
actuated all concerned, the distinctive
characteristic of the command was the absolute
ignorance of the Philippine Archipelago, in respect
of geography, climate, people and the general aspects
of nature.
There was little or no literature aboard from
which instructive information could be obtained. One
writer to whom we had access advised all travellers
to carry coffins, as few returned alive from Manila.
Another and more optimistic writer cited an Eastern
epigram to the effect that for romance and adventure
the entire Eastern world relied upon Manila. These
two facts constituted about all we could learn by
investigation .... 34
In addition to this lack of basic information,

other

problems in Washington seriously impeded efficient
planning for war. The War Department was besieged by
office seekers and reporters, who quickly relayed every
detail of American war plans to the outside world.35 In
order to expedite interviews with office seekers,
withdrew all chairs from his office,

Corbin

save his own, and
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kept all those seeking patronage standing in front of his
desk. The Adjutant General frequently called meetings at
three in the morning to avoid the crowded War Department
hall-ways the crush of reporters those wishing to promote
themselves and interfering congressmen. William Jennings
Bryan was among those who offered his services and
McKinley reluctantly approved his commission. He was
appointed colonel of a regiment of Nebraska volunteer
infantry. Corbin made sure that the leading Democratic
politician was given no opportunity to become a war hero,
and his regiment was assigned to a mosquito-filled camp on
the St. John's River in Florida.36
The mobilisation of the National Guard was a
calamity. Almost half the guardsmen refused to leave home
for an extended length of time and were replaced with
hastily assembled volunteers. Most state troops were
equipped with Springfield rifles,

a single-shot,

breech

loader, using charcoal powder, which created a large cloud
of dust when fired, revealing one's position to the enemy.
These Springfield rifles were poorly maintained,
often exploded in the user's face when fired.

old, and

Less than

half of National Guard officers had attended an
instructional course,

and even fewer had passed a formal

command examination.37 Training for the enlisted men
consisted of weekly company drills,
regimental drills during the week,

supplemented by
or ten days of summer
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camp. Little time was devoted to target practice since
ammunition was in short supply. This inadequate training,
however, was more than the replacement volunteers
received.
While the National Guard struggled with mobilisation,
Alger and Miles continued to argue. Alger openly resented
Miles and dismissed his abilities asserting that,

"many of

the General's proposals were obviously impracticable,

and

not infrequently impossible."38 The lack of planning and
proper command procedures promoted inter-service rivalry
between Admiral William T. Sampson and General William R.
Shafter,

the commanders for an invasion of Cuba.39

Shafter,

a friend of both McKinley and Alger, was

appointed to command the army attacking Cuba after Miles
refused to go. A grossly fat, short-legged man, he
displayed all the faults of a late nineteenth-century
career officer. An aging Civil War veteran, promoted
through the seniority system, he had spent the years since
the Civil War in sedentary garrison posts.

Shafter was

neither physically nor mentally equipped to command the
expedition to Cuba.

In describing his physical condition,

the chief commissary officer stated:
miles in an hour,

"he couldn't walk two

just beastly obese."40 The lack of

further educational facilities in the military had
prevented Shafter from acquiring the necessary theoretical
knowledge to command an army. The dispersed state of the
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army since the Civil War prevented any practical training
with units larger than a regiment.

Shafter,

like many of

his senior colleagues, was the product of a neglected
system.
The army was further handicapped by the choice of
Tampa Bay,

Florida as the main embarkation port for the

invasion of Cuba. Although closer to Cuba than any other
U.S. port, Tampa had several fundamental flaws. Unlike New
York,

Charleston, Mobile,

or New Orleans, Tampa was not a

deep water port and relied on a single mile-long pier to
service ocean-going shipping.

Florida was largely an

undeveloped land of swamp and pine forests,
snakes,

insects,

filled with

and disease throughout much of the state.

Significantly, Tampa was served by only one rail link.
Galveston,

Savannah, Mobile, Wilmington N.C.,

and

Charleston all had more than four rail links. New Orleans
had eighteen rail links, which provided extensive access
to the northeast and midwest.41 The choice of Tampa was
made by Alger, after conversations with both General Miles
and Morton F. Plant. Plant owned the main railroad from
South Carolina to Florida and the only railroad which
served Tampa.
was overruled,

Corbin, who recommended the use of New York,
and wrote sadly of the decision:

Mr. Plant, of the railroad system bearing his name
persuaded the Secretary of War that Tampa was the
place and his railroad was competent to handle the
army and all its supplies. It proved that neither
was true .... The moving of a large army only
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meant plenty of traffic to him. His ability to do
it he did not doubt, only he did not realize what
he was undertaking. That was not all. Secretary
Alger had all the confidence in his judgement and
ability, and that was a misplaced confidence, one
that I never shared with him .... He believed in Mr.
Plant, no one could move him from his confidence in
his judgement.I shall always think that all in all
Tampa was the very worst place one could have
assembled this force.42
General Miles added to administration problems by a
series of ill-timed press leaks and the use of his office
to augment his income.

In April,

1898 Dr. W.H. Daly,

a

member of General Miles's staff and close personal friend,
wrote to several companies in Pennsylvania that Miles was
in financial difficulties.

Six companies each advanced

$5000 to the General,

in return, he recommended them

and,

for War Department contracts.4 - Miles received money from
Mr. Plant in Florida,

in return for which the General made

seven requests to Secretary Alger to establish a camp for
10,000

soldiers near Miami,

Florida,

a camp supplied by

the Plant railroad. Alger relied on the recommendation
from Miles and no survey of the camp was carried out.

It

was later discovered that the camp was situated on a coral
reef,

only two feet above sea-level and was surrounded.by

thick forest with no clearings for drill.

In July 1898 the

camp was closed.44
The full extent of corruption in the office of the
commanding general was outlined a year later by a report
compiled by Colonel Wra. H. Carter who estimated probable
corruption in purchases worth over $1 million. He wrote:
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Incredible as it may seem these official reports
show among other things, that General Miles
recommended the purchase of one type of gun, which
had been tried by the Board of which he was
President, had exploded with disastrous results and
that not with standing this fact, he officially
informed the Secretary ... that the trial
demonstrated high explosives could be thrown by them
with perfect safety.
Carter criticised the attempt by Miles to replace the
standard issue Krag-Jorgensen rifle with a Winchester
rifle of inferior quality and concluded:
The reports of the Chiefs of Ordnance upon General
Mile's various positions will make it clear, why,
at a very early stage in the war, it became
absolutely necessary to question General Miles in
matters he should have known all about.45
Despite these problems,
across America,

army camps were established

and an invasion force began to assemble at

Tampa. On April 29 General Shafter arrived in Tampa with
the first 6,000 troops and after a further evaluation of
the probable dangers,
40,000 troops,

McKinley authorised a force of

to be sent to Tampa in early May . 46

The arguement for an active life demanded physical
activity to counter weakness in martial spirit caused by
urbanisation.

Roosevelt,

eager to follow this idea,

resigned as assistant secretary of the navy to become a
lieutenar.t-colonel in the first volunteer cavalry.

Deeply

involved in strategic naval planning Roosevelt was
appalled at the confusion he experienced while in the
army. Neither the army nor the navy had the shipping to
conduct an invasion. The Quartermaster's Department
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struggled just to assemble thirty-eight chartered vessels
at Tampa,
barges,

a motley fleet of steam lighters, a collier,

a tug and two hastily converted hospital ships:

the "John Englis" and the "Olivette." The whole fleet
could carry only 16,000 men and a limited amount of
equipment, well below the force of 40,000 authorised by
the President.47 The immediate problems of training and
supply increased with embarkation, which underlined both
the lack of staff planning and inadequate resources
available to the army. Roosevelt was disgusted and wrote
to his friend,

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, describing the

shambles in Tampa:
There are hundreds of freight cars containing
stores of all kinds which nobody knows anything
about, and the line is so jammed that it is
impossible to move as fast as the muletrains go
alongside .... On the wharf not one shadow of
preparation had been made to receive any regiment,
no transportation had been assigned in advance, and
there was actually no office for either the
Commissary or Quartermaster

....48

By May 8, 1898, over 1,000 freight cars were stranded
between Charleston and Tampa, while on the pier only two
or three freight cars could be unloaded each day. The army
and Mr. Plant had not agreed on any specific loading
schedule,

and there were frequently no invoices for the

railroad wagons. Nobody had any idea what was on each
train or what had priority. The hot and humid weather
added to everybody's discomfort. When troops discovered
that less than half the force could be carried on waiting
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FIGURE 1

The Philippines in 1902
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ships, they illegally seized ships to ensure their
participation in the invasion. These men were crowded
aboard ill-designed transports for eight days in hot,
humid weather, before they eventually set sail.49
The preparations for the invasion of the Philippines,
under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt, were
much more successful. He organised an effective
expeditionary force despite having to sail 7,000 miles
from California to a land defended by 20,000 Spanish
soldiers. Unlike Shafter, Merritt had experience
commanding divisional forces in the Civil War, was
physically fitter than Shafter, and enjoyed the benefits
of San Francisco's deep-water harbour and rail links.
Despite this successful organisation of forces the attempt
to invade and hold the Philippines proved disastrous. The
islands occupied 114,000 square miles and were larger than
all U.S. states and territories except Alaska, Texas,
California, Montana,

and New Mexico. There were over 7,000

islands in the archipelago with over 1,000 were inhabited,
(see Figure 1). Encountering nearly seven million people
and seven main language groups, Merritt's force of 10,000
men would prove wholly inadequate.50 On May 3, 1898, NeoHamiltonian Republican John Hay, U.S. ambassador to Great
Britain,

strongly recommended McKinley approve the

annexation of Hawaii.

Such a move would prevent Germany

from linking Hawaii with either Samoa or the Philippines
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in any future negotiations. The American ambassador
indicated tacit British support for such a measure,
through his contacts with the Foreign Office.51 On June
15, 1898 Hawaii was formally annexed by Meritt's force en
route to Manila. Hawaii would provide a secure forward
base for the invasion of the Philippines.52
On June 22,

1898, American forces landed at Daiquri,

a small village harbour in Cuba, and quickly seized the
neighbouring harbour of Siboney. Both villages were merely
breaks in the steep shoreline cliffs and offered neither
piers nor wharfs to the invaders. Fortunately, the landing
encountered no Spanish resistance,

as the American forces

had no landing craft: troops swam and waded half a mile
through heavy surf to get ashore. Even more fortunately
the Spanish commander, General Arsenio Linares,

insisted

on scattering his troops throughout Cuba, a policy which
gave the American forces local superiority despite their
overall numerical inferiority.53 The supply bureaus,
confronted with the shambles in Tampa, a shortage of
shipping,

and the non-existent harbour facilities in Cuba,

struggled to provide even basic necessities to the army in
the field. These supply problems were compounded by the
Cuban rainy season, which started just days after the
invasion and which turned dirt roads into thick mud
virtually stopping all supplies to front line troops.
Roosevelt bitterly described these staff and supply
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failures, while besieging Santiago in July,

1898:

The mismanagement has been beyond belief .... We are
half starved; and our men are sickening daily. The
lack of transportation, food, and artillery has
brought us to the very edge of disaster; but
above all the lack of any leadership, of any
system or executive capacity.54
Three weeks into the campaign, men still had no
shelter tents and were soaked by the daily rains.55 In
Washington D.C., Miles and Alger continued to bicker,
diverting attention from the chronic problems in Cuba. The
Commanding General insisted that the steel shields he had
devised, which weighed over a 1000 pounds and moved on
long steel axles,

should be shipped to Cuba. Over 200 of

the shields had been manufactured,

and several were

shipped to Cuba, taking valuable space on troop
transports. They proved to be utterly useless on mudfilled Cuban trails.56
The army had twelve staff bureaus, all accountable to
the secretary of war, who invariably had no knowledge of
army organisation. The bureaus normally handled the
administration of an army of 25,000 men, not the 250,000
mobilised for war with Spain. Army supply was controlled
by three bureaus with no overall coordination. The largest
staff bureau was the Quartermaster's Department,
responsible for clothing, tentage, wagons, horses and
transportation for troops.

The Commissary Department

provided food for the troops, while the Subsistence
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Department delivered accessories such as candles,

oil and

salt. The Signal Bureau managed army communications,

and

the Medical Bureau oversaw all aspects of health,
including the supply of medicines. The Pay Department paid
the troops. The Engineer Corps controlled civil and
military construction projects. The Judge-Advocate's
Office was the legal office for the army and secretary of
war. The Inspector General's Office conducted examinations
into all aspects of army operations. Lastly, the Adjutant
General's Office,

commanded by Corbin,

issued all army

orders and held many army records. Alger and Miles proved
incapable of exercising authority over this complex
system. Corbin, was left the impossible task of
coordinating army staff functions, performing as a one-man
general staff. The result was independent action by staff
bureaus, which created considerable chaos. Captain Edmund
Rice, a member of Shafter's Staff,

summed up the confusion

in a telegram to the War Department:

"Expected 275 reserve

troops for Shafter in Cuba. Commissary Department mistakes
led to 23,000 lbs. of potatoes instead."57
The Inspector General's Office provided little
information on staff failures.

Inspector General Joseph C.

Breckinridge, the senior officer, disliked Corbin and
supported Miles. He left his bureau with no orders when he
took a field command in Cuba.58 His actions deprived
McKinley's administration of crucial information on the
poor state of army training,

supply and shelter.
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Despite these problems, by early July, American
forces had laid siege to Santiago. Admiral Cervera,
commander of the Spanish Caribbean Fleet, was forced to
sail and was convincingly defeated by the U.S. navy. This
second decisive victory over Spanish naval power doomed
Spanish forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico, who were dependent
upon supplies from Spain. General Miles, having been
largely ignored in Washington, accepted the chance to
command the invasion of Puerto Rico. Miles organised an
effective invasion force that left from Charleston and New
York and met with little Spanish resistance. On July 17,
1898 the large Spanish garrison in Santiago surrendered to
American forces, while in the Pacific General Merritt
seized the island of Guam, as his forces headed towards
Manila in the Philippines.59
By mid-August all Spanish forces had surrendered in
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and Manila. American battlefield
casualties were relatively light:

294 servicemen killed

and 121 wounded. A further seventy-three died in various
accidents,

including forty-eight who drowned struggling

ashore through the surf in Cuba.60 More servicemen drowned
than were killed by Spanish fire during the landings in
Cuba. These unnecessary deaths due to the lack of proper
shipping were, however,

secondary to the 2565 deaths

caused by disease. Death through illness was five times
more common than battlefield fatalities.61
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Brigadier General George Miller Sternberg commanded
the Medical Bureau. A kind, German Lutheran he had
attended Columbia Medical School and joined the regular
army medical department in 1861. He served extensively as
a field surgeon, became a pioneer in public health,

and

conducted research into the causes of yellow fever. His
work was admired by Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister. He
founded the Army Medical School to improve training of
surgeons established new schools for the Hospital Corps
and introduced biological laboratories to hospitals.62
Yet, despite Sternberg,

army health care collapsed during

the war. There was no General Staff to direct the
allocation of resources to the greatest need, while
medical supply faced the same chaotic system as other
stores. Roosevelt outlined the problem to Lodge:
Even now with Santiago taken and our ships in the
bay and with a month in which to have gotten ample
transportation, food, and medical supplies our
condition is horrible in every respect. I have
over one hundred men down with fever in my own
camp out of my regiment of four hundred, two
hundred having previously died or having been sent
to rear hospitals. The mismanagement of the hospital
service in the rear has been such that my men will
not leave the regiment if they can possibly help it;
yet here we have nothing for them but hardtack, bacon
and generally coffee without sugar. I cannot get even
oatmeal without paying for it myself .... The
engineers and artillery have done poorly and the
hospital division even worse. But the prime
difficulty has been the lack of transportation,
including the means to land from ships.63
Shafter wrote to the War Department, describing the
condition of thousands of troops who needed medicine,
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while all the field hospitals could provide for eleven
days was a supply of quinine.64 Thankfully, victory was
close at hand.
In Washington, the disgruntled Miles believed a
conspiracy had denied him the credit for victory and thus
began collecting details of army failures.
Corbin that Miles and his friends,

Shafter warned

Inspector General

Breckinridge and Colonel Waugher, were gathering
information to discredit the army's performance in Cuba.65
Army surgeon W.H. Daly, a member of Miles's staff, began
collecting information on the unpopular and frequently
inedible, tinned beef ration.66
In the Philippines, while Spanish forces vacated the
islands, the alliance between Filipino nationalists and
the U.S. army remained intact. On August 12, 1898 America
and Spain signed a peace protocol in Paris. The American
negotiating team consisted of two Neo-Hamiltonian
imperialists,

Senator William Frye and the diplomat

Whitelaw Reid; two limited imperialists,

Senator Cushman

Davis and former Secretary of State William Day; and anti
imperialist Democratic Senator George Gray. McKinley,

at

best a reluctant expansionist, hoped this negotiating team
could ensure tangible territorial gains to offset any
criticism of war management. The American representatives
were instructed to press for recognition of U.S. claims to
Guam, Puerto Rico, a coaling station in Cuba, and
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occupation of strategic points in the Philippines.
early Autumn of 1898 the commander of U.S.

In the

forces in the

Philippines, General Merritt, arrived in Paris to convince
the American negotiating team to demand the annexation of
all the Philippines. The conference remained deadlocked on
this new demand until December 10, 1898, when Spain agreed
to accept $20 million for the islands.67
Anti-imperialists were concerned by the American
decision to seize the Philippines. William Jennings Bryan
left his volunteer regiment,

still bivouacked in Florida,

to visit McKinley in Washington. He challenged the
President to disband all volunteer regiments and attacked
expansionism saying:

"They volunteered to break the yoke

of Spain in Cuba, and for nothing else. They did not
volunteer to ... subjugate other peoples or establish
United States sovereignty elsewhere."68
However,
Spencer,

the ideas of William Graham Sumner, Herbert

and Herbert Croly had grown in popularity in

America. Many people were now willing to endorse limited
imperialist goals. A Literary Digest poll of 192 editors
discovered that half favoured annexation of the
Philippines and that a further third supported U.S.
coaling rights in the islands.69 Within the Republican
Party, president McKinley and future president William
Howard Taft emphasised the new willingness to accept some
form of imperialism. Unlike true imperialists,

these
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limited imperialists,

believed that a limited period of

Western guidance would benefit other countries by allowing
them to achieve multi-party democracy and free market
capitalism.

Such figures relied on the teachings of Josiah

Strong and stressed the moral duty to help those who were
less fortunate. True imperialists, such as Hay, Lodge,

and

future army chief Leonard Wood, endorsed the racial
stereotyping of Social Darwinism,

and believed certain

peoples would always be incapable of self-government.
These views reflected the conclusions of Dewey,

Sumner,

and Croly, who believed that technology and business
expansion were the basis of all progress.70 Many important
people, however,

including Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain,

and William Jennings Bryan all remained opposed to any
overseas expansion.
Britain urged Ambassador Hay to insist that McKinley
retain the Philippines or give Britain first option in any
future sale.71 Popular British author Rudyard Kipling also
encouraged American expansion and wrote to Roosevelt,

the

Republican nominee for governor of New York:
I can't tell you how pleased I was to get your
letter or how sorry to see that you are nominated
for Governor this fall. Why not leave that sort of
skittles to Bryan and Co. and go in for being a
colonial administrator. God knows your country
will need'em pretty bad in a few years .... Now go
in and put all the weight of your influence into
hanging on permanently to the whole of the
Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pick-axe
into the foundations of a rotten house and she is
morally bound to build the house over again from the
foundations

,...72
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To examine all the issues related to the war McKinley
established the Dodge Commission under Civil War veteran
and railroad executive Grenville M. Dodge. The commission
convened on September 24, 1898 and consisted of twelve
Civil War veterans, many of whom were also successful
businessmen. The commission conducted five months of
hearings, which for a while, were followed closely by the
press. The testimony of General Miles, which attacked the
canned beef ration, caused the greatest public interest.73
Miles cited evidence surreptitiously gathered by his
friends, surgeon Major Daly and Lieut. Colonel M.P. Maus,
at Camp Thomas, that the tinned beef ration was treated
with boric acid, making it unhealthy for human
consumption.74 The allegations led to a separate inquiry
into the beef ration, publicity in the newspapers for
Miles, and the eventual court-martial of Commissary
General Patrick Eagen. Eagen, a hot-tempered Irish
immigrant, was enraged at the accusations levelled against
his department. He was charged with conduct unbecoming of
an officer before the Dodge Commission when he threatened
to pour the contents of the camp latrine down Miles's
throat. Corbin quietly recommended clemency for the
Commissary General to McKinley, and Eagen was retired on
full pay.75 The claims made by Miles,

later found to be

untrue, were typical of the strategems used by the
Commanding General to promote himself as a presidential
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candidate.76 Miles emphasised other issues in later years
to embarrass the incumbent administration and to promote
his own political goals, which only complicated relations
in the army high command.
In February,
findings.

1899 the Dodge Commission published its

It concluded that the failures in the staff

system were caused by an inept management structure, which
failed to provide contingency planning for future
conflict. The Inspector General's Office was criticised
for ignoring orders from the Secretary of War. Committee
members were particularly concerned by one event on May
17, .1898, when in response to public pressure over the
condition of army camps, Alger authorised an inspection.
The order was ignored when Miles claimed the right to
command inspections and countermanded the order by the
Secretary. The resulting squabble over jurisdiction of
command prevented the poor condition of many army camps
from being reported.77 Many Americans were most annoyed by
the poor medical treatment given to wounded soldiers. The
commission recommended the Medical Bureau be enlarged to
deal with an army four times its regular peacetime
strength.78 Army supply bureaus were criticised for being
unprepared and for failing to stockpile enough food,
wagons,

or money for soldier's pay.79 The divided command

structure of the army was noted by the committee,

and the

comments of General Schofield were published in the

75

report. The former Commanding General testified effective
army command depended on his willingness to act as chief
of staff to the secretary of war and president.80
Many staff officers believed that the application of
business values to the army would produce greater
efficiency and this idea proved popular with a committee
dominated by businessmen. The army signals chief,
Brigadier General Adolphus Greely, recommended the
amalgamation of the Inspector General's Department and
Adjutant General's Office to promote efficiency and a
centralised command. Greely further suggested the
unification of all supply bureaus under business
management principles.81 This suggestion which combined
the Quartermaster's Department,

Subsistence Department,

Commissary Department and Pay Bureau was not surprisingly
opposed by the members of those staff departments,

but

they also expressed their views in business terms.
Commissary General Eagen cited a current industrial debate
which highlighted the problems of placing too many
functions in one department.82
The eight-volume report of the Dodge Commission
produced little immediate impact when published.

Elihu

Root, however, was a close friend of commission chairman
Grenville Dodge. He later read the report, during his
first year as secretary of war and used its conclusions
.

t

.

.

O '?

when formulating his ideas on military reform.OJ
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The victory over Spain increased the army's military
commitments.

In Cuba and Puerto Rico the army was

responsible for establishing civil administration
including sanitation,
Philippines,

education, and commerce.

In the

the alliance between Filipino nationalists

and the American army ended, when the Paris conference
approved the American purchase of the islands. Fifty
thousand Filipino nationalists began hostilities against
the occupying American forces. The war quickly developed
into a nasty guerrilla war that lasted over three years
and caused more casualties than the Spanish-American
War.84 The Hull Bill, passed in 1898, established a larger
army based on volunteers who Were entitled to go home when
peace was concluded with Spain. The new demands of civil
administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico, emerging conflict
in the Philippines,

and manning of newly built coastal

batteries all required a larger permanent army.
A bitter debate began in Congress on the need for
creating such an army. The argument focused on those who
favoured the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian principles of a
locally controlled, volunteer force and those who proposed
a professional force under central command,

as championed

by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Bryan in a speech to an
enthusiastic crowd in Nebraska, took up the Democratic
challenge:
Our People defended Cuba against foreign arms, now
they must defend themselves and their country
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against foreign ideas - the colonial idea of
European nations. Heretofore greed has perverted the
government and used its instrumental interference for
private gain; but now the very fundamental principle
of our government is being assaulted. The Imperialist
idea was antagonistic to ideas and ideals cherished
since the writing of the Declaration of Independence.
We must refrain from entering a colonial policy or
abandon the doctrine that governments receive their
just powers from the consent of the governed. A house
divided against itself cannot stand, this nation
cannot endure half-republic and half-colony half-free and half-vassal.85
Lodge, Hay, Roosevelt and other Neo-Hamiltonian disciples
utterly rejected these ideas.
Social Darwinism,

Influenced by Spencer's

and Brooks Adams's economics, they

demanded an efficient military to protect American
overseas expansion. Colonial expansion was essential for
continued economic growth and American prosperity.
Congress started prolonged hearings on the need for a
larger army. These congressional hearings,
political debate,

and the wider

focussed on the centralisation of

political power. The argument highlighted the influence of
business and the concepts of "professionalism" and
"efficiency," in military reform. Quartermaster General
M . I . Luddington testified that he opposed the unification
of staff bureaus since,

"this was an age of specialities,"

while Dr. Thomas N. Jamieson argued that a new Army Bureau
of Pharmacy was required to recognise pharmaceutical
expertise.86 Commissary General Eagen underlined the
influence of business analogies when, commenting on the
amalgamation of supply bureaus, he

stated:

"Any
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businessman if he stops to consider what ... the
departments do will reach the same conclusion I have that each has enough to do."87
Adjutant General Corbin attacked amateur idealism and
stressed the importance of professional training in the
modern army.88 Schofield again called for a general-inchief appointed by the president to control staff bureaus
and the army line. Such an officer, would act as chief
adviser to the secretary of war and the president and
would be politically accountable.89 General Miles claiming
Corbin and Alger planned to "Imperialise" the army,
continued to defend the office of commanding general by
citing the common belief that the military success of von
Moltke, Grant, and others was due to their military
autonomy from political constraints. Miles argued that a
civilian secretary of war who held the post for an average
of two years was incapable of grasping the intricacies of
military management. The solution was to place all
military administration under the commanding general.90
McKinley despaired of getting any sweeping army
reform accepted and eventually approved a measure calling
for a larger army and ignoring the other problems. On
March 2, 1899 an act entitled "Increasing the Efficiency
of the Army" was passed by a partisan vote in Congress.
The act authorised an army of 65,000 men and allowed the
President to raise a further 3 5,000 volunteers, who would
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remain in service until July,

1901. A few minor reforms

were accepted as amendments to the act. An examination was
established for new second lieutenants,

and the number of

major generals in the regular army was increased to three.
The most significant reform was an extension of
presidential power: the appointment of volunteer officers
by the president, not the states.91
Increasingly concerned about public criticism of war
management, McKinley was, how e v e r , reluctant to force
either Miles or Alger to resign. He feared that any
prominent resignation would implicate his administration
in the military failures. Both men were also extremely
influential. Miles had many friends in Congress, was
related to the powerful Cameron family in Pennsylvania,
and was a senior member in the important Civil War
veterans association,

The Grand Army of the Republic.

Alger, the former governor of Michigan and business
millionaire,

enjoyed the friendship of many business

leaders including Cornelius Vanderbilt.
In June 1899 however, Alger's senatorial ambitions
became known. He allied himself with Michigan governor
Hazen Pingree, a man openly critical of McKinley's policy
in the Philippines. Unimpressed with Alger's war
management, McKinley decided to ask for his resignation.
On Sunday July 8, 1899 Vice President Garret A. Hobart
visited Alger and delivered the President's decision. The
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following day Alger resigned.92 He was at best only a
passable administrator unable to handle the ambitious
General Miles. Over-confident of the army's abilities,

and

unwilling to listen to professional advice, he was at
least partly responsible for the military shambles in the
war with Spain.
The army was now vastly different from when he took
office. The regular army had increased three fold; senior
officers John M. Wilson and Elwell S. Otis were proconsuls
in Cuba and the Philippines; and the army was engaged in a
large-scale guerrilla war in the Philippines. America had
acquired an empire that included Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
Guam, and Pago Pago. In the army many fundamental flaws
remained: the divided command structure,

ineffective

military education, promotion by strict seniority, poor
inter-service cooperation, and a badly trained National
Guard.

In the words of Rudyard Kipling, however,

some at

least had learned a lesson:
Let us admit it fairly, as a business people
should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end
of good.
It was our fault, and our very great fault - and now
we must turn it to use.
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not
a single excuse.
So the more we work and the less we talk the
better the results we shall get.
We have had an Imperial lesson. It may make us an
Empire yet!93
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CHAPTER THREE
EARLY ARMY REFORM AND THE
ELECTION OF 1900
Debate on army reform was encouraged, both by the
weaknesses that appeared in the American army in the
Spanish-American War and by the new colonial
responsibilities created by that war. Traditional American
political philosophy promoted trust in a volunteer army
with local political control and rejected the idea of
military preparedness. Military reform, which proposed a
strong central executive and large standing army,
challenged these assumptions. Neo-Hamiltonian politicians
endorsed this challenge,

encouraged by their belief that

increasing global competition for limited resources was
inevitable. Abroad,

the on-going guerrilla war in the

Philippines and the Boxer Rebellion in China kept army
reform at the centre of political debate. At home the
enduring admiration for business and its organisational
achievements ensured that corporate ideals would continue
to influence the debate on military reform.
The new secretary of war,
considerable challenge.

Elihu Root,

faced a

Born in 1845, he had grown up in a

world far removed from military service or its values. His
grandfather,

father,

and brother were all teachers. Root

taught briefly at two girls'

schools after graduating from

Hamilton College.1 Root's only previous encounter with the
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military came during the Civil War, when the army rejected
him due to frail health. After raising some money from
teaching, Root studied law and received a B.L. and M.A.
from New York University Law School in 1867.2 By the late
1890s Root had established himself both as a prominent New
York lawyer and as a staunch Republican. His clients
included New York City, the Sugar Trust, Consolidated Gas,
six railroads and William M. Tweed, the important
political boss of New York City.

In 1879 he was defeated

as the GOP candidate for judge on the court of common
pleas, but in 1886 he was elected leader in his assembly
district. A year later President Arthur appointed him U.S.
district attorney for the Southern District of New York
City.

In this capacity he met Henry Cabot Lodge and

Theodore Roosevelt. He was a member of the Bar Association
and was President of both the Republican Club and the
Union League Club in New York.

In early 1899 he

successfully defended Roosevelt in a tax fraud case.3
McKinley then offered Root the U.S. ambassadorship to
Spain, which he refused, having no knowledge of Spanish.4
Some months later, the president decided to replace
Alger as secretary of war. The new secretary was to be an
experienced administrator and lawyer,

able to deal with

the legal problems involved in creating colonial
government.

The list of qualified candidates was soon

reduced to three names.5 McKinley canvassed Adjutant
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General Corbin, the new secretary of state John Hay,
governor Roosevelt,

and Root's friend,

secretary of the

interior Cornelius Bliss for their opinions. Corbin,
Bliss, and Hay endorsed Root. Roosevelt supported the
candidacy of General Francis V. Greene and privately
wished himself to be considered.6 Despite the reservations
of Roosevelt, McKinley offered the job to Root. Root at
first refused saying:

"Thank the President for me, but say

it is quite absurd I know nothing about war,

I know

nothing about the army."' The caller insisted Root
reconsider because McKinley required a lawyer to handle
colonial administration, not a military expert. The
President called Root and appealed to his sense of duty
and honour,

ideals of great importance to a nineteenth-

century professional gentleman,

and convinced Root to

accept.8 The choice of Root emphasised the low priority
McKinley attached to military reform,

and his

unwillingness to accept the Neo-Hamiltonian vision of the
world, which demanded an efficient military. Roosevelt,
Lodge, and others were surprised by McKinley's choice and
believed the appointment was designed to prevent military
reform.9
Summoned by the President, Root arrived in Washington
on the Congressional Limited from New York at 10.30 pm,
Monday July 24, 1899. He went straight to the White House
where McKinley and Corbin met him for the first time.10 As
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he entered McKinley's office, Corbin saw a small trim man,
with dark eyes, a wide forehead and small iron-grey
moustache. He was wearing a light summer suit and a jaunty
straw hat. McKinley greeted him as secretary of w a r . 11 A
week later, on August 1, 1899 he was officially sworn in
and spent that night in the Arlington Hotel with General
Corbin.12 Root was immediately confronted with problems
both in colonial administration, and military
organisation. The general public had a lively interest in
military reform,

encouraged by newspaper reports of

military mistakes, the return of volunteer officers to
politics at home, and the conclusions of the Dodge
Commission. Root, accompanied by Corbin,

set about

familiarising himself with the War Department and its
sta f f .
The War Department was in the executive building
beside the White House.

It was a large multi-storey,

Victorian, grey stone building, which occupied a whole
block. Corbin and the Secretary had connecting offices,
while those of the commanding general and his staff were
at the other end of the building.

Initially Root tried to

elicit the cooperation of General Miles,

and the bureau

chiefs, but only Corbin proved helpful.13 Corbin and Root
quickly became friends, and the connecting door between
their two offices was soon swinging constantly.

Both men

joined the active life fad, promoted by Roosevelt,

Sumner,
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and others,

and they rode together each week-day evening

and Sunday.14 Corbin introduced Root to Assistant Adjutant
General Lieut. Colonel William H. Carter, who soon became
Root's chief military adviser and friend.
Carter was a slight dapper man, with brown hair and a
full moustache. He had a great interest in American
military reform. Born in December 1850 in Brooklyn, he
entered West Point in the early 1 8 7 0 's. The noted reformer
Emory Upton was the school commandant.
studied the ideas of Sherman,

In the college he

Schofield,

Upton,

and Hazen.

His classmates included Arthur Wagner, Tasker Bliss,

and

Thomas H. Barry, officers later influential in army
reform. After graduation Carter remained at West Point as
a teacher in the department of tactics and joined Bliss
who was assigned to teach languages. The new commandant
was General Schofield. Throughout the 1880s Carter served
with the 6th cavalry fighting Indians in Arizona, the
Dakotas,

and Wyoming.

On Aug.

30, 1881 he won the

Congressional Medal of Honour for retrieving the bodies of
Captain E.C. Hentig and Private Bird while under heavy
fire from Apache Indians.

In the 1890s Carter was

appointed an instructor at The Infantry and Cavalry School
Fort Leavenworth, where Wagner and Swift were also
teaching.

In 1897 he was appointed major and assistant

adjutant general on the recommendations of noted military
reformer Brigadier General Theodore Schwan and Brigadier
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General George Crook.15 Schwan, Wagner,

and Carter drew up

the legislation for the Act of March 2, 1899 which
increased the regular army to 65,000 men, and mobilised
35,000 volunteers for two years. Carter was to become a
valuable adviser to a secretary of war ignorant of army
matters.16
Root's immediate problem was colonial administration.
Major General John R. Brook, Brigadier General Leonard
Wood, and Brigadier General William Ludlow were the
leaders of colonial government in Cuba. Major General
Elwell S. Otis was acting governor in the Philippines.

In

Cuba and Puerto Rico the army handled domestic government,
overseas trade, and security. The Teller Amendment
provided for Cuban independence, while Puerto Rico was to
become an American colony. Cuban independence reguired the
creation of tariff agreements on U.S.- Cuban trade and a
legal agreement for a U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. While
these issues involved Root, help from Charles Magoon,

a

legal expert appointed to the law offices in the Bureau of
Insular Affairs,

allowed Root time to study some of the

problems of military administration.17
The efficiency of the army once more took on sudden
urgency with the escalation of the conflict in the
Philippines.

On December 10, 1898 Spain had agreed to sell

the islands to America. This was followed eleven days
later by McKinley's speech calling for "benevolent
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American assimilation” of the islands.”18 Throughout
January 1899, the Filipino leaders Emilio Aguinaldo,

Pedro

Paterno, and Apolinario Mabini protested against the
American decision.19 Many Americans were appalled by this
overt attempt to acquire empire, but the champions of
anti-imperialism refused to act. William Jennings Bryan,
the leading Democrat,

allowed his obsession with reforming

the Gold Standard, to distract him and his party from
attacking this widely unpopular move to American
imperialism. He wanted foreign policy matters settled
quickly,

so he could concentrate on domestic economics and

the increasing power of business.20 Anti-imperialists such
as Andrew Carnegie and Mark Twain tried repeatedly to get
Bryan to speak out against the Senate treaty which
approved the annexation of the Philippines,
their requests,

but he ignored

and the treaty passed the Senate on

February 6, 1899 fifty-seven votes to twenty-seven: only
one vote more than the necessary two-thirds majority.21
Two days before this vote, Major General Otis
authorised an assault on the Filipino army outside Manila.
Otis, who had replaced Merritt in August 1898 as commander
of U.S.

forces in the Philippines, regarded

Filipinos as

"rag-tag” inferiors and was determined to crush them
before any political directive could stop him. A pompous,
fussy,

career soldier, he resented political interference

from Washington. Archbishop Chapelle,

the papal legate in
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the Philippines, described him "as of about the right
mental calibre to command a one-company post in
Arizona."22 Throughout the spring of 1899, U.S.

forces

skirmished with the Filipino army. Even in January 1899,
Private William Christner wrote home:

"We killed a few to

learn them a lesson and you bet they learned it."23
In May 1899, Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton
arrived with more troops to conduct an offensive in the
Philippines.

Lawton was a brave, eccentric individual. A

Civil War veteran,

and holder of the Congressional Medal

of Honour, he had also captured the Indian leader Geronimo
in 1886.

In Cuba, he had served as a brigade commander and

led the important attack on El Caney. Rewarded for his
leadership in the Spanish-American War, he was made
Governor of Santiago,

only to be sent home in disgrace

after a six-day drinking spree. He arrived in Manila
wearing a British pith helmet and a bright yellow scarf,
which he wore on all subsequent campaigns.24
When Root took office Otis, Lawton, and Major General
Arthur MacArthur had apparently routed the Filipino army;
killing over 3,000 Filipino soldiers at a cost of only
sixty American lives.25 Aguinaldo, the main Filipino
leader, however,

instructed his forces to disperse and

begin guerrilla warfare against the American forces.

In

Washington D.C., Root supported the acquisition of the
islands and was confident of quick success. Throughout the
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autumn he read widely on British colonial policy as he
considered how best to govern the new colonies. Root,

like

Hay, Lodge, and Wood, regarded British imperial ideas as
successful and worth copying.26 Secretary Root encouraged
Otis to give selected journalists greater access to
military information,
papers,

especially those from Hearst's

as they supported annexation of the Philippines.27

Root and his expansionist colleagues enjoyed good
relations with British officials and were increasingly
suspicious of Germany. On September 2, 1899 Roosevelt
introduced Root to the British military attache Colonel
Arthur Lee, who accompanied Roosevelt during his time in
Cuba. Lee and Roosevelt were good friends and remained so
throughout their future careers. Root dined frequently
with Lee and the British Ambassador Lord Pauncefote.28 The
secretary of war read and appreciated Kipling,
memo to the secretary of state,

and,

in a

indicated his support for

British intervention in Egypt.29 In contrast, he and other
senior Republicans were alarmed by any rumoured German
expansion in the Caribbean or Pacific. This unease over
German intentions was encouraged both by British and by
German actions.

In 1898 Count Hatzfeldt the German

ambassador in London,

approached the then American

ambassador John Hay and demanded German coaling stations
in the Pacific in return for German recognition of the
American annexation of Hawaii. This action encouraged
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Hay's suspicion of German intentions, already cultivated
by the British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.30 In late
1899, a memo on the Philippines authorised by the
president,

discussed the problems caused by guerrilla

warfare and possible German intervention. The report
circulated among senior members of the cabinet and
concluded that control of the islands was being contested
by Spain,
States.

Filipino nationalists, Germany,

and the United

Summing up the international situation it stated:

.... The situation is further complicated by the
semi-hostile attitude of Germany, which has
maintained an unnecessarily large naval force in
front of Manila for the last five months, the
officers of which have on many occasions shown
their disposition to embarrass and thwart the
United States ..... It is not probable that Britain
will permit the Philippines to go to any of her
rivals except ourselves. She has her own reasons,
looking to the future, for allowing us to keep
without objection, what our own arms and resources
have won. (Hence the U.S., in the face of guerrilla
opposition, has to hold the islands itself).31
The delicate diplomatic situation was underlined by the
actions of Captain Chichester R.N. He placed his three
ships between Manila and a German squadron commanded by
Vice Admiral von Diederichs, which seemed determined to
seize an island for Germany.32
The international situation encouraged Lodge, Hay,
Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonians to press for further
colonial expansion and military reform. American victory
over Spain had made isolationism irrelevant.

For

expansionist Republicans the issue was: would America play
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its new international role well, or badly? Neo-Hamiltonian
supporters argued that industrial growth and overseas
expansion were evidence of American ingenuity and
superiority.
Root was a notable corporate lawyer and participant
in the remarkable success of American business.

During his

early life, the value of internal American commerce
increased from $2 billion,

in 1850, to $18 billion by

1900; exports rose from $17 million to $435 million;
railroad mileage,

just 9,000 miles in 1850, reached

194,000 miles in 1900; and coal production increased from
three million tons to 240 million tons over the same
period.33 Root defended corporate amalgamation and
believed in it explicitly. In an address by Mr. F.B.
Thurber he underlined the following passage:
Not less foolish is our attitude towards the
organization of industry known as "trusts." With the
advent of the powers which now control the world,
steam, electricity and machinery, came the
organization of industry, because these great forces
could only be economically handled in large units and
so "corporations" .... These to promote economy and
efficiency have been consolidated into larger
organizations known as "Trusts." It has been popular
to oppose and denounce these organizations, but it
is safe to say that corporations and "trusts" have
been an important element in the rapid development of
our country, and to them we must look for the
continuance of progress.34
These ideas were an anathema to followers of Bryan
and challenged Jeffersonian-Jacksonian ideals of an
agrarian democracy. Root, Hay, Roosevelt,

and others
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regarded business boards served by professional advice as
the appropriate blueprint for efficient government.

In

foreign policy and defence this system was essential to
defend both the United States and its overseas interests
against European and Japanese competition.

Senator Lodge,

in a speech before Congress, pledged his support for a
policy of creating American economic superiority to
preserve political independence. He warned of the
competition America faced in implementing such a policy:
"But does anyone suppose they like it? They are gasping
for breath in all parts of Europe .... we occupy a great
position economically. We are marching to a still greater
one ... but, dazzled by its splendour,

do not forget its

p e r i l s ."35
Commercial expansion encouraged the development of
professionalism,

the ideal of efficiency,

and overseas

expansion. Middle-ranking officers interested in military
reform were inspired by the apparent success of business
organisation and sought to achieve the same efficiency in
the army. Lieut. Colonel Carter outlined the analogy
between successful business and hoped-for army reforms
when he wrote:
In our early history, when railroads were
constructed with a view to uniting adjacent towns,
they needed honest management and technical skill;
but when they were merged into great systems
controlling thousands of miles of track, and
dependent upon the freights from distant territory
... it was no longer enough that they should
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posses skilled engineers and accountants, but it
became necessary that they be controlled by
directors - groups of men whose principal work was
to observe rival lines, to consider state and
local laws and to prepare the system to derive all
possible advantage from future growth of
contiguous territory. The duties of these vast
corporations are very nearly akin to those of the
proposed General Staff of the Army .... The business
of the War Department, which in proportion exceeds
that of many of the largest trusts or corporations of
the world combined, is managed upon an entirely
different plan from that pursued in any private
concern.36
Within the army there were many people who opposed
military reform. The National Guard, based on volunteerism
and provincial command,

and middle-ranking regular army

officers, who had waited years for promotion by strict
rules of seniority,

opposed most reforms.

In service

journals militia officers stoutly defended the locally
recruited volunteer and warned darkly against the military
professionalism of "Hessian and other continental
monarchies" and the army of the,

"hired assassin stamp,"

which would destroy American liberty.37 Few National Guard
officers supported the opinions of Iowa National Guard
Colonel, J.G. Gilchrist, who described the Guard as having
weak staff organisation,
training,

poor commanding officers, meagre

and piteous equipment.38

The controversy over military reform and the new
colonial problems of America gave the new secretary of war
much to do. Root gained a further problem when he fell out
with General Miles.

In mid-August 1899 operations against

guerrillas in the Philippines required the construction
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and manning of many posts.39 To provide officers for these
new commands, Root wrote to retired General Francis
Greene, Governor Roosevelt, Corbin, and Miles asking them
to recommend able officers for the new positions
available.40 Miles recommended promotion by strict
seniority. The following day the whole story of officer
selection appeared in national papers. Root believed Miles
leaked the story to the press. He never trusted Miles
again and attempted to isolate him from the army.41
The failure of the army to secure a quick victory in
the Philippines worried Root and the administration. The
American commanders of the campaign, Otis and MacArthur,
consistently denied they needed more troops, despite
inquiries from Root and the War Department. MacArthur,
frustrated by the lack of success against poorly equipped
natives,
trains,

turned to technology for a solution. Armoured
naval artillery,

Gatling guns, and a fire engine,

adapted to spray petroleum on villages, were all
introduced with little effect.42 The war became
increasingly vicious,

and one private wrote home

describing retribution inflicted on one area after an
American soldier was killed and disembowelled:
"Immediately orders were received from General Wheaton
[Maj. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton] to burn and kill every native in
sight; which was done to the finish. About 1,000 men,
women,

and children were reported killed."43 Each side
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ruthlessly retaliated to each new atrocity. American
troops were buried alive in ant-hills, decapitated,

and

castrated, while Filipino nationalists lost their lives,
homes, and livestock in ever increasing numbers.
In America,

Senator Carl Schurz, appalled at the

continued violence,

established an Anti-Imperial League.

Mark Twain, William Dean Howells,

Illinois Governor John

Altgeld, William Jennings Bryan, and Andrew Carnegie all
became prominent members.
of casualty figures,

In response to one reported set

Carnegie wrote caustically to

Republican Whitelaw Reid:

"...

it is a matter of

congratulations, however, that you seem to have about
finished your work civilising the Filipinos.

It is thought

that about 8,000 of them have been completely civilised
and sent to heaven.

I hope you like it."44 McKinley and

his administration were increasingly worried both by the
failure to end the war and the increased public support
for anti-imperialism.

The President,

disillusioned with

Otis, decided to send more troops to the Philippines.

By

the end of October 1899 U.S. forces occupied only 117
square miles on the main island of Luzon. Hundreds of
islands, encompassing 115,000 square miles of land
remained unconquered.45
Throughout October Root worked long hours to complete
his first report as secretary of war. Published in
November,

it recommended systematic military planning for
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any eventuality, promotion by merit, posting of line
officers to all staff bureaus except the Medical
Department for five year periods,

inter-service

cooperation, and creation of a war college to educate
bright officers.46 The war college would be governed by a
board of senior officers appointed for fixed terms by the
president. Military information division records,

and

reports by military attaches, would be placed at the
disposal of the college. The college would supervise the
other army service colleges,

coordinate all army

education, and educate the brightest service school
graduates. Root urged Congress to set aside $20,000 to
fund work on the new college.47
Predictably Democratic congressmen, national
guardsmen,

state politicians,

and middle-ranking officers,

opposed Root's program. The Secretary, however,

remained

determined to centralise army command and place the state
militias firmly under federal control.
Root realised any interference with the National
Guard would be unpopular,

and he astutely left plans to

federalise the militia to a separate committee. Roosevelt,
always willing to promote military reform,

suggested that

"General" Daniel Butterfield of the New York National
Guard to chair the contentious committee on militia
reform. A nine-man committee was established including six
National Guard officers. Army Colonel A.L. Mills and legal
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adviser, deputy Judge-Advocate General Lieutenant-colonel
George B. Davis joined Butterfield as committee members.
The committee legislation provided for 100,000
locally trained militia under federal command in time of
war.48 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unhappy with
this compromise. They wanted complete central government
control over the militia. Root's proposals received
support from governor Roosevelt,

secretary of state Hay,

and the few professional officers interested in reform.
the Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Beveridge,

In

and Military

Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph B. Hawley congratulated
Root on a great report.49 Proctor,

a former secretary of

war, and currently the senior senator from Vermont was
most enthusiastic. Root, aware of Proctor's strong
business connections in Vermont, qualified his praise
stating:

"The only trouble with Proctor was that he wanted

everything built out of Vermont marble."50 Hawley,

the

senior senator from Connecticut, was a close friend to
Root. He supported the creation of a strong central
government and,

like Root, had attended Hamilton

College.51
Despite powerful support, Root faced considerable
opposition as well. Many congressmen were annoyed at NeoHamiltonian support for the British position in the Boer
War and the failure to end the conflict in the
Philippines.

They attacked ideas of colonial expansion and
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military reform as un-American. With an election due in
1900, many Republican congressmen remained reluctant to
support contentious proposals for military reform.
Nonetheless Root pressed on. He instructed Brigadier
General Theodore Schwan and Carter to draft legislation
for an army bill to be presented in 1900. Carter,

ever

enthusiastic, proposed legislation to create a general
staff structure. Root, aware of congressional opposition,
remained more cautious. A novice on ideas of military
organisation, he wished to study Carter's plans in detail.
Distracted by the need to address the problems of colonial
administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico and the on-going
war in the Philippines, he lacked the time and political
will to endorse fully Carter's ideas.52
In Cuba the military leadership was influenced by the
evangelical ideas of Josiah Strong and Kipling's concept
of the "White Man's Burden." A program of social
improvements was initiated. The overall commander in Cuba,
Major General John R. Brook, was less enthusiastic in
implementing social reforms than his two deputies Leonard
Wood and William Ludlow. Root invited all three to
Washington D.C. to discuss social and political reform in
Cuba. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans expected to transform
their new colonial empire into a set of states which
endorsed multi-party democracy and free trade. These two
reforms they believed were essential to provide the
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political stability and expanding markets to benefit U.S.
business.
Root was impressed with the enthusiasm which Wood and
Ludlow had for their task. He was less impressed with
Brooke. The old major general refused to mingle with
"inferior” natives and displayed no interest in social or
industrial reform.

In contrast, Ludlow as governor of

Havana had established food centres to. avert famine, which
fed 20,000 people daily.
prevent disease,

Streets were cleaned regularly to

a new sewage plant was planned,

street

lighting was installed and a new bacteriological
laboratory was created to study tropical disease.53 Wood,
as governor of Santiago, promoted sanitation projects,
education,

and extensive harbour improvements to improve

trade. Wood summed up their achievement:

"The stagnant

pools and dirt in streets had disappeared. Houses no
longer discharged effluent onto the streets and disease
such as yellow fever declined dramatically."54 The decline
in yellow fever was used as further evidence to support
American involvement overseas. The gulf coast of America
was frequently infected with the disease from Cuba. A
reduction in the incidence of the disease in Cuba reduced
the chance of infection in America.
Disappointed by Brooke's attitude, Root recommended
that he be replaced. McKinley favoured Ludlow, but
Roosevelt intervened and in early December Wood was
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promoted to major general of volunteers and governor of
Cuba. Root, toasting Wood's promotion, underlined the
importance of civic and economic reform to NeoHamiltonians stating:
I am prouder of Wood in Santiago and Wilson in
Mantanzas and Ludlow in Havana, cleaning the streets
and disinfecting the pestholes and teaching the
elements of civic government; teaching them how to go
back to work, to earn their living; teaching them to
become self-governing citizens of a free state, than
I ever could be of a hero on the ramparts amid the
hail of shot ....55
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans agreed with Josiah Strong
that America had a moral duty to help those states less
fortunate than the Republic. Of greater importance,
however, was the establishment of an American claim to the
limited natural resources and economic markets provided by
the world. Military success in the Philippines was
essential to secure a share in the important Pacific
market.
In the Philippines Brigadier General Samuel Young and
Brigadier General Lawton almost captured the guerrilla
leader Aguinaldo. Otis disliked both Young and Lawton,
and, before his rivals returned, he claimed all the credit
for their mission. He announced that Aguinaldo's family
had been seized and that the war was over. Unfortunately
for Otis the war continued and his premature announcement,
which had raised hopes in Washington, became another
source of irritation between the administration and the
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General. On December 18 Lawton died while helping wounded
men to escape enemy fire. The hero who had captured
Geronimo was shot by a Filipino rifleman named Lucerio
Geronimo. Much to the annoyance of Root, the end of the
war seemed no closer.56
In South Africa war broke out between the British and
Boer farmers. The British were confident of success, a
view shared by pro-British Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans.
Unfortunately the Boer War, which lasted for over three
years, exposed the same organisational problems in the
British army as existed in the American army. The
political support provided by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans
to the British in South Africa increased the opposition in
Congress to military reform and overseas expansion. Root,
Hay, and others hoped for a swift British victory, but, as
in the Philippines,

they were to be disappointed. The

inefficient British staff system and poor training caused
initial disaster and defeat.57 At Magersfontein on
December 1, 1899 poor staff work was responsible for 968
casualties in the Highland Brigade, when they were shelled
by their own artillery.58 The weaknesses exposed in AngloAmerican armies in the Spanish-American War and Boer War,
produced closer collaboration between the two states on
military reform.
Military difficulties in the Philippines and South
Africa provided opponents of Anglo-American imperialism in

109

America with evidence that it was a failure, un-American
and pro British.

Irish and German political lobbies

attacked McKinley's tacit support for Britain. Bryan
denounced Anglo-American imperialism and upheld the virtue
of the democratic, Jeffersonian, republic.

In a speech to

Congress he explained the dangers of imperialism:
.... After a century and a half of English domination
in India, less than one twentieth of one per cent of
the people of India are of English birth, and it
requires an army of seventy thousand British soldiers
to take care of the tax collectors.... A colonial
policy means that we shall send to the Philippine
Islands a few traders, a few taskmasters and a few
office-holders and an army large enough to support
the authority of a small fraction of the people while
they rule the natives....59
Roosevelt, Root,

and Hay were furious at criticism of

what they regarded as the essential expansion of commerce.
Hay angrily wrote to Whitelaw Reid that Bryan was "a
halfbacked glib little briefless jack-leg lawyer,"
grasping for power.60 Lodge reminded the Senate that
Britain supported the American desire for free trade in
China and the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt vilified Bryan
and dismissed his ideas claiming that those who opposed
British imperialism invariably disputed the American right
to intervene in the Caribbean and Pacific.61 Secretary of
State Hay attempted to prevent South African President
Kruger from visiting America.
Lodge he wrote:

Commenting on the request to

"The Boer women and children are in the

concentration camps simply because their husbands and
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brothers want them there, and as to the war ... it will
stop the instant Botha and deWet wish it to stop."62
Despite British set-backs in South Africa, Republican
desires for free trade and overseas expansion encouraged
the adoption of a pro-British stance.

Increasingly many

Republicans recognised that the two countries had common
interests.
Root entered the new year determined to get some army
reforms approved. His main goals, however, were to learn
more about army organisation and gain greater support for
the concept of military reform. During the autumn, Carter
had provided Root with a copy of Upton's book, The Armies
of Asia and Europe. The text gave Root a survey of foreign
military organisations and exposed him to the ideas of
Upton, one of the most influential late nineteenth-century
army thinkers. When he discovered the book was out of
print he ordered a new edition. To promote awareness of
the need for military reform, he had it distributed to all
army posts and major newspapers. Root found the book
invaluable stating:

"it gave me the detail on which I

could base my recommendations and overcome my ignorance as
a civilian."63 The secretary of war gained further insight
from the eight-volume Dodge Commission Report on the
Spanish-American War. Root was friends with the chief
author of the report, and to gather even more information
on military reform Root authorised the creation of a board

Ill

to study army reform.64 The chairman was Brigadier General
William Ludlow. Ludlow had impressed Root with his program
of civil works in Cuba. Unfortunately, the governor of
Havana had closed two anti-American newspapers in the
city: La Lucha and El C u b a n o . This act angered local
people and involved Ludlow in an unseemly argument over
press censorship. Root recalled the Governor to Washington
D.C. and offered him the opportunity to chair the board on
army reform.65 Ludlow accepted the appointment.
Ludlow graduated from West Point in 1864. A qualified
engineer, he served with distinction as chief engineer in
20th corps of the Army of the Cumberland and .later as
chief engineer for General Sherman.

In one twenty-six day

period, his command built thirty-seven trestle and pontoon
bridges and mapped over 1,700 miles of road.66 After the
Civil War he spent the next three decades working on army
civil engineering projects. He worked on harbour
improvements in New York and Baltimore,

constructed sea-

coast defences at Staten Island and Charleston S.C., and
built new water and sewage works in Washington D.C. and
Philadelphia.67 He fought hard against machine politics
and was well liked by social reformers. Arriving in
Philadelphia in February 1883, he confronted scheming
speculators, hoping to benefit from the new water works
contract.

One contractor entered Ludlow's office and

quietly laid a $50 bill upon his desk. The general slowly
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picked it up, rolled it like a reefer, held it to a gas
jet and lit his cigar.68 In 1894 he was posted to Great
Britain as the U.S. military attache where he served for
two years. While in London he came into contact with the
British military reformer Spencer Wilkinson, the first
Chichele Professor of War, at Oxford University. Ludlow
forwarded a considerable number of newspaper cuttings,
articles,

and books on military affairs to the Military

Information Division in Washington. On April 18, 1896 he
forwarded Wilkinson's work, The Brain of the A r m y , which
provided new insight into how to create an efficient,
German-style army, while maintaining democratic control.69
The text would become highly influential both among
British and American military reformers.
The other members of the Ludlow Board were Joseph P.
Sanger and Henry C. Hasbrouck.

Colonel Sanger was well

acquainted with military reformers and their ideas. He was
a Civil War veteran, honour graduate of the artillery
school in 1868 and former professor of military science at
Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. He had accompanied
Upton on his world tour, when they inspected the armies of
the world, and was an aide and military secretary to
Lieutenant General Schofield for fourteen years.70 The
other committee member was Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck. A
graduate of West Point, he served as assistant professor
of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point
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between 1863-1865. He spent the 1870s fighting Indians in
the West. In the 1880s he was appointed commandant of West
Point and in 1892 became the director of the artillery
school at Fort Monroe.71 All three officers,
army reformers,

like most

enjoyed a military career of education and

travel, unlike most of their colleagues. The three
officers were instructed by Root and Corbin to make
preliminary recommendations on the creation of a war
college. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, Root's chief military
adviser, was appointed secretary to the board.72
Congressional debate on the army bill proposed by
Root began in February 1900. The legislation recommended
interchangeable staff and field appointments for army
officers. Permanent staff appointments, except in the
Medical Bureau, were to be abolished.

In an attempt to

extend executive authority over the army, all bureau
chiefs would be appointed for fixed terms determined by
the president. A $2 0,000 appropriation for a new war
college was proposed.
Ludlow Board,

Carter, despite his duties with the

attended all the hearings with Root. Corbin

testified supporting the suggested reforms.

The other

bureau chiefs mostly opposed reform. Paymaster-General
Alfred E. Bates supported the removal of permanent staff
appointments but opposed other reforms.73 Chief of
Engineers John M. Wilson,

Chief of the Records and

Pensions Department Fred C. Ainsworth,

Judge-Advocate
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General G. Norman Lieber,

and Inspector General John C.

Breckinridge opposed all army reform.74 In the Senate,
Redfield Proctor and Francis Cockrell introduced
amendments to support Root. They cited the success of the
American navy in the Spanish-American War, which already
had staff-line interchange,

a war college, and amalgamated

staff departments.75 The amendments were voted down.
General Nelson Miles, the commanding general of the army,
testified in favour of many of the reforms. As he pointed
out that he had recommended staff-line interchange and an
expansion in formal army education when he became
commanding general in 1895. Miles warned Congress that the
increase in the regular army,

from 24,000 to 65,000 men

approved until July 1901, would have to be extended.
Garrison forces were required in Hawaii, Guam, Puerto
Rico, Cuba,

and the Philippines. Miles reminded Congress

that it had increased the demands upon army manpower
through its coastal defence policy.76 Carter reported that
only forty-three out of seventy-five new coastal forts
were even partially manned. The instillations,

built due

to public pressure in the Spanish-American War, had cost
over $100 million dollars. Without 18,000 new troops to
maintain these defences,

Carter predicted they would

rapidly deteriorate and be useless in any future
conflict.77
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The proposed military reforms and congressional
debate were influenced both by British military thinking
and American business principles. German military ideas
played only a minor role; only the proposed war college
owed its existence to German military thinking. The two
most contentious issues, the abolition of permanent staff
appointments and promotion by merit, were inspired by the
example of the British army. Upton in his influential The
Armies of Asia and Europe described how British staff
officers were required to serve in the field after a fiveyear appointment in the staff.78 Root and Carter,

familiar

with Upton's work, recommended a four-year detail to
coincide with the American electoral process. Brigadier
General Theodore Schwan, a recognised expert on the German
army, denied Germany had any meaningful staff- line
interchange. Once admitted to the army staff, only
extremely incompetent officers were removed. There was no
institutionalised length of staff service followed by a
period of service in the field.

Schwan also wrote that

most regular army appointments were by seniority.79 These
ideas influenced Root and Carter and their proposed bill.
Relying on the work of Upton and Schwan, they used the
British example in planning staff-line interchange.
The language of those who opposed and endorsed
military reform regularly included references to American
business. General Greely,

chief of army signals, argued

against the proposed detail system and cited the views of

116

the American Institute of Electrical Engineers to support
his position:
Certainly no man can become an electrical expert by
the simple detail of four years. The present system
embodies the principle that has enabled American
corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railway, New
York Central Railway, the Westinghouse, the General
Electric and other companies to train bodies of
scientific experts who have placed national
interests in the van.80
Ideas of "professionalism” and "efficiency” dominated the
debate on military reform. Both concepts were strongly
associated with corporate success. Unfortunately,
supporters and opponents of army reform sought to apply
professionalism in different ways. Bureau chiefs regarded
professionalism as a vindication of their autonomous
position within the army, while supporters of reform
thought professionalism required improved military
training for the whole army. This debate on how to achieve
professionalism in the army hindered progress on military
reform. The drive for professionalism had inspired new
military associations.
cavalry,

artillery,

In the late nineteenth century the

and infantry,

all established

associations with their own membership standards and
journals. The proposal to establish a war college, which
promised tougher educational standards,

appealed to those

determined to encourage professionalism in the whole army.
Professionalism created efficiency according to army
reformers,

both by providing a trained army,

educated advice to government.

and supplying
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The professional idea, however, hindered army reform
by encouraging further fragmentation in the army staff.
Bureau chiefs, opposed to reform,

stressed that staff

specialisation required knowledge achieved only by
continued staff service. The creation of further staff
bureaus was promoted by veterinarians and pharmacists who
demanded professional recognition.81 Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans rejected these views, which threatened greater
autonomous specialisation,

and undermined their desire for

greater central planning and control.

In a rare victory

for army reform, Root was able to block the creation of
two new staff bureaus for veterinarians and pharmacists.
Record and Pension Chief Fred C. Ainsworth demonstrated
the manipulation of the professional idea by staff
officers when he spoke before congress:
This is an age of specialities in all professions,
the military as well as the legal and the medical,
and that there is no man who can hope to be
proficient in all branches of any profession; that
it takes a lifetime of devotion to any one branch
to make a man master of all its details; and that
no good would come of half educating a comparatively
small number of the line officers of the Army by
detailing them ... for four years and then sending
them back to the line.
In response to further questioning he bluntly concluded:
"It would mean incomplete education of a small portion of
officers of the line and utter demoralisation of staff
departments."82
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The congressional argument on military reform
continued unabated. Republican party managers became
increasingly concerned that the party was promoting
unpopular military reform. The presidential election was
only five months away. McKinley, under pressure to act,
instructed House Speaker David B. Henderson to limit
debate on military reform. Henderson agreed and promised
to re-introduce personally an army reform bill in the new
congress.83 The continued inability of the army to end the
war in the Philippines and Republican support for the
British in the Boer War worried Republican Party
supporters.
The Democrats decided to make the American annexation
of the Philippines a major election issue. Encouraged by
Bryan, German-Americans opposed to militarism and IrishAmericans opposed to Britain announced their overwhelming
support for the Democratic Party. In a speech at the New
York Academy of Music, the "Irish Joan of Arc," Maude
Conne, denounced Britain as "the robber nation of the
world. Hence it matters not what nation England is at war
with,

right or wrong,

it is Ireland's duty to oppose."84

Confronted with growing public annoyance over American
foreign and defence policy, both McKinley and Root were
desperate for victory in the Philippines. The President
decided to relieve General Otis and appoint a civilian
governor-general in the Philippines.

In late April 1900,
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it was announced that, after twenty-one months in command,
Otis had "earned a rest."85 Major General Arthur MacArthur
replaced Otis,

and William Howard Taft became the new

civilian governor.
Taft, a graduate of Yale and Cincinnati Law School,
was reluctant to accept the appointment. A former
solicitor-general of the United States and federal circuit
court judge, he really wanted an appointment to the
Supreme Court.86 A stout fellow who had never served in
the army, he hated killing things and was at best a
reluctant imperialist.

Surprisingly, Root thought him the

ideal choice.87 Taft hesitated but accepted, when McKinley
promised him a future appointment to the Supreme Court.
Root appealed to his sense of honour and duty ideas of
importance to upper-middle-class gentlemen.88 In May 1900
Taft accepted and set sail for the Philippines with the
new civil commission.
Despite the public opposition to military reform and
imperialism, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans persisted in
supporting these ideas. Roosevelt, Hay, Root, Croly, Henry
Adams,

and others were convinced that international

politics and trade were dominated by national selfinterest.

In such a world conflict over limited markets

and resources made war certain. The most efficient
response was "military preparedness." Popular among NeoHamiltonian Republicans,

this philosophy gained increasing
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support within the entire party. Events abroad seemed to
provide overwhelming evidence to support this view.

In the

Philippines the continued presence of a German fleet
provoked concerns over both a possible German invasion and
possible aid for the Filipino rebels.89 In May 1900, The
New York Times worried over the future of the relatively
unimportant Danish West Indies. The paper caused
considerable alarm among

Republicans when it speculated

the islands might be purchased by Germany.90 The
Commercial Bulletin of Boston,

summarised the fears of

Root and others in a May editorial:
Now nobody desires or is seeking war with Germany.
At the same time it is silly to close our eyes to
the fact that we are rivals. If any person doubts
what German feeling for this country is, he has
only to look at German caricatures and editorial
articles, which though not insulting to the United
States ... are nevertheless hostile .... For a
quarter of a century Germany has tabooed our
provisions, made war on our trade, counterfeited our
goods in foreign markets, and furnished guns and
cartridges to our enemies. She has not threatened
war, but she has been a strong and active commercial
rival.
The performances of the German vessels in
Manila Bay are one evidence of her attitude. Over
her great marine exhibit in Paris is the motto,
"Our future lies on the sea." Everywhere in Samoa,
among the Cameroons, Germany is seeking expansion.
The article concluded with a call to arm:

"We certainly do

not want war with Germany or any foreign power. We as
certainly cannot prevent encroachment by stripping
ourselves of defence."91
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Events in China added to Neo-Hamiltonian concern.

In

the summer of 1900 two German missionaries were killed in
Shandang. The German authorities retaliated by burning two
Chinese villages,

an act that provoked the Boxer Rebellion

by northern Chinese against foreign intervention in their
country. The Boxers besieged the American and various
European legations in Beijing.92 In early July Brigadier
General Adna Chaffee and a U.S. force dispatched from the
Philippines joined the Western relief efforts of Russia,
Japan, France,
Waldersee,

Britain, and Germany under Count von

the German commander.93 For the Neo-

Hamiltonians the international events of 1900 only
confirmed the need for military reform.
Despite the coming election, Root continued to
encourage military reform.

In late July he instructed

Corbin to send letters to all general officers and
regimental colonels for their views.94 The replies arrived
throughout the autumn of 1900. Of the eight regular army
general officers only Major General Miles and Brigadier
General Joseph Wheeler did not reply. Ten of the eighteen
volunteer general officers replied, but only fourteen of
forty-two regimental colonels forwarded their opinions.
The views expressed did little to encourage the supporters
of reform. The only point of consensus was the need for a
larger army. Bureau chiefs remained implacably opposed to
all reform and the replies from line officers only
confirmed the widespread ignorance and apathy.95 The
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secretary of war was thoroughly discouraged,

and his

misery increased when in September he contracted influenza
and colic.96
A month later the Ludlow Board presented its report.
Ludlow spent considerable time in Britain and Germany
studying the military command structures there.

Sanger,

another member of the board, visited Switzerland to
observe the mobilisation of its reserves.97 In London
Ludlow contacted the noted military thinker Spencer
Wilkinson and picked up a copy of Wilkinson's most recent
work, the Brain of the A r m y . Ludlow took the book to
Germany,

read it, and on his return to Britain,

eagerly

sought out Wilkinson again, and discussed military reform
well into the night.

Finally, Ludlow asked Wilkinson why

he did not awaken Britain to its own military realities.
Wilkinson replied that citizens in a democracy were more
interested in domestic politics. Ludlow agreed but added,
"We also have a democracy in America, but you have
something here we haven't got," "What's that?" Wilkinson
asked.

"Stupidity at the top, all the way around," came

the reply.98 Wilkinson's work described how an efficient
German military structure could be established without
threatening democratic political control. He recognised
that Germany had the most effective army but, with the
death of Bismarck, was now operating without civilian
political control.

In a democracy such military freedom

remained unacceptable.99
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While Ludlow went to Germany,
Switzerland.

Sanger went to

Switzerland attracted attention because it

was a republic with locally organised reserves. The
reserve forces were better trained and equipped than the
National Guard. The Swiss government could mobilise
several hundred thousand militia in twenty-four hours, an
impossible task for the American army.100
In October 1900 the Ludlow Board reconvened in
Washington D.C. to present a memorandum to Root that
suggested executive action. The board proposed an army war
college headed by a general officer, with the necessary
assistants,

all with four-year,

fixed-term appointments.

The war college would coordinate and provide a unified
army education system and provide advanced learning for
selected officers.

Fort Leavenworth, the Cavalry and

Infantry School would provide all practical training with
large military formations. The board warned Root that a
war college was no substitute for a general staff. Both
institutions were required for an efficient military.101
In a separate meeting Ludlow presented his ideas and a
copy of Wilkinson's Brain of the Army to the Secretary of
War. Root read Wilkinson's book and was greatly influenced
by it, but for now no action was taken on the
recommendations of the Ludlow Board with the presidential
election only weeks away.102
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The ongoing war in the Philippines and British
blunders in South Africa continued to give Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans domestic political problems.

In the

Philippines they awaited the arrival of Taft and his
fellow commissioners. Taft was joined by Henry C. Ide, a
New England lawyer and former Chief Justice of Samoa;
Professor Dean C. Worcester, a zoologist from the
University of Michigan; and historian Bernard Moses from
the University of California. This eminent group sailed
first to Japan where it had an audience with the emperor
and

left convinced of Japanese friendship

towards America.

The

party enjoyed several days of sightseeing and visited

the temples at Nikko, high in the mountains. Taft
described the trip to his brother, made more difficult by
his weight,

now close to 3 00 pounds:103

.... The road was steep and got steeper. I had one
pusher in addition to the jinrikisha man,
[jinrikisha a small light weight two wheeled
passenger vehicle], when I began, another joined
when we were halfway up, and it seemed to me that
[when] we struck the last hill the whole village was
engaged in the push. The Japanese seemed to look
upon me with great amusement; at the various
places we changed cars there were a great number of
people clattering along on their wooden platforms
which they used as shoes, and they gathered about me,
smiling and enjoying the prospect of so much flesh
and size....104
When the Commission finally arrived in Manila,

they

received a cool reception from the army high command.
MacArthur, the military commander, resented civilian
interference in the islands and so failed to greet them at
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the pier and assigned the commission only one room for an
office. Relations did not improve when Taft criticised
heavy-handed military operations and suggested cooperation
with the natives.
In America McKinley and Root were further discouraged
as the anti-imperialist movement gained support in the
South.

Senator Daniels from Virginia and E.L. Godkin

attacked imperial expansion which threatened a “w i t c h e s 1
cauldron of inter racial friction between Blacks, Asians,
and Anglo-Saxons."105 The increasing political opposition
to imperialism among previously sympathetic groups
increased the pressure on MacArthur to achieve victory.
The army was angry at Taft's conversations with "the
little brown brothers" and pressed Root to approve more
vigourous measures. MacArthur, without waiting for
approval from Washington,

ordered the execution of

Filipino prisoners in retaliation for atrocities committed
against U.S.

forces. Taft was furious, and his anger

reached a new level when MacArthur gave the former judge,
who prided himself on his legal knowledge,

a lecture on

the constitution. Taft wrote caustically to Root that it
was not often the constitution was used to maintain the
absolute power of a subordinate military commander against
presidential orders.106 The administration angered by this
civil-military bickering ordered MacArthur to cooperate
with Taft.
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At home the Republican Party reaffirmed support for
overseas expansion, despite increased support for Bryan
among Southern Democrats,
Americans.

Irish-Americans, and German-

Secretary of State James Hay sought advice from

British imperialist James Bryce on how to govern the
Philippines.107 Hay was convinced that a Franco-German
plot existed to undermine the Anglo-Saxon desire for free
trade.108 Root, Lodge,

and other Neo-Hamiltonian

Republicans continued to endorse a philosophy of
competitive natural selection, evangelical good works,
free trade.

In Chicago, Bishop Bowler,

and

summed up the pr e 

election mood of these expansionist Republicans:
Expansion is the law of Saxon life. When he accepted
individual accountability directly to God without
intervention of any man, then God gave him selfreliance and sent him about the job of saving the
world. Mrs Partington with her broom trying to sweep
back the tide of the ocean is more certain to win
than the men who stake their success fighting
expansion; for they are fighting not merely McKinley,
and the Rough Rider and the American People, but they
are also fighting the restless force ... of natural
selection - and they are also fighting God's external
purpose to elevate the races.
Expansion is in our blood, in our history, and
in our destiny .... If McKinley is elected he will
hold the United States up to the front as a world
power, secure the open door for trade and the gospel,
and help perpetuate civilization. Thus hastening the
end of heathenism and the Christianization of the
world.109
Roosevelt,

nominated as McKinley's running mate,

underlined the belief in American moral rectitude based
upon Anglo-Saxon superiority. He described expansion by a
"masterful people" as a source of pride and not regret.110
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Bryan travelled the country attacking militarism and
imperialism. He proposed public ownership of municipal
franchises, greater regulation of big business and
Filipino independence he also and sympathised with the
Boers in South Africa. The democratic leader warned
audiences repeatedly that an imperial policy must lead to
a larger standing army which would threaten American
liberty.111 Root responded with a widely reported speech
from Canton, Ohio in which he criticised anti-imperialists
for encouraging Filipinos to continue the war and praised
American forces for their successes in the Philippines and
China. The Secretary of War attacked proposals to regulate
efficient business organisations and the claim that a
larger army would be used to suppress labour.

In an attack

on Bryan's use of Jefferson to justify anti-imperialism,
Root reminded his audience that Jefferson had not
implemented democracy in the territories acquired in the
Louisiana Purchase. The speech angered Bryan, but was one
of the most effective of the campaign.112
Appreciative of the good coverage he had received,
Root thanked sympathetic journalist William Laffan of the
New York S u n . In his letter he again lambasted Bryan,
describing him as "a disgusting, dishonest fakir" and
concluded:
him,

"When I see so many Americans running after

I feel very much as I do when a really lovely woman

falls in love with a cad."113
On November 7, 1900 the election took place,

and the

Republican Party won in New England, the mid-Atlantic
States, and upper mid-West. Bryan carried the old
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Confederacy and Colorado, Montana,

Idaho, and Nevada.

It

was a convincing Republican victory. McKinley polled over
7.2 million votes,

against 6.3 million for Bryan.

In the

Senate the Republican Party took a fifty-five to thirtyone majority with four seats held by minority parties.
Nine of the fourteen senators who opposed Anglo-American
imperialism were defeated.114 The election vindicated the
policies of the Republican Party and strengthened the
position of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in American politics.
Attention turned once again to military reform and winning
the war in the Philippines.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Republican victory in the election of 1900 allowed
Neo-Hamiltonian ideas to flourish. Hay and Root continued
to control the State and War Departments. Theodore
Roosevelt,

a supporter of strong central government and

overseas expansion, was the new vice-president.

In the

Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Joseph R. Hawley, Albert J.
Beveridge,

and Joseph B. Foraker ensured staunch support

for imperialism and military reform. These men were
determined to expand American trade, promote military
reform,

and strengthen central government and dismissed

the of idea of the locally controlled agrarian republic as
irrelevant in the modern world.

In his early speeches

Roosevelt demanded larger armed forces,
merchant navy,

a subsidised

increased American exports,

and the

application of business methods to government to ensure
efficiency. To the new vice-president,

Jefferson was

simply "the most incompetent chief executive we ever
h a d . nl
The rapprochement between the Republican Party and
Great Britain continued. American neutrality in the Boer
War was at best ambiguous.
instructed Stanford Newell,
Netherlands,

Secretary of State John Hay
the U.S. ambassador to the

to discourage Boer President Kruger of the
13 8

139

Transvaal Republic from visiting America. McKinley
recalled the letter, but Kruger decided against coming to
America anyway.2 Throughout the Boer War American
businessmen provided the hard-pressed British army with
thousands of horses, hundreds of tons of animal feed, and
considerable amounts of foodstuffs. The New York Times
reminded those who were pro-Boer that thirty-eight percent
of all American exports went directly to Britain and that
over half of all American trade was with the British
Empire.3 Root,
Africc

like Hay,

supported British intervention in

and praised the new Anglo-Egyptian government of

Lord C r omer.4
In America, despite the convincing Republican
election victory, many people remained sceptical about the
value of imperial expansion or military reform. President
Charles Eliot of Harvard,

Lincoln Steffens, Mark Twain,

and William Dean Howells all joined Bryan in attacking
American involvement overseas.5 Bryan defended the ideals
of Jefferson and was furious with Root, who

compared the

annexation of the Louisiana territories in 1803 to the
annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines.

In a direct

attack on imperialism, Bryan quoted Jefferson:
is not in our principles;

"conquest

it is inconsistent with our

government."6 Mark Twain sent an "updated" version of the
Battle Hymn of the Republic to his friend Hay:
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I have read his bandit gospel writ in burnished
rows of steel,
As ye deal with my pretensions, so with you my
wrath shall deal,
Let the faithless sons of freedom, crush the
patriot with his heel,
Lo, greed is marching on.7
In the Philippines the American military position
deteriorated further. Mutual brutality encouraged greater
violence. The army resented both civilian criticism and
Taft's attempted policy of local reconciliation. Generals
MacArthur,

Young, and Bell ignored T a f t 's advice and

adopted more vigourous tactics to end the wa r . 8 Root
defended the army from charges of harsh conduct, both in
America and from the Philippine Civil Commission. Taft
found his ideas of reconciliation rejected, as the
government sought to end the war through military means.
In Washington, the administration was under pressure
to pass a new army bill before February 2, 1901 when the
temporary approval of a larger standing army ended.

If no

new legislation was approved, the army would return to its
pre-Spanish-American War level of 24,000 men. This force
was inadequate to meet the new defence commitments at
home,

in the Pacific,

and in the Caribbean. Root

instructed Carter to present a new army bill for
consideration by Congress.9 Nolonger inhibited by election
concerns, Root approved the inclusion of several reform
ideas in the new bill,
college,

including creation of an army war

a new corps structure for the artillery, the

amalgamation of the three bureaus concerned with army
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supply into one department,

fixed four-year appointments

to most staff bureaus, promotion by merit, and a permanent
increase in the size of the regular army.10 Root refused
to approve Carter's request to include general staff
legislation in the new bill. The Secretary of War remained
concerned that opposition to centralised army command
among staff officers, Naticnal Guard officers,

and

congressmen would threaten the possibility of any change
being approved.

This cautious approach by Root was

vindicated when the measures provoked considerable
protest.
Middle-ranking officers, who had waited for years for
promotion by seniority,

condemned promotion by merit.

In

an anonymous letter one major expressed the majority view:
I entered the army from West Point nearly 30 years
ago. I have never ceased to be a student; have
been faithful in the school of application, lyceums,
in the execution of the problems of minor tactics, as
subaltern, captain, squadron commander, in garrison
and field, in all which I have won the praise of my
superiors. The Spanish war, with its fine
opportunities came .... I never worked so hard before
... worn out with work I became the victim of malaria
.... Is there anything in this record of 30 years, or
in the labours of the past 3 3 months, to be ashamed
of? Is there anything worthy of punishment? If not,
why should I be deprived of the long delayed
advancement given by law? I should be glad to see
merit suitably rewarded but on behalf of myself and
hundreds of others do earnestly pray that Congress
may never approve so unjust a measure.11
Staff officers joined middle-ranking colleagues in
lobbying Congress to oppose army reform. The objections
raised by these officers received considerable support
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among those in Congress who feared any extension of
executive authority through the introduction of promotion
by merit or fixed-term staff appointments. Representative
John Hull, the House Military Affairs Committee chairman,
expressly informed Root that the majority of congressmen
opposed fixed four-year term staff appointments and
promotion by merit for these reasons.12 Root introduced a
compromise suggesting that only one-third of all
promotions be decided on merit. The president would select
one officer for promotion from a choice of three
recommended by an army promotion board.13 Congress
remained skeptical of this attempt to strengthen executive
authority over military appointments,

because the idea of

trained professionals advising a strong central authority
was not recognised by most Americans as an appropriate way
to achieve effective government.14
General Miles, the commanding general of the army,
announced his support for fixed-term staff appointments,
larger army, and more artillery,

a

but he opposed the other

suggested reforms.15 Most bureau chiefs resisted

reform

except the proposal to increase the size of the regular
army; all wanted more men for their particular
departments.

Brigadier General A.R. Buffington the

Ordnance Chief,

Inspector General J.C. Breckinridge,

Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington,

and Judge Advocate

General G. Norman Lieber rejected all suggested reforms.16
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Paymaster General Alfred Bates,
Greely,

Signals Chief Horace

and many artillery officers supported most of the

recommendations by Root. The inability of the army officer
corps to present a coherent program of reform aided those
opposed to any change in the traditional reliance on the
hastily mobilised volunteer.
Industrial analogies and the twin concepts of
"efficiency" and "professionalism" once more dominated the
debates on military reform. The issue of a separate bureau
for veterinarians was again advanced on the basis of
emerging professionalism.17 Root forcefully opposed
further fragmentation of command and lobbied hard against
such ideas. He wrote to Senate Military Affairs chairman,
Joseph Hawley,

that the creation of any further staff

bureaus only enhanced the disintegration of army command,
which in turn promoted inefficiency.18 Carter, the author
of the proposed reforms, was impressed with the ability of
modern business organisations to control diverse
specialisations and markets.

For military reformers there

were clear analogies between the success of American
business and organisational failure in the army. Carter
and Root believed that centralised control and clear lines
of command in any system created efficiency. Alexander
Hamilton had advocated such ideas in government,

and

American business success seemed to prove him right.
The expansion of the regular array had required the
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selection of 298 new staff officers and 837 new first and
second lieutenants so that the need for new officers added
impetus to recommendations for army education reform.19
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans regarded education as
essential to creating an efficient military profession and
Root was aware the current system was wholly inadequate.
In September,

1900 Colonel Joseph P. Sanger issued a

scathing attack on army education.

He -reported a lack of

standardised training in the National Guard, poor
educational facilities,

and the general ridicule of formal

education as a means of training in the army. No state had
classes for National Guard officers or non-commissioned
officers.

In the regular army, most officers received no

training after leaving West Point,

and only three percent

of enlisted men attended post schools.20 Military training
at universities was mostly symbolic and was ineffective
for current defence needs. All of the 104 university and
college courses were regarded as inadequate:
practice,

sanitation procedures,

target

and army administration

were omitted from the syllabus in many cases.21
In his annual report Root attempted to tackle these
problems. A new system of continuous education for army
officers v/as recommended.

Each army post would educate

junior military officers who had not attended West Point,
and a national system of certificates would document the
courses completed by junior officers.

Five service schools
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would provide specialist training for certain officers:
artillery training at Fort Monroe; engineering at
Washington Barracks;

submarine defence at Fort Tctten;

army medicine at Washington Barracks; and staff work at
Fort Leavenworth.22 The last would give officers
experience with large military forces in order to prevent
repetition of Spanish-American War command failures. A
permanent garrison of several thousand men would be
stationed at Fort Leavenworth to provide officers with
practical experience in handling brigade-size units.23
The final element of Root's proposed reforms was an
army war college.

The college would supervise and inspect

all other schools and oversee all aspects of military
education. The brightest officers would receive advanced
training in command and organisation at the college.
Strategic planning would be conducted on the basis of
military information gathered from abroad. A general
officer would head a five-man committee in charge of the
college.

The chief of artillery,

superintendent of West Point,

chief of engineers,

and the commander of Fort

Leavenworth would attend committee meetings as ex officio
members.24 Root hoped these officers would act as an
informal general staff by acting as the centre of
education and information gathering.
previously,

Six months

Root had expressed the reasons for these

changes before the Senate:
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Instead of having nothing but a poor, weak, simpleminded civilian secretary of war who is the only
person to bring the strings together of all this
multitudinous activity you have a board of the
leading officers of the army, including the heads of
all the staff departments whose business it is to
advise on all the great questions of military
preparation.2 5
Despite this testimony, many remained skeptical of Root's
proposals.
The proposed artillery reform abolished the
regimental system and created a new corps system,

sub

divided into coastal defence and field sections. The new
coastal fortifications,

built to defend communities from

naval assault in the Spanish-American War, were
undermanned so an increase of 7,000 artillerymen was
unanimously recommended by army officers as the solution
to the problem.26
These proposed organisational changes caused great
division of opinion in the army. Nelson Miles, army
traditionalists,

and most bureau chiefs opposed any change

to the regimental system.27 Typical opposition was
expressed by Inspector General Breckinridge who
pronounced:

"As a soldier I believe in regiments. This

section abolishes them.

It would disband admirable

regiments that have a history running back a hundred years
and an esprit de corps which might be the envy of the
world."28 Supporters of reform argued that the corps
system produced a more flexible organisation with a
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general officer providing a unified authoritative voice on
the needs of the artillery. Army artillery previously
struggled under the divided authority of regimental
colonels. The recommendation underlined Neo-Hamiltonian
desires for centralised army command which enhanced
political control over the army. The United States did not
rely exclusively on Germany for ideas on military reform,
for the suggested change in artillery -organisation was
borrowed from the corps structure used in the British
army.
The proposed introduction of fixed term assignments
for army officers proved controversial.
already outlined,

The staff system,

gave permanent tenure to officers

transferred to staff bureaus, which made them
unaccountable to the commanding general,

(see Appendix 1).

It created envy between staff and line officers as staff
officers enjoyed city life and influential political
friends. The introduction of fixed four-year staff
appointments,

followed by an automatic appointment for at

least two years to a field command,

attempted to solve

these problems. Only the president could re-appoint any
officer to the staff without an automatic re-detail to the
field.29 The recommendation applied to only six of the
twelve staff bureaus:

the Adjutant General's Office,

Inspector General's Office, Quartermaster's Department,
Commissary General's Office, Ordnance Department,

and
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Signal Corps.
knowledge,

Specialist technical or professional

excluded the other bureaus,

such as the

Engineers or Medical Corps. The reform was further limited
when Root agreed to apply the new measure to only the 155
new staff positions,

created by the expansion in the

army.30 The 185 current members of the army staff were,
both excluded from re-detail and guaranteed promotion by
seniority.31 These concessions underlined the significant
opposition to this reform by Congress and staff officers.
Throughout the nineteenth century the issue of staffline interchange had provoked endless controversy,
highlighted by the failed attempts to limit staff
appointments by the Banning,

Coburn,

and Garfield

committees on military reform.32 The bitter fight in
Congress to pass even a limited rotation of staff and line
officers confirmed the political acumen of Root, who
rejected any attempt to move quickly on radical reforms.
The measure endorsed by Congress limited staff experience
to only ten percent of all army officers in their first
twenty years of service. The majority of senior officers
would continue to have no staff experience. A full detail
system was only envisaged after twenty,

or thirty years,

when the last of the current staff officers had retired,
(see Table 3).
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF ALL ARMY OFFICERS AT
EACH GRADE LIKELY TO SERVE IN THE STAFF
RANK
Generals/Colonels
Lieut. Colonels
Majors
Captains
First Lieutenants
Second Lieutenants

PERCENTAGE OP TOTAL OFFICERS
34.2
35.6
23.4
30.6
9.6
None

Presented in hearings on the Army Bill before the Senate
Military Affairs Committee, 56th Cong. 2nd ses s . , Dec. 11,
1900, p . 63.
The Senate altered the final reading of the bill by
promoting Commanding General Miles and Adjutant General
Corbin. The top rank in the American army after the
retirement Sherman in 1883 was only major general, two
full ranks lower than most other armies. After years of
protest by senior officers, Congress agreed to restore the
rank of lieutenant general.33 Miles was promoted to
lieutenant general and Corbin to major general, restoring
the original rank distinction between the commanding
general,

adjutant general,

and the bureau chiefs.

On February 2, 1901 the new army bill was finally
passed by Congress. Root had achieved only a partial
victory. The expansion of the army was approved. The
regular army increased from 24,000 to 60,000 regulars.
This force could be further raised, at the discretion of
the president, to 88,000 in times of national emergency.34
Such a flexible system reflected both congressional
desires to keep the army small, and the Neo-Hamiltonian
wish for greater control by the executive. The president,
not Congress,

determined the size of the army.
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The focus of army expansion emphasised the view of
military reformers that "military preparedness" was the
best response to inevitable future conflict. Since the
training required for artillery and cavalry service took
longer than for the infantry, they received a larger
proportional increase in numbers. The number of infantry
regiments jumped from twenty five to thirty while the
number of cavalry regiments increased by fifty percent and
the new artillery force almost doubled in size.35 The new
artillery corps and the refusal to create any further
staff bureaus were victories for the supporters of
centralised command.

Congress, however,

refused to approve

the amalgamation of the three supply bureaus and severely
curtailed the implementation of staff-line interchange.
These failures and the decision by Root to tackle National
Guard reform in a separate bill underlined the political
strength of Democrats,

bureau chiefs,

and National Guard

officers and the Jeffersonian ideology of states rights,
volunteerism,

and local control.

The creation of the war college was the most
significant change agreed to by Congress. This institution
was a major step towards the general staff system, the
ultimate aim of the reformers.

Carter, Bliss, and

Schofield all pressed Root to continue the reform process.
All three hoped the secretary of war would introduce a
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general staff bill to Congress. Root, backed by a
politically secure executive, was more sympathetic than
previously to such requests. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans
hoped the new general staff would rectify previously
confused army management,

and strengthen executive

authority over the National Guard.
The idea of a staff for generals was many centuries
old. Originally they consisted of aides who relayed
messages throughout the army and clerks who copied and
kept orders. Larger armies required more efficient
administration and a new centralised body, the general
staff, emerged.

It administered, maintained,

and directed

the army.36 The first effective general staff system
appeared in early nineteenth-century Prussia. Prussia had
three powerful states on its borders:
Hungary,

France, Austria-

and Russia. National independence required an

efficient army. France's defeat of Prussia at Jena in 1806
underlined the importance of the army in preserving
national sovereignty. Military defeat forced Prussia to
reform its army and in 1807 a commission was established
to recommend a new military organisation.

This commission

included the most significant military thinkers of the
nineteenth century. Gerhard Scharnhorst, Neithardt von
Gneisenau, Karl von Stein, Karl von Grolman,

and Herman

von Boyen as commission members and Count Goetzen and Karl
von Clausewitz,

an important military theorist,

associate members.37

as
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These men hoped that military reform would serve as a
means to transform a monarchical absolutist state, with
its strict caste system,

into a liberal democratic state.

Prussia required an army for its existence, and,

if the

army recruited from all able-bodied male citizens,

it

should give these citizens access to government.38
Scharnhorst emphasised military education and promotion
based upon merit. He laid the foundation for an effective
military education system open to nobles and commoners,
with new war schools at Berlin, Konigsberg,

and Breslau,

and a new war academy in Berlin.39
It was this war academy that had impressed successive
generations of American military reformers.
Upton, Schofield, Bliss,

Sheridan,

and Ludlow all reported

favourably on the institution.

In 1821, the general staff

was established in Prussia as a separate department, which
reported through the war department to the King. This new
department had periodic staff-line officer reassignment.
Gneisenau developed the great general staff which remained
in Berlin, while other general staff officers, were
assigned to field commands to ensure the implementation of
staff planning.40 The Prussian nobility rejected liberal
reforms and convinced successive Prussian monarchs to
oppose democratic accountability over the military.
Liberal reformers had succeeded in creating an efficient
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military structure, which in the end became a bulwark
against liberalism and democracy.41
The Prussian General Staff expanded throughout the
nineteenth century.
Austria,

In 1866, during the war against

the king subordinated all units of the army to

the Chief of Staff von Moltke. This remarkable order
allowed Moltke to command the entire army, without
reference to either the king,

or war minister.42

Militarily successful, this degree of autonomy further
undermined civilian control over the military. Although
the order was rescinded between the armistice with Austria
in 1866 and war with France in 187 0, a dangerous precedent
was established. The rapid defeat of France in 1870
further weakened civilian political control over the army.
Military victories made the army popular. The General
Staff was rewarded for its success with complete control
over all military decision-making. The new German system
rejected the teachings of Clausewitz who warned that
military planning must always be subordinate to civilian
political policy.

In America,

only General U.S. Grant

enjoyed such freedom of command during the last year of
the Civil War. Moltke ignored the assertions of
Clausewitz,

Scharnhorst,

and Bismarck that military policy

must always implement civilian political goals.
by military victories,

Supported

he easily resisted civilian

attempts to regain some control over the army.43 Without
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the influence of wider political concerns, the German army
conducted its strategic planning in a political vacuum,
the fatal consequences of which were exposed in World War
One. The system, with its reputation for efficiency,
impressed Upton, Hazen,

Sherman,

and Grant. Only

Schofield,

among nineteenth-century American military

reformers,

realised that the autonomy given to the German

army was politically unacceptable in America.44
The German military system was unattractive to NeoHamiltonian Republicans who wanted stronger, not weaker,
political control over the army. Spencer Wilkinson's Brain
of the Army presented the Secretary of War with a solution
to this problem.45 Wilkinson argued that the essence of
government was a single strong authority and that the
object of representative government was to put authority
into the hands of a body which had the confidence of the
majority.

The problem with the British and American armies

was that government could not get professional advice
because they had failed as professional bodies. AngloAmerican armies lacked proper educational standards,
failed to plan for future conflicts,

and were unable to

present government with efficient prepared alternatives in
time of national emergency.46 The divided U.S. army
command structure only aggravated these failings,

(see

Appendix 1). The problem was how to reconcile a civilian
president who was commander-in-chief,

with the Commanding
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General of the army, who presumably was an expert.
Wilkinson presented the solution:
What we want for the defence of Great Britain is in
each of the two services, the navy and the army, a
department for campaigns and battles, for preparing
as Moltke prepared, for the next war, for the
directing it when it comes, and all the time training
and testing the admirals and generals. As the heads
of these two departments we want the best naval
strategist and the best military strategist in the
service; and we want no one whatever to stand between
either of these men and the Cabinet. Of course, when
I say Cabinet, I mean for this purpose the First Lord
of the Admiralty [Secretary of the Navy] and the
Secretary of State for War. Each of these
Ministers is the Cabinet to the service over
which he presides; when he says "yea" or "nay" it
is the Cabinet [President] that speaks through
him."47
Wilkinson's solution was close to the original idea of
Prussian military reformers who advocated a Prussian
general staff reporting to an elected civilian war
minister, who represented a politically accountable
government. Root instructed Carter to prepare a general
staff bill on the Wilkinson model.
American foreign policy was dominated by

policy of

"benevolent assimilation" in new colonies and the war in
the Philippines. The ideas of Josiah Strong, who believed
America had a moral duty to improve the lives of less
fortunate foreigners,

were partially implemented.

General

Young informed Army Headquarters in Manila that 203
schools teaching 10,714 children had been established and
he hoped enrollment would rise to 25,000 in a few months.
The general requested over 30,000 textbooks,

15,000
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slates,
English,

30,000 slate pencils,

seventy-five teachers of

and building materials for 150 school

buildings.48 In Washington, Root received reports from
High School Superintendent Eduardo Diaz and Morgan T.
Scudder, principal of New York State Normal School,

on

education in Cuba. The reports emphasised the need to
teach civics,

especially American democratic ideals, and

business methods to high school students.40 These social
reforms underlined the determination of Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans to combine Strong's claim of moral
responsibility with the extension of U.S. trading
opportunities.
The creation of politically stable,

English-speaking

democracies that endorsed free trade, would benefit
American exports.

In the competitive world market,

Republicans sought to support actively American business.
Root,

a corporate lawyer,

retained many business contacts

and staunchly supported attempts to increase U.S. exports.
The Secretary of War endorsed free trade and regarded the
Pacific as "the Ocean of the future." America could
dominate this new market through its control of more than
half the North American Pacific coastline,

Hawaii,

and the

Philippines.50 Root sent maps of Asia to prominent
industrialists to encourage trade with the east, regularly
requested information on foreign trade from his colonial
legal adviser Charles Magoon,

and defended the industrial
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trusts as elements of progress essential for foreign
trade,51 He agreed with Hay that Anglo-American friendship
was bound by many ties and that Japan and Germany were
America's main commercial rivals.52 Only fishing rights
off the coast of Canada and right of free passage in any
proposed Panama Canal remained as difficult issues between
Britain and the United States.
The large increase in the regular army allowed Root
to recommend promotion for several officers. Adna Romanza
Chaffee, who commanded U.S.

forces during the Boxer

rebellion in China, was promoted to major general.

Five

other officers were promoted to brigadier general,
including Leonard Wood and J. Franklin Bell, men
sympathetic to army reform and to the ideas of NeoHamiltonianism.53 The promotion of Wood from surgeon
captain to brigadier general was the most contentious.
Wood joined the army as a contract surgeon on June 9, 1885
having graduated from Harvard in 1884. His military
career,

like that of most army reformers, was

unrepresentative of the standard army career. He was not a
Civil War veteran but had served extensively in the South
west in the campaigns against the Apache Indian. After the
capture of Geronimo,
McPherson,

Georgia.

he was appointed surgeon at Fort
In the early 1890s he became attending

surgeon to Presidents Cleveland and McKinley.
he organised the 1st Volunteer Cavalry,

In May 1898,

"The Rough
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Riders," with his good friend Theodore Roosevelt. Upon the
surrender of Spanish forces in Cuba, he was appointed
governor of Santiago.
His attempts to implement sanitary and educational
reforms gained favourable recognition from Root. Wood was
a staunch imperialist who admired the British Empire. He
supported military reform both to sustain American
expansion overseas and because he believed international
conflict was unavoidable. A close friend of Roosevelt, his
outspoken defence of American imperialism and support for
army reform made him a staunch supporter of NeoHamiltonian Republicanism.

In December,

1899, he was

appointed governor of Cuba and promoted to major general
of volunteers.54 His regular army rank remained captain
and surgeon. The promotion of "Doctor" Wood over hundreds
of colleagues caused the first of many controversies which
occurred throughout Wood's career. Corbin,

Shafter,

other senior officers resented the promotion,

and

but Wood

proved an able officer who encouraged army reform and
American imperialism.55 Wood and Corbin soon became firm
friends. The Adjutant General quickly recognised his
abilities and stated:

"I have never ceased to say that it

is utterly wrong in principle, but I also say that ... the
man is eminently worthy ... Wood is a soldier and a
scholar.1,56
The promotion of James Franklin Bell created further
resentment among many regular army officers. Bell had
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graduated from the U.S. Army Military Academy in 1874.
Wagner, Bliss, and Carter were all his classmates. After
graduation he served extensively in the West. A captain in
the 7th Cavalry in 1898, he served in the Philippines and
was rapidly promoted to volunteer major,
colonel,

lieutenant

and brigadier general. On Sept. 9, 1899, he won

the Congressional Medal of Honour during fighting against
Filipino forces near Poroa Luzon.57 A n advocate of tough
reprisals against Filipino guerrillas, he attracted
favourable attention from army superiors, Root, and
Roosevelt. Governor Taft, attempting a policy of
reconciliation in the islands, was less impressed. Bell
was promoted over 1036 more senior colleagues and, with
Wood, represented a major assault on promotion by
seniority. Both officers were to have a significant role
in future army reform.58
The poor performance of the American army in China
increased pressure on Root to implement further army
reforms.

In the early spring, William Crozier, the

ordnance chief for American forces in China identified
the poor training of officers,
country,

ignorance about the

lack of forward planning,

and supply failures as

major problems affecting the army.59 The world-wide
commercial expansion of Germany and uncertainty over the
intentions of Japan added impetus to demands for army
reform.
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The improvement in Anglo-American relations continued
with sympathetic reaction to British imperial development,
while Japanese and German expansion was severely
criticised.

Secretary of State John Hay wrote to his

friend Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, hoping for a speedy end to
the Boer War and the creation of a "new English- speaking
commonwealth South of the Zambesi" and in Eastern A s i a . 60
While Hay encouraged British imperialism, Roosevelt railed
at German belligerence:
Some friends of mine who have been at the German
field manoeuvres last year were greatly impressed
with the evident intention of the German military
classes to take a fall out of us when the
opportunity arises. I find that the Germans regard
our failure to go forward ... as a sign that our
spasm of preparation, as they think has come to an
end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few
years they will be in a position to take some
steps in the West Indies or South America which
will make us put up or shut up on the Monroe
Doctrine .... I wish to see us act upon the old
frontier principle, Don't bluster, don't flourish
your revolver and never draw unless you intend to
shoot.61
The opinions of both the secretary of state and the
vice-president emphasised a new Anglo-American
understanding.

Throughout the spring of 1901, relations

between America and both Japan, and Germany,
deteriorate.

continued to

In April it was discovered that Mr. Taiyo

Hojo, a Japanese consular official in Manila, was acting
as a spy for Filipino guerrillas. He accompanied U.S.
missions against Filipino forces and passed information on
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American troop dispositions to the guerrillas. He was
arrested and deported to Japan.62 Root reported this
action by the military to secretary of state John Hay.
Later the same day, Root reported further evidence of
Japanese treachery to the State Department. The U.S.
military attache in Beijing reported certain steamers
smuggling arms from Japan, via Hong Kong, to Manila. The
secretary of war asked the British government in London to
tighten customs procedures in the colony.63
Despite these developments, the American army seemed
close to victory in the Philippines. On March 23,
Brigadier General Frederick Funston,

1901

in a da?:ing

undercover raid, captured the guerrilla leader Aguinaldo.
Funston intercepted a courier carrying a message from
Aguinaldo to his brother requesting reinforcements.

The

general organised 81 Tagalog-speaking Macebe scouts who,
with Funston and three others disguised as captured
American officers,

entered Aguinaldo's camp and captured

the elusive guerrilla leader.

Funston rushed his prisoner

to the coast where they boarded the U.S.S. Vicksburg. This
daring raid made Funston the hero of the hour and
depressed many of his contemporaries, who regarded him an
irksome blowhard.64 Aguinaldo ordered a cease-fire and
much of the fighting on Luzon stopped.
islands, however,
groups.

In outlying

the war continued with various tribal
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In Washington, Assistant Secretary of War George D.
Meiklejohn was replaced by William C. Sanger. Sanger, from
New York State, was Roosevelt's friend, attended Root's
alma mater, Hamilton College, and was an expert on the
militia. The appointment signalled Root's determination to
reform the National Guard and demonstrated Roosevelt's
influence over appointments.66 The vice-president was
responsible for advancing the careers of Wood, Bell,
Crozier,

Sanger, and others who contributed greatly to

military reform. The appointment of Sanger,
Hamiltonian Republican,

a Neo-

indicated McKinley's willingness

to endorse further military reform. While Sanger
familiarised himself with his office, Root was compelled
to review colonial, not military problems.
In the early summer a constitutional convention
established a new American-Cuban relationship. The
agreement featured many of the imperialist goals of NeoHamiltonians.

Cuba was forbidden from concluding treaties

with any foreign power or allowing the construction of
military bases by foreign powers. The United States
reserved the right to intervene in Cuba, to protect life
or property,

and demanded a naval station on the island at

Guantanamo. Wood, as governor of the island, presented the
American terms to the islanders. The agreement, ensured a
virtual American protectorate over the island.66
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In the Philippines the capture of Aguinaldo reduced
the level of fighting. Root took the opportunity to remove
MacArthur and replace him with Chaffee, the successful
commander in the Boxer Rebellion. The Secretary of War
hoped this change would improve the poor relations between
Governor Taft and the army in the Philippines. On July 4,
1901, the formal transfer from MacArthur to Chaffee took
place. MacArthur headed home to a hero's welcome in
California, despite allegations of corruption among his
staff, which included giving favoured status to certain
companies in return for a percentage of the profits.67
The appointment of Chaffee failed to heal the rift
between the army and civilian authority. Otis, MacArthur,
Chaffee,

and Young believed the Filipinos to be

untrustworthy heathens who required enlightened American
leadership so the duty of the army was to restore order
and introduce democracy and capitalism to an inferior
people. Taft rejected this indictment and criticised the
draconian measures imposed on local people. He infuriated
the army by inviting Filipino leaders to dinner and
consulting them on government reform.68
Chaffee,

a career soldier who felt more comfortable

on a horse than behind a desk, soon fell out with Taft. He
informed the Governor that he distrusted native government
and that he intended to give the Filipino "bayonet rule"
for years to come. Later he informed a journalist,

"if you

should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put
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away, don't grow too sentimental over it." Chaffee brought
in his fellow cavalrymen, J. Franklin Bell and Jacob
Smith, officers who believed in a thorough prosecution of
the war to deal with rebellions in Batangus and Samar.69
(see map, p . 60 Chpt.

2). The methods employed by these

officers later caused a major political scandal.
The continued failure of the British to secure
victory in South Africa annoyed those Neo-Hamiltonians
attempting to convince the American public of the benefits
of imperialism. The Army and Navy J o u r n a l , impatient with
British failure,

sought to explain what had happened. The

British lacked business efficiency.

Piecemeal organisation

and divided command created unpreparedness and gross
inefficiency. The Journal continued:

"if a railroad,

after

being reorganised, were placed entirely under the control
of the engineers and traffic superintendents,
be long before it came to grief again.

it would not

It must have

business managers." The solution for the British was to
put the army staff "upon a business footing" and have as
head a man,

"thoroughly versed in business methods."70

Later that month, Root received from Paymaster General
Alfred Bates a letter

advocating the amalgamation of

staff bureaus on the basis of business efficiency.71
Despite this enthusiasm for applying business methods to
the army,

opposition to reform remained widespread. The

New York Evening Post described Root's reforms as "An Act
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to Make the President of the United States a Military
Dictator" and attacked the extension of federal powers.72
McKinley's administration ignored these criticisms,
implemented the reforms already approved,

and planned

further changes.
In the summer of 1901, the War Department selected
Washington Barracks as the site of the new war college.
Major General S.B.M. Young was appointed college
president.

Young and the other officers appointed had no

training in the role of a war college. Root hoped the war
college could act as a de facto general staff, until
Congress approved the creation of a new staff system. The
decision overburdened an inexperienced War College Board
with administrative, planning,

and educational functions.

The early development and success of the college was
severely curtailed by this decision.73
Military reform was only one important proposal,
among several,

suggested by Neo-Hamiltonians to strengthen

federal government. The consular service,
government,

local

and federal civil service, also required

reform. To create a strong centralised government,
by professionals,

advised

required that provincial amateurs be

replaced throughout government.74 Business ideas of
organisation influenced reform in each of these areas.

In

1900, the first municipality was established in Galveston,
Texas. The municipality was designed to operate as a
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business corporation, which applied business methods to
public service. Municipal commissionaries were regarded as
a board of directors.

By 1907 the corporate idea in local

government was common in Texas,

and by 1913 over 3 00

cities adopted such an organisation. Municipal
commissionaries planned for the future, adjudicated
between competing interest groups, and coordinated city
government, much like the functions of- an army general
staff.75
In August 1901 Brigadier General William Ludlow died.
An efficient colonial administrator and enthusiastic
supporter of military reform, his death was a set-back for
supporters of military reorganisation. Having completed
the recommendations of the Ludlow Board, which he
presented to Root, he was posted to the Philippines. On
the outward passage he contracted bronchial problems
diagnosed in Manila as tuberculosis. He returned home
immediately and died two months later, at Convent,

New

Jersey; he was fifty-seven.76 William H. Carter made
extensive use of Ludlow's ideas as plans for a general
staff slowly developed. The ill-health of both the
Secretary of War and Senator Hawley,

chairman of the

Senate Military Affairs Committee, hindered progress on
introducing further military reform for much of the year.
Root was ill throughout most of the early spring and much
of the autumn of 1901 with influenza,

colic and a series
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of painful boils.77 In early September, despite continued
ill-health, Root announced his intention to introduce a
general staff bill that year.78
Unfortunately,

two disasters halted all progress on

military reorganisation. On September 6, while attending
the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, president William
McKinley was shot. He died six days later. The sudden
death of McKinley temporarily paralysed government with a
period of mourning and the arrival of a new president.79
The second tragedy occurred three weeks later.
Company C, 9th U.S.

Infantry,

camped at Balangiga,

was almost all massacred in a native attack,
p . 60 Chpt.
Connell,

Samar,

(see map,

2). The unit was commanded by Captain Thomas

a devout Catholic, who decided that on Sundays

only camp sentries were to carry arms. Native forces
surprised the unarmed soldiers at breakfast on Sunday,
September 27. Armed with only tent poles, hot water, and
shovels,

a few men made it to boats on the coast. The

following day six survivors,
eight men and three officers,

out of a total of eightyreported the tragedy to the

regiment. The relief column discovered terrible savagery
in the camp; Connell's body was found decapitated and on
fire, other bodies were burnt or slit open and stuffed
with camp stores.80
The massacre was reported extensively in America,
Roosevelt,

the new president,

and

quickly endorsed the army's
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demand for harsh retaliation.

Chaffee, the army commander

in the Philippines, was furious at the death of colleagues
who had served with him in China. The general attacked
Taft's policy of friendship and promised tough reprisals.
Roosevelt and Root supported Chaffee, and Taft was left
isolated in his role as civilian governor.
announced his sympathy with civilian,

In vain Taft

not military,

methods and insisted that "justice requires that both
sides should be heard before judgement is given." Neither
the army nor Roosevelt was prepared to be so reasonable.
The President wrote to Taft instructing the Governor to
come to terms with Chaffee.81 To compound a miserable
October for Taft, he contracted Dengue fever,

and was

forced to return to America for treatment.
The departure of Taft, removed the only voice of
restraint and compromise on the islands and left Chaffee
and the army free to deal with the natives. Taft, the
reluctant imperialist,

read Kipling to his staff before he

departed for San Francisco:
Now it is not good for the Christian
To hustle the Aryan brown.
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles,
And he weareth the Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a toombstone white,
And the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph dear, "A fool lies here,
Who tried to hustle the East.82
Chaffee met his colleagues,
Jacob Smith,

J. Franklin Bell and

and instructed both to show no mercy against
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suspected guerrillas.

Bell ordered a Filipino prisoner

shot every time an American soldier died. Both Bell and
Smith ordered field commanders not to discourage junior
officers who were "over enthusiastic" in carrying out
their orders. Bell described the new policy as a short
aggressive war, where the innocent and guilty suffered to
produce a quick conclusion. The example of William T.
Sherman in the Civil War justified the. army's actions.83
In contrast to events in the Philippines, the attempt
to establish American primacy in the Caribbean proceeded
smoothly.

In Cuba, Wood reported local approval for the

American conditions for independence,
America,

increased trade with

a drop in yellow fever and continued progress in

educational reform.84 In November 1901, Lord Landsdowne
signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which established
conditions for a Panama canal.85 The agreement abrogated
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which stipulated any
canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must never
be fortified or controlled by either Great Britain or the
United States. The new treaty allowed America to
construct,

control, and fortify any isthmian canal. The

agreement concluded by Lord Pauncefote, the British
ambassador who was an expert on international canal
legislation,

and John Hay, the secretary of state,

emphasised increasing Anglo-American cooperation.86
For many senior British officials the SpanishAmerican War had been a decisive event. The brief war both
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stimulated American naval construction and showed the
ability of the U.S. navy in battle.

TABLE 4
BATTLESHIP NUMBERS 1896-1906: BUILT AMD UNDER
CONSTRUCTION.
Year/Country
1896
1898
1901
1904
1906

6.B.
57
63
66
68
67

6ER.
24
22
36
38
39

FR.
35
36
33
42
41

U.S.
12
13
18
25
28

JAP
-

6
7
9
17

From the Accounts and Papers in the Parliamentary Records
cited by Aaron L. Freidberg, The Weary T i t a n , p . 153.
Great Britain,

confronted by German, Russian, Japanese,

and American industrial and military growth, could
nolonger expect to dominate world trade. The solution was
a new mutual understanding between the two "Anglo-Saxon1'
powers and in 1902 an alliance with Japan against Russia.
The weakened British position was emphasised by the
deterioration in British naval superiority

(see table 4).

Britain regarded Russia and Germany as the greatest
military threats to its world position. To defend the
empire against the challenge,
other powers.

required comprimise with

In a letter to the prime minister's private

secretary, George Clarke, secretary of the Committee on
Imperial Defence,

summed up the British position:

What is best not to say is that we believe that
the idea of opposing the navy of the United States
...
close to its bases must be abandoned. This
naturally altered some strategic aspects of this
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part of the world. In years not far distant, we
shall be quite unable to oppose the navy of Japan
in its own waters. It is best to recognise facts,
but not always proclaim them from the housetop.87
In America Neo-Hamiltonians happily endorsed this new
reapproachment with Great Britain.
On October 23, 1901, Root returned to reforming the
War Department after a three-month absence due to
McKinley's death,

ill-health,

and the distractions of

events in the Philippines. The new President and Root were
concerned by the level of army staff opposition to reform.
They decided to weaken this opposition through the
promotion of younger officers to senior positions. JudgeAdvocate General G. Norman Lieber,
legal officer,

as the army's senior

advised Congress and the War Department on

the constitutionality of reform. His opposition to
military reorganisation seriously hampered the progress of
reform legislation.88 Root wanted a chief legal officer
who actively supported change: particularly contentious
militia reform which involved increasing presidential
authority.

He selected Deputy Judge Advocate Lieutenant

Colonel George B. Davis. Davis served on General
Butterfield's Committee on Militia Reform in late 1899. He
was familiar with the arguments and indicated his support
for greater federal control over local reserves.89
Root also wanted to replace ordnance chief Brigadier
General A.R. Buffington. The Ordnance Department performed
poorly in the Spanish-American War and had been criticised
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by Congress and the army line. The bureau had refused to
cooperate with the artillery service or Board of Ordnance
and Fortification.90 Roosevelt and Root wanted to abolish
the overlapping functions of these organisations, to
produce a simplified,
William Crozier,
in China,

"business organisation." Captain

the ordnance chief with American forces

impressed the President with his enthusiasm for

army reorganisation.91 Crozier was only forty-seven years
old. A senior captain,

he had served in the army for

twenty-six years in both the artillery and Ordnance
Department at home and abroad. He was an expert on small
ship design and European Ordnance and had travelled widely
in Europe. At West Point he attended classes with Carter,
Bliss, Wagner,

and Bell,

all prominent supporters of

military change.92 These two nominations, which ignored
promotion by seniority, provoked immediate opposition in
the Senate. Roosevelt and Root again confronted the
opposition in a protracted fight.93
In late November 1901, Root released his annual
report as secretary of war.

It contained an outline of

proposed military reorganisation. The main recommendations
included an expansion in military education; the
integration of the National Guard with the regular army,
common training,

and standardised equipment; amalgamation

of supply bureaus and the creation of a general staff.94
Root argued strongly for all the reforms and wrote of the
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general staff proposal:
No one can doubt the general and field officers of
our army have been too exclusively occupied in the
details of administration, with inadequate
opportunity and provision for the study of great
questions, the consideration and formulation of
plans, comprehensive forethought against future
contingencies, and coordination of the various
branches of the service with a view to harmonious
action .... I strongly urge the establishment by law
of a general staff, of which the war college
board shall form a part.95
The report praised American expansion overseas and the
social reforms implemented in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Philippines.

and the

Root argued for new low tariffs in the

Pacific and Caribbean to encourage American exports.
Support for a subsidised merchant navy was encouraged.
Lastly,

the continued guerrilla war in the Philippines was

dismissed as "minor in character."96
Root's report outlined an agenda of reform which
stressed the dominant Neo-Hamiltonian,

imperial,

and

business influences within the Republican Party. The
general staff and National Guard reform proposals weakened
state control and promoted presidential power.
bureau amalgamation produced simplified,
command,

Staff

centralised

apparently similar to successful American

business enterprises.

The suggested promotions of Crozier

and Davis indicated a commitment to merit-based
professionalism and not amateur volunteerism.

Root's

attempts to belittle continued problems in the Philippines
and his praise for Wood's colonial reforms emphasised the
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continued importance of imperialism to the Republican
Party. Local political control and a volunteer army,
however, remained popular ideas nationally. Many people
were still unwilling to trust a system of limited
professional military freedom under a strong federal
government, far removed from local control. The attempt to
turn Root's proposals into law emphasised these
ideological divisions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ROOT'S ARMY REFORMS
On December 7, 1901 Roosevelt delivered a
presidential message arguing that America needed a more
efficient, better educated army. The United States did not
need a larger army but ought to have professional armed
forces selected by merit to achieve military efficiency. A
general staff, with a chief of staff at its head, ought to
plan and coordinate army actions. The militia law was
obsolete. Roosevelt recommended a major extension of
executive authority. The training,
organisation,

equipment,

and

of the National Guard was to be placed under

federal control. The President concluded by supporting
Root's reforms passed in 1901: the substitution of fouryear details from the line for permanent appointments in
staff divisions,
artillery,

the creation of a unified command for the

and the ability of the executive to determine

the size of the army. The implementation of general staff
and militia reform, would complete the successful
transformation of the army into a professional body
responsive to central government.1
The suggested reforms were opposed by the established
alliance of senior staff bureau members,
Democrats,

congressional

state governors, many militia officers,

Commanding General of the army Nelson Miles. Miles
183

and
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resented the creation of an army war college, which placed
military education under the control of the adjutant
general not his office. He thought further training of
army officers unnecessary and was appalled at the prospect
of joint training with "certain classes of men"
principally the National Guard. Miles claimed that the
suggested reforms were more appropriate to a "military
aristocracy" or "monarchical Germany," than to the
American Republic.2
Root decided to challenge his opposition. Carter,
Young, Bliss, and Ludlow convinced the Secretary of

War

that the war college could not perform as a general
staff.3 This decision caused great animosity between Miles
and Root.

In early December Miles got into further trouble

when, as chairman of a board on post closures, he reviewed
political and military considerations. The General was
reminded that political considerations were the domain of
Congress and the executive.4 Miles persisted in commenting
upon issues unconnected with his office, and in late
December, he was again disciplined by Root when he
supported Admiral Dewey in his claim for credit in the
naval victory over Spain.5 Angry at Miles's disobedience,
Root announced the new chairman of the War College Board
would be Major General S.B.M. Young. The Board, approved
by Roosevelt, was the first step towards a general staff.
The other members

of the Board remained unannounced

six months passed

before its first meeting.6

and

185

Events in the Philippines repeatedly prevented
Roosevelt and Root from introducing further military
reform. Major General Chaffee appointed his friend
Brigadier General Jacob Smith to command the district
where the Balangiga massacre had occurred. A veteran of
the Indian wars, he regarded all non-whites as savages and
was nicknamed "Hell-Raising Jack." Smith informed
reporters that he intended to burn all of Samar and
inflict heavy casualties on the natives. This report and
orders by Bell and Chaffee to shoot civilians and
prisoners were reported extensively in the American
press.7
The army supported the new tough measures. Major
General Young summed up army feelings on the Philippines
War, civilian interference,

and Japanese involvement in a

highly publicised speech delivered in Washington:
War does not usually come before full scope has
been given to forensic display, and diplomacy has
exhausted itself. When war does come, the humanity
talked of in times of peace has no place. To carry
on war, disguise it as we may, is to be cruel; it
is to kill and burn, burn and kill, and again kill
and b u r n . ... I feel confident our little Jap
friends would have stopped the pattering of the
bare feet of our "little brown brothers" through the
jungle in a very short time, and that the aggressive
Army of our German friends would not have viewed with
equanimity the burying alive of their friends as did
our soldiers in obedience to home sentiment....
Young finished by stressing the views of Sumner, Croly,
and Strong and the importance of Social Darwinism and
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evangelical-inspired reform. He concluded:
God is good and He is forgiving, but He is also
just, and I believe, when the day of judgement
comes He will surely award the proper punishment to
the
malicious slanderers of His Army.
That the American Army was His Army in Cuba and
the Philippines, I believe,
admits no doubt. No army
that had been neglected for so many years by its
government and was so ill prepared for war could have
achieved such remarkable success, unless He took it
in His special care.8
Many newspaper editors and congressmen were appalled
at the flagrant disregard for human rights by the army.
Senator Lodge was forced to establish a congressional
committee on the Philippines to review army actions.
Supporters of imperialism were appointed to fill
Republican vacancies on the committee.
Beveridge,

Proctor,

Senators Lodge,

and William Allison sought to reduce

harmful testimony by the various witnesses. Ant i 
imperialist Democrats Thomas Patterson,
Culbertson,

Charles

and Joseph L. Rawlins, however,

secured

injurious admissions from Brigadier General R.R. Hughes,
and Governor William H. Taft. Taft specifically condemned
the indiscriminate attacks on the native population in
retaliation for acts of violence.9 The Anti-Imperialist
League gained more public support.

Samuel Gompers,

American Federation of Labor President,

the

Edwin Lawrence

Godkin and Horace White, editors of the New York P o s t , and
Professor Henry Van Dyck joined Carl Schurz, Carnegie,
Howells,

and others in denouncing imperialism.10
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Despite these difficulties,
his program of military reform.
Carter, and William Cary Sanger,

Root continued to develop
In early January 1902
the new assistant

secretary of war, drafted the new militia legislation.11
Root outlined the proposals to sympathetic newspaper
editors in late January.12 In the Senate, the bill was
introduced by Senator Hawley, chairman of the Senate
Military Affairs Committee,

and in the- House by Charles

Dick, who had access both to the recommendations of the
unofficial Butterfield Committee and to the views of
Carter and Sanger. A Republican from Ohio and secretary of
the Republican National Committee, he supported militia
reorganisation. As a major general in the Ohio National
Guard, however, he understood that most of the militia
opposed any federal interference.13 The bill entitled "To
Increase the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other
Purposes" was the first attempt to modernise the militia
since 1792. The bill re-defined the duties of the National
Guard:

equipment and training would be standardised to

match that in the regular army and in times of national
emergency the militia would operate under federal control
as a national reserve.14
Root hoped to introduce general staff legislation in
tandem with militia reform. The legislation was delayed,
however,
chiefs.

by Carter, who sought a compromise with bureau
Carter was convinced that the proposed
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amalgamation of supply bureaus threatened the passage of
general staff legislation. Root rejected this advice as
Roosevelt pressed for a comprehensive reform bill. On
February 14, 1902 the army reorganisation measures were
placed before Congress.15 The bill created a new
department of supply,

commanded by a major general, with

four sub departments responsible for army pay, all aspects
of supply,

and transportation. The amalgamation of supply

bureaus was justified on the basis of centralisation in
business, which apparently had created greater efficiency.
Colonel Carter reaffirmed this when he informed Congress
that departmental consolidation was in vogue with the
great corporations. The second item suggested was a
general staff. The Office of the Commanding General,
Adjutant General's Department,

and Inspector General's

Office would be amalgamated to create this new body.
Headed by a lieutenant general,

it would include thirty-

six officers who held the rank of lieutenant or above in
the regular army. The lowest staff grade was captain,

and

each officer detailed for four years could only be r e 
appointed after having served two years in the field.16
Presidential selection of staff officers and control
over re-appointment underlined the continued attempt to
increase executive authority at the expense of Congress.
The reforms were justified on the basis of certain future
conflict which required an efficient military.

The success
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of American industry suggested organisational competence
was possible by applying the methods of business
organisation.

In the North American R e v i e w . Carter

compared the structure of a general staff to the
management board of a vast railroad which manipulated
international markets,
distances,

carried diverse freight over vast

and maintained thousands of miles of track.17

Root outlined the relevance of business principles in
defending the amalgamation of supply bureaus before the
Senate Military Affairs Committee.18 Even those opposed to
reform used business organisation examples to support
their position.
Progress on the General Staff Bill was disrupted by
the need for Root and Roosevelt to justify army actions in
the Philippines.
Hull,

The poor health of Republican J.A.T.

chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee,

also delayed the passage of army reform.19 The harsh
measures used in the Philippines increased opposition both
to American expansion overseas and to the military reform
which proposed a stronger federal army. Roosevelt and Root
were alarmed by increasing opposition to their policies.
Root published a document entitled Charges of Cruelty,
e t c . . To the Natives of the Philippines 1902 to answer
opponents of imperialism. The document claimed cruelty by
the army against civilians was rare but, unfortunately,
highlighted light sentences given to offending soldiers.
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Newspaper editors seized on one case,

in which an army

lieutenant killed a prisoner and was sentenced to five
years hard labour. Roosevelt commuted the sentence to half
pay for nine months and forfeiture of thirty-five places
on the promotion lists.20 The story created an uproar in
the country and provided opponents of military reform and
imperialism with more support.
The Commanding General sensed an opportunity to
embarrass Root and supporters of army reform. He asked the
President for permission to visit the Philippines because
the large forces committed,
involved,

the considerable expenditure

and the severity under which the war was being

conducted made a visit necessary.21 Roosevelt determined
to prevent unwanted interference by the ambitious Miles,
denied the request.

Several days later, Miles leaked his

request to visit the islands to the press. Roosevelt was
incensed and publicly rebuked Miles,

reminding him that he

was in overall command at Wounded Knee, when the army
shelled helpless Indian women and children. Undaunted,
Miles suggested he be appointed military governor of the
islands an idea the President and Root quickly rejected.22
In Congress opposition to the army reforms increased.
The new staff legislation was attacked by bureau chiefs
who saw their autonomy threatened. The Inspector General,
Quartermaster General,

and Paymaster General all opposed

the new staff structure.23 Commanding General Miles
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produced the most hostile testimony to the bill. Relations
between Miles and the administration,

always difficult,

degenerated to a new low. Roosevelt detested the
Commanding General,

and even in 1899 he had warned Lodge

of Miles's obsessive desire to be president and the
difficulties Root faced in dealing with Miles.24 Miles was
determined to remain commanding general and rejected the
post of chief of staff,

a position he regarded as inferior

to his own.
Root and Carter were surprised by Miles's powerful
testimony against all the suggested reforms.25 He
denounced the consolidation of the three supply bureaus
and the recommendation for a general staff, which
disbanded his office of commanding general. Miles argued
that the creation of an army transport division only added
another bureau to the three already responsible for army
supply.

In an appeal to past glories,

he staunchly

defended the current structure:
More than 100 years ago our Army was organized by
the genius of Washington, Steuben, Hamilton, and
others. In all wars in which we have been engaged
it has in the end been victorious .... In my
judgement, a system that is the fruit of the best
thought of the most eminent and ablest military men
that this country has produced should not be
destroyed by substituting one that is more adopted
to the monarchies of the Old World .... Unlike our
Presidents, the sovereigns of Spain, Italy, Turkey,
Austria, Germany, and Russia, are trained from their
earliest boyhood with a view to commanding armies ...
such as suggested might be better adopted for those
countries than our Republic.
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Miles warned of the dangers in military
centralisation which a General Staff created. He appealed
to the committee,

dominated by Civil War veterans, not to

abolish the office of commanding general held with
distinction by Grant,
by declaring:

Sherman,

and Sheridan. He concluded

"It seems to me you are throwing the door

wide open for a future autocrat or a military despot."26
Miles's position as the top ranking soldier in the country
and as a noted Civil War veteran increased the effect of
his testimony with many senators who had themselves served
in the Civil War. The Grand Army of the Republic the
powerful congressional lobby group which represented Civil
War veterans,
his testimony,

endorsed Miles's views. At the conclusion of
Carter, who had been present throughout,

was informed by Senator Hawley that no favourable action
on the bill was likely. Hawley,
testimony,

impressed by Miles's

joined Democrats in opposing the bill.

Root reported the effect of Miles's testimony to the
President and the cabinet. After a prolonged debate,

they

unanimously decided to continue with the army reform
proposals.27 Determined to encourage further American
expansion overseas,

Roosevelt, Hay, Root,

and others knew

that future conflict was certain future American greatness
depended on the ability to hold possessions in the
Pacific,

control Asian trade,

and defend American

interests in the Caribbean and Americas. Root openly
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admitted to Carnegie,

a staunch anti-imperialist, the

desire of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans to control the
Caribbean from the,

"point of Florida to the gateway of

the proposed Isthmian canal."28 The continued attempts to
buy the Danish West Indies and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
on the isthmian canal underlined this statement.

In late

January 1902, the Senate supported Neo-Hamiltonian
policies and approved the purchase of the Danish West
Indies,

but the Danish Rigsdag rejected the offer. The

Danish government only agreed to a sale in 1917 and after
a national plebiscite,
Thomas,

the islands of St. Croix,

St.

and St. Martin were purchased for $25 million.

Certain of full cabinet support for military reform,
Root and Carter planned the counter attack against their
opponents. Root arranged for retired generals Schofield,
and Merritt to testify before Congress.

Both men were

famous Civil War veterans with distinguished military
careers. Root hoped their testimony would negate that of
Miles, who claimed to represent the army past and
present.29 Carter was assigned to advise both Schofield
and Merritt, while Root approached Senator Francis M.
Cockrell for his support in putting helpful questions to
both witnesses during their testimony before Congress.30
The Secretary of War attempted to enlist supportive
testimony from other retired and serving officers. Apathy,
and a reluctance to testify against colleagues and
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superiors,

led to a poor response. Among senior officers,

only Brigadier General George W. Davis in the Philippines
and retired General Grenville Dodge agreed to testify.31
Throughout the spring the Senate Military Affairs
Committee remained hostile to all of Root's reforms.

In

early April 1902, the committee rejected the proposed
nomination of Captain William Crozier to replace Brigadier
General Buffington as ordnance chief.32 Root continued to
stress the need for a general staff and circulated
favourable information including his report as secretary
of war for 1902 to twelve leading newspapers.33 General
Corbin coordinated the publicity campaign and used his
knowledge of the press,

army, and government to maximise

the impact of documents supporting military
reorganisation.

Roosevelt gave Root his full support,

despite opposition from Congress,

staff bureaus,

and

General Miles. The President regarded the general staff as
an important policy to strengthen federal government and
to equip America for further expansion overseas.34
Miles and his supporters threatened the
implementation of reform. Roosevelt was bitter at the
Commanding General's failure to serve the administration
and its policies.

The President was further angered when

Miles cast doubt on whether Roosevelt participated in the
famous charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American
War.35 Roosevelt responded to these attacks in a letter to
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Root, bitterly denouncing the Commanding General:
During the six months that I have been President,
General Miles has made it abundantly evident by his
actions that he has not the slightest desire to
improve or benefit the Army, and to my mind his
actions can bear only the construction that his
desire is purely to gratify his selfish ambition,
his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly
incompatible, not merely with the intelligent
devotion to the interests of the country, but even
with intelligent devotion to the interests of the
service.36
The poor relations between the Senate Military
Affairs Committee and the administration,

caused by

Miles's testimony, made future reform seem doubtful. The
Commanding General sought to embarrass the government
further when in early April 1902, he again raised the
issue of atrocities in the Philippines. Miles passed
confidential information on several incidents to members
of the Senate.37 The General again requested permission to
visit the army fighting in the Philippines.

Root agreed

and encouraged Miles to also tour Europe and Russia. This
apparent defeat for the Secretary of War was actually a
clever ploy to isolate the most persistent critic of
military reform by sending him abroad. Miles sailed from
San Fransisco in the late spring on a trip that would take
several months.
On April 9 Schofield and Merritt appeared before the
Senate.

Schofield,

reorganisation,

a long-time supporter of military

proceeded to counter effectively the

testimony of General Miles. He recalled the chaos in the
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army created by a divided command structure. The past
highlighted only the frustration produced by divided
command. General Winfield Scott left Washington in disgust
for New York; General Sherman moved to St. Louis
frustrated and angry; and General Sheridan, who remained
in Washington,

became ill. Schofield argued that all the

great generals of the past,

including Washington,

advocated centralised command. He admitted German
influence in the general staff idea but denied the system
proposed would lead to military autocracy. The general
praised the benefits of army education, the suggested
amalgamation of bureaus,
"efficiency,"

and emphasised the benefits of

"professionalism," and stronger federal

control over the army.38 Merritt seconded Schofield's
arguments and stressed how consolidation of staff bureaus
would reduce friction and increase efficiency.39
The testimony of these two senior army officers and
respected Civil War veterans rallied Republican support
for military reform. The testimony of Brigadier General
Davis,

a commander in the Philippines,

added further

support to military reform, when he claimed a general
staff would have prevented the organisational disasters of
the Spanish-American War.40 In late May the Senate
reconsidered military reform and signaled a change of
heart by confirming the appointment of two reforming
officers,

Crozier and Davis,

as ordnance chief and judge
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advocate general respectively.41 Root had succeeded in
reopening the debate on army reorganisation.
Abroad,
1902.

Cuba was granted independence on May 20,

America retained military bases in the island and

kept control of Cuban foreign policy. The intentions of
Germany and Japan continued to concern Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans.

In Cuba, Wood reported "official coolness"

between American officials and German seamen during the
independence celebrations.42 In the Philippines,

suspicion

over Japanese expansion in the Pacific increased.

Chaffee

and Davis warned Root of substantial Japanese forces
moving into Formosa and Java. The army command in the
Philippines recommended a permanent garrison of 35,000 men
both as evidence of American commitment to the islands and
as a warning to Japan.43 The future defence of the
Philippines and guerrilla war on outlying islands
continued to distract Root from military reform.
Throughout the summer,
extensively by the press,

the "Waller trial," covered

added to political scandal over

army actions in the Philippines. Major Littleton Waller,
marine,

a

was under the command of Jacob Smith in Samar.

"Hell-Roaring Jack" ordered Waller and his command to kill
all natives over ten years of age. Waller ignored the
order and attempted to traverse the unknown mountainous
jungle of Samar to find the main rebel camp. The
expedition failed and over half the company was taken
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sick. Waller,

ill with a fever, ordered twelve local

guides shot when it was discovered that they planned to
lead the weakened force into a trap. The incident was
reported to Root.44 The Secretary of War,

aware of

criticism over light sentences for officers who killed
indiscriminately, had Waller brought to trial. Root hoped
the trial of a marine officer would redirect criticism
from his department to the navy. Unfortunately, Waller
still had a copy of Smith's orders, which he read to the
court. Waller was acquitted and Jacob Smith arrested. Root
and the army command in rhe Philippines were shocked by
these events. The Secretary of War sought to have Smith
pronounced insane,

but not enough doctors would confirm

the diagnosis.45 Smith was found guilty and was retired
from active service. Roosevelt was appalled at Smith's
"loose talk" during the trial and his defence of various
arbitrary killings.46 The army supported Smith throughout
the trial,

and Chaffee,

Young,

and Bell all pressed

unsuccessfully for an acquittal.
The slow progress of general staff reform, militia
reorganisation,

and the Waller trial, all depressed Neo-

Hamiltonian Republicans. As the spring session of Congress
came to an end, however,

two important Neo-Hamiltonian

measures were approved by Congress.
passed the Isthmian Canal Act,

On June 28 the Senate

authorising the financing

and building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama.

In
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the event the President could not obtain a concession from
the Panama Canal Company of France - which he eventually
did for forty million dollars - he was to negotiate a
treaty with Columbia. A few days later, the Philippine
Government Act was approved declaring the Philippine
Islands an unorganised territory and all inhabitants
territorial citizens of the United States. A presidential
commission was authorised to govern the new territory. On
July 4 Roosevelt granted amnesty to all political
prisoners in the Philippines in an attempt to end the war.
No agreement was reached on militia reform or general
staff legislation,

and they remained to be re-introduced

in the autumn session of Congress.
On July 14, 1902 Root promoted his military adviser
William H. Carter to brigadier general. Three days later
Tasker Bliss,

another strong supporter of military reform

and Wood's deputy in Cuba, also received his promotion to
brigadier general.47 Major General Arthur MacArthur
retired,

and Brigadier General John C. Bates gained his

second star in the reorganisation of army command. Wood
and Bliss returned to America immediately after the
implementation of Cuban independence. Wood stayed in the
White House with his friend the President while he waited
for re-assignment.48 Bliss was appointed to the War
College Board which, with the failure to pass general
staff legislation,

continued to operate as a de facto
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general staff.49 Major General Young chaired the Board,
and the other members were: Brigadier General Carter,
Chief of the Artillery Wallace Randolph,

Chief of

Engineers George Gillespie, Major W.B. Beach,

and Major

H.A. Greene.50 Root encouraged these men to discuss
planning and preparation for future conflicts. The
Secretary of War also directed the Board to recommend a
system of continuing officer education for the 1,500 new
lieutenants commissioned due to army expansion. To deal
with the training of these officers, J. Franklin Bell was
reassigned from the Philippines to command the Army Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth.

Colonel A.L. Mills was

appointed superintendent of the Military Academy.

Both

were appointed ex officio members of the War College Board
and were instructed to follow its directives.51
In June Germany invited three senior American army
officers to attend their summer military manoeuvres. Root
and Roosevelt decided to send Corbin,

Young,

and Woo d . 52

Young and Corbin left early in July, while Wood left later
with Root, who was a member of the commission to decide
the U . S .-Canadian border in London. Root's associates on
the commission were Senator Lodge and former Senator
George Turner. The President instructed Root to secure as
much of the Pacific coastline as possible,

advice

unpopular with Secretary of State Hay, who sought better
Anglo-American relations.53 Roosevelt,

however, was
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determined to control the North American Pacific coast and
to ensure American domination of Asian trade. On July 24
Root and Wood set sail from New York on the S.S. Savoie,
to London and Le Havre respectively.

Corbin, Young, and

Wood were not to return to America until early October.
While Root was away,

Sanger was appointed acting secretary

of war, and Carter was adjutant general, deputising for
C o r b i n .54
Wood arrived in Le Havre on July 24 and was greeted
by prominent French officials. After a night in France he
left for a holiday in Spain. A week later Wood joined his
colleagues in Berlin.
in Germany,

The three officers spent two weeks

as guests of the Kaiser,

visiting military

schools and observing the army manoeuvres.55 The visit was
covered extensively by the press in America.

Corbin's

comment that the German army was the best in the world was
widely quoted.

In the New York S u n , a paper supportive of

military reform, Miles's contention before Congress that a
system good enough for Grant and Sherman was good enough
for today was dismissed by Corbin as "oratorical rot." The
three officers enjoyed the publicity,

national attention,

and their frequent dinner engagements with the Kaiser. The
officers described the German leader as similar to an
enterprising president of an American railroad.

Such

business analogies revealed the high reputation American
business organisation enjoyed among senior officers.56
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Not all the press comment on the trip was favourable.
Democrats and anti-imperialist opponents of a large
professional army criticised the visit. One paper
characterised it as "The Terrible Spectacle in Berlin"
while others variously reported the visit as "repugnant to
Quaker blood" and "whetting the American appetite for
bloodshed."57 These emotive headlines underlined the deep
divisions in America over policies advocating imperialism,
a stronger executive,

and a professional military. After

two weeks in Germany,

Corbin,

Young,

and Wood left for

Paris having been invited to the French manoeuvres.
France had attempted to reform its army after the
disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. To
solve its problems, the army attempted to use German
military ideas. The decision to introduce German military
institutions also presented France with the problem of
maintaining democratic control over its army.58 Unable to
resolve this dilemma the army produced an ineffective
command structure. The chief of staff,
general,

a junior brigadier

acted as secretary to the war minister. This

general had no control over staff bureaus,

and often more

than twenty officers outranked him.59 Military reform
suffered in a political process which produced thirty-two
governments,

and twenty-six ministers of war between 1870

and 1900. Political instability was compounded by the
Dreyfus affair in which a Jewish army captain was wrongly
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convicted for treason. The Dreyfus controversy divided the
army and created public suspicion of the military.60
France had little to offer America on the subject of
military reorganisation.
at dinner parties,

Young and Wood spent their time

visited Switzerland,

and toured Monaco.

Wood was irritated at the lack of time spent observing the
French army. He dismissed Monaco as thoroughly rotten with
its dependence upon gambling and high suicide rate.61
In early October Corbin,

Young,

and Wood left France

for Great Britain. Root, having completed his work on the
U . S .-Canadian Boundary Commission, had already left for
New York. The Secretary of War contacted military theorist
Spencer Wilkinson during his visit,

and the two men

discussed in London how to create an effective military
system in a democracy.62 These discussions between
Wilkinson and the Secretary of War were to prove
invaluable in helping Root formulate ideas for American
military reform.
The reception given to Root, Corbin,

Young,

and Wood

in Britain emphasised the developing relationship between
the two powers. All four men were deluged with requests to
attend dinner parties and various social functions. The
date of Wood,

Corbin,

and Young's departure was postponed

from October 18 until November 1, 1902 to accommodate new
engagements. All three dined with King Edward, Lord
Roberts, Kitchener,

Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain,
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James Bryce,
American War,

and Roosevelt's mess mate in the SpanishFirst Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee. The

cordial welcome and willingness of the American party to
enjoy British hospitality to the full contrasted sharply
with the formal two-week stay in Berlin. Root, Wood,
Corbin,

and Young all visited British military

establishments and discussed military reform and colonial
government in detail with their hosts. On October 30 Wood,
Young,

and Corbin left London and the following day

boarded the St. Louis, bound for New York.63
The informal Anglo-American alliance grew stronger
while suspicion of Germany increased. Corbin,

Young,

and

Wood were sent to Germany not only to view the German
general staff and war college but also to assess the
abilities of a potential enemy.

In America,

the war

college emphasised increasing suspicion of Germany, with
its first special study of future conflict. The college
produced a planned response to a German attempt to prevent
America from seizing Santo Domingo and Haiti.64 On his
return to America, Wood produced a detailed analysis of
the German army for Root and Roosevelt. He discussed
potential weakness in the use of cavalry,
company level command,

ineffective

and the strength of their

artillery.65
Root returned home and decided to resign as secretary
of war. Happiest in New York with his lucrative corporate
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law practice, he disliked public speaking and faced
pressure from his shy wife to leave public office.

In late

September he informed Roosevelt of his decision. He agreed
to remain in the cabinet until March 1903, allowing one
last attempt to get militia reform and general staff
legislation through Congress.66 On October 4, 1902, Root
wrote to the Army and Navy Journal reaffirming the
influence of business organisation on military reform
proposals:
The trust is an evolution rather than a survival,
and it represents the furthest advance of the
process of concentration in the business world. Its
development has been harmonious and logical ....
Improved machinery, better methods of distribution
and stricter attention to small details of management
have resulted in enormous reductions in operating
expenses .... The trust ... has placed the United
States foremost among the industrial nations. We take
it therefore, that if the trust per se is a menace to
American industry then the Army per se is a menace to
American liberty. The trust is a highly organized
kind of energy of one kind and the Army a
highly organised kind of energy of another kind. In
both power is supplemented by responsibility. The
preciseness, simplicity, economy, and thoroughness of
the methods of military establishment are clearly
reflected in the conduct of the successful trust. The
analogy between the two is unmistakable.67
No legislative reform could be implemented until
after the mid-term congressional elections in early
November,

1902. Supporters of army reform remained

confident that the militia bill would pass and pressed
Root to continue with all his proposed reforms.68 The
Secretary of War avoided most requests to speak before the
election and spent his time gathering information on
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military matters.

He instructed the War College Board to

prepare a detailed analysis of the supplies needed to
equip a force of 50,000 men to fight either in the
Atlantic or Pacific.69 These requirements were presented
to Congress.

On November 4. the results of the election

were announced.

Both major parties gained seats from minor

parties or vacant seats. The Republicans however,
maintained a fifty-seven to thirty-three majority in the
Senate.

In the House of Representatives the total number

of seats rose from 357 to 386, and the Republicans kept
their majority over the Democrats,
9 Young,

Corbin,

208 to 178. On November

and Wood arrived in New York. /0 The end

of the election and return of important senior officers
were quickly followed by the re-introduction to Congress
of militia reform and general staff legislation.
Root implemented a propaganda campaign endorsing
military reorganisation.

In late November,

copies of

Root's annual report as secretary of war for 1902 were
distributed to sympathetic newspapers and businessmen,
including Paul Danna of the New York S u n . R.L. Fern of the
New York T r i b u n e . J.P. Morgan,

and Richard McCurdy,

President of Mutual Life Insurance.71 The normally
reticent chairman of the War College Board, Major General
Young,
reform.

joined in enlisting commercial support for army
In a speech to businessmen in Cleveland, he argued

that any increase in American exports depended upon the
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creation of an efficient army. The General defended
American policy in the new territories as humane and
civilised and warned of the dangers posed by European
competition.

Young continued:

"If we wish to gain the

supremacy in commerce in the East, we must maintain a
military force in the Philippine Islands that can act
instantly ... at any point in the East and that fact must
... be understood by all Oriental people." He finished by
promoting military preparedness as the best guarantee of
peace stating:

"The larger and more efficient the force,

the more widely its strength of arms be delayed."72 The
speech was well received and emphasised the alliance
between many business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian
R epublicans.
In early December congressional hearings on the
various military reforms resumed. Root was confident of
success with General Miles,

a main opponent of reform,

still abroad. Many military reformers thought future
conflict would involve mass armies under central control.
The professional army was only the basic structure for
this larger military force.73 Trained reserves were vital
to provide the manpower for armies in excess of 100,000
men. To achieve this goal, militia reform was of great
importance. Military reformers proposed a voluntary
national reserve force to consist of 100,000 veterans
under federal control.

In an attempt to weaken state and
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local power, the National Guard would be relegated to a
position as second volunteer reserve.
The National Guard Association was appalled at these
proposals,

and proud of its role in national defence it

quickly mobilised opposition to the proposal.

Congressmen

were lobbied by state politicians and National Guard
officers to change the bill. Confronted with such
opposition,

the War Department was forced to compromise.74

National Guard officers recognised the need for reform and
suggested mandatory summer training camps,

inspections by

the regular army, and an end to political appointment or
election of officers.

The Guard rejected plans to replace

them with a national reserve and upheld the importance of
local identity and organisation.75 In a compromise,

the

War Department reluctantly agreed to accept the National
Guard as the first reserve.
On December 4 Root introduced the compromise militia
reform bill.

In his speech announcing the legislation,

he

attacked the obsolete basis on which the National Guard
operated. Organised without standardised education,
equipment,
•

and training,
»

the Guard failed in the Spanish•

American War to provide an effective reserve.

7 f\

° The new

militia bill recognised the National Guard as the first
volunteer force, while the remainder of the male
population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five was
termed the unorganised reserve.77 The bill extended
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federal power. The Guard accepted federal funding;

joint

army-National Guard exercises were introduced; militia
officers were to attend war college courses; and all
equipment was standardised regular army issue. This
compromise legislation made rapid progress through
Congress and was passed as the Dick Act on January 21,
1903.

The new act preserved the state organisation of the

National Guard but established greater federal control
over the reserve. The issue of deploying the Guard abroad
remained politically contentious. The Attorney General,
encouraged by Roosevelt and Root, announced that the
legislation clearly permitted the president to deploy the
Guard abroad.78 Opposition to the deployment of the
militia in foreign wars, however, refused to disappear.
Over ten years later,

in 1917, Congress challenged the

right of president Woodrow Wilson to send the National
Guard to Europe during World War One.
One week after the militia bill was introduced to
Congress,

the equally contentious army reform bill was

tabled before the relevant committees. The bill proposed a
general staff and chief of staff to replace the divided
army command structure

(see Appendix 1). The office of

commanding general was replaced by a chief of staff. The
Inspector General's Department and Adjutant General's
Office were abolished to create the general staff. The Pay
Department,

Quartermaster Corps, and Commissary Department

were amalgamated into one division of supply.
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The general staff could consist of three general
officers, detailed for four years by the president from
serving general officers.
colonels,

Four colonels,

six lieutenant

and twelve majors were detailed from the army,

under rules of selection determined by the president. All
officers appointed to the general staff served four-year
appointments and, upon completion of their tour of duty,
returned for at least two years to a field command. Root
and other army reformers hoped fixed-term appointments
would end animosity and jealousy between staff and line
officers. All operational planning would be controlled by
the general staff. Unlike the old system, there would be
no division of responsibility between the top general of
the army and secretary of war.

(see Appendix 2).

Root used business analogies to explain the reforms
to Congress.

In response to a question from Senator

Foraker, he explained the need for improvement:
You are in the position of a railroad company
without a railroad manager as if the president of
a railroad company who is not a railroad man were
to undertake to run the railroad by dealing directly
with the general passenger agent and the chief of
motive power and the heads of the different
departments of the railroad. It is impossible for any
civilian secretary to perform this duty.79
Despite support from powerful men in Congress, the
proposed legislation was soon in trouble. The supply
bureau chiefs and Inspector General Breckinridge opposed
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the amalgamation of their departments.

Congress attacked

the presidential appointment of general staff officers as
an unnecessary extension of executive authority. Promotion
by merit was criticised both by middle-ranking officers as
a threat to their rightful promotion and by Congress as a
dangerous expansion of presidential authority.80 In
response to this opposition,

Carter and Root introduced a

modified general staff bill. The proposed merger of the
supply bureaus was dropped,

and the Inspector General's

Office was retained. Vacancies created by general staff
detail would not be filled until the general staff proved
its use.81 This compromise removed opposition from
powerful bureau chiefs to reform. Opposition in Congress,
however remained high,
Root,

Schofield,

despite favourable testimony from

Young,

Carter,

and others.82 Root

enlisted Roosevelt's help to convince Congress to pass the
bill.

In early January, Roosevelt met Richardson, the

House minority leader,

in an attempt to prevent further

Democratic opposition.83
In the Philippines,

General Miles still attempted

from far away to discredit the administration during the
delicate negotiations on military reform. He forwarded a
report to the War Department and president which supported
claims of army brutality in the islands. The report
charged the army with torture,
corruption,

unnecessary death,

and abuses of civil rights. Roosevelt and Root
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prevented publication of the information gathered by
Miles, because the President was determined to give
Congress no further excuse for postponing military
reform.84
Corbin continued the public relations offensive.
speech before businessmen,

In a

he stressed the Neo-Hamiltonian

belief that international conflict was certain and that
the prudent response was military preparedness.85 The NeoHamiltonian view of the world was given credence by the
widespread reporting of international commercial
competition. Many leading articles warned of German
expansion in Latin America,
Central America,

European encroachment in

and the danger of losing the "vital1
"

Asian market to Europe or Japan. Newspapers compared
American and European industrial performance and
criticised neglect of the merchant navy, as Britain and
Germany expanded their fleets. These press stories were
taken seriously by business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans who were convinced American greatness depended
on overseas markets.85 The battle to implement the general
staff reforms continued.
Root was determined to provide the army with the same
centralised departmental system that existed in large
business concerns.87 The scale of War Department
operations made reliance on talented individuals for
effective command inefficient and dangerous. American

213

business and the German general staff system provided the
answer.

Industrial vice presidents,

like a general staff,

concentrated on long-term planning. General managers,

in

charge of daily operations, were similar to staff officers
with field commands. Root, who had worked extensively as a
corporate lawyer,

frequently made this analogy in

explaining how a general staff would work.88
Throughout January,

1903 hearings on military

reorganisation continued in Congress, Generals Young,
Carter,

and Corbin all testified for a second time.89

Brigadier General Crozier, the new ordnance chief,
Davis the judge advocate general,

and

broke ranks with other

bureau chiefs and endorsed change.90 On January 7, 1903
the general staff bill achieved unexpected success in the
House of Representatives. Root's compromise, which kept
the supply bureaus and Inspector General's Office, passed
by 154 votes to fifty-two.91 General Miles, who was on the
Trans-Siberian Railroad,

heard the news weeks later when

he reached Paris.92 In early February the bill was
approved by the Senate. Brigadier General Fred C.
Ainsworth,

head of the Army Records and Pensions

Department,
accepted.

succeeded in getting one last amendment

In a subtle,

but significant change to the

wording of the bill, the chief of staff would supervise
but not command the staff bureaus.93 Carter hoped bureau
chiefs would accept the chief of staff's authority,

and
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would ignore any ambiguity in the legislation.
Unfortunately bureau chiefs frequently challenged general
staff authority in later years.94 Roosevelt and Root
agreed to introduce the staff system, which abolished the
rank of commanding general, one week after General Miles
retired on August 8, 1903.95 These final concessions
ensured the passage of the general staff bill. On February
14,

1903 Roosevelt signed the bill into law.96
The General Staff Act was a triumph for Root and his

adviser Carter. Carter wrote the legislation which Root
requested and provided important testimony before
Congress. Other officers knowledgeable on military reform,
particularly Brigadier Generals Theodore Schwan and Tasker
Bliss,

did little to help Carter or Root.97 Schwan wrote

the most influential pamphlet published on the German
army. Bliss taught at the Naval War College and was an
aide to Schofield for many years. Neither ofiicer
testified before Congress,

despite their long interest in

military reorganisation. The Secretary of War acknowledged
Carter's central role in both drafting and fighting for
military reform legislation:
Special credit is due to Brigadier General William
H. Carter for the exceptional ability, and military
industry which he has contributed to the work of
devising, bringing about, and putting into operation
the General Staff Law. He brought thorough patient
historical research and wide experience, both in the
line and staff, to the aid of long-continued, anxious
and concentrated thought upon the problem of
improving military administration, and if the new
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system shall prove to be an improvement the gain in
the country will be largely due to him.98
The act was a major success for Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans,

despite the failure to amalgamate the supply

bureaus, the Ainsworth amendment,

and the delay in

implementation until Miles retired. The Dick Act and
General Staff Act strengthened executive control over the
army and promoted greater professionalism.

Individualism

and localism no longer dominated army command or training.
On January 22, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans achieved
another important legislative victory. The Hay-Herran
Treaty, which guarantied a ninety-nine year lease and U.S.
sovereignty over a Panama canal zone, was signed with
Columbia. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on March
17, 1903. The Senate also approved nine new ocean-going
warships for the navy.99 Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian
supporters were delighted.

On April 3, in a speech in

Chicago, Roosevelt praised the new legislation that
strengthened the military and approved a canal to link the
American Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The speech,
influenced by the Social Darwinism of Croly,
Spencer,

Sumner,

and

and the evangelicalism of Strong, praised

American achievements in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Philippines. Roosevelt warned,

however,

and the

of the dangers of

international competition and expansion and reminded his
audience of recent attempts by Britain, Germany,

and Italy

to blockade Venezuela to collect over-due debts. America
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needed to be prepared to protect and advance its position
in the world. The President concluded:
I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart
and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority
of our fellow countrymen so believe in it; but, I
would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than
to see us put forward and bluster about it, and yet
fail to build up the efficient strength which in the
last resort can alone make it respected by any strong
foreign power whose interest it may ever happen to be
to violate it .... There is a homely old adage which
runs, "Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will
go far." If the American Nation will speak softly and
yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training
...
the Monroe Doctrine will go far.100
Notwithstanding these legislative victories, Roosevelt and
his Neo-Hamiltonian allies realised that continued
American success required further policies to support the
navy,

foreign investment,

and exports.
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CHAPTER SIX;
AMERICA AND THE CONTINUED EXTENSION
OF THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN
In America, the years 1903 and 1904 were a triumph
for the aspirations of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans.

In

international relations Anglo-American friendship
continued to develop, while suspicion of Japan and Germany
intensified. The implementation of Root's military reforms
suffered from over-confident reformers,
bureau and congressional hostility,

continued staff

and ignorance of how

to use a war college and general staff. General Miles
persisted in criticising administration policies in the
Philippines and even his retirment proved controversial.
In 1904 Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth emerged as the
new arch critic of Root's army reforms. Root retired as
secretary of war. Roosevelt won a full term as president,
despite Democratic charges of imperialism and militarism.
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were confident of their
ability and right to govern at home and abroad. The
success of democratic capitalism in the Anglo-Saxon state
epitomised progress and justified American imperialism.
Speeches and articles reaffirmed these values.1 Military
preparedness remained the key policy to defend American
progressive,

democratic,

and commercial ideas.2 The

passage of the Dick Act on militia reform and the General
Staff Act were only part of the Neo-Hamiltonian
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legislative program. Roosevelt and his allies remained
determined to further American trade by investment abroad,
civil reform in U.S. colonies and protectorates,
government subsidies to the merchant marine,

and support

for free trade and democracy abroad.
In January 1903 Secretary of State Hay concluded the
details of the Hay-Herran Treaty with the Columbian
Ambassador. The agreement ceded a ten mile canal zone
across the Panamanian Isthmus to the United States.
America agreed to pay Columbia $10 million dollars and an
annual rent of $250,000 for the proposed canal. When
built, the canal would encourage American trade in the
Pacific and give the U.S. navy greater flexibility in any
future conflict,

especially in any war with Japan. On

February 14, 1903 Congress passed both the general staff
bill and the bill creating the Department of Commerce and
Labour.

These two pieces of legislation underlined the

Republican commitment to overseas exports and a strong
federal government. The new Commerce and Labour Department
was designed both to promote business exports and inform
government of industrial competition at home and abroad.3
Root,

like many of his colleagues, promoted American

overseas trade and was concerned by foreign competition,
particularly from Germany,
These measures,

in Central and Latin America.4

implemented by successive Republican

administrations, greatly encouraged overseas trade.

In
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1900 investment abroad was less than $1 billion dollars:
by 1908,

it reached $2.5 billion dollars.5

The military reforms, passed in 1903, attempted to
prepare America for conflict. The regular army was much
larger, the general staff promised efficient management,
and the militia was under greater federal control. A new
scheme of military education would establish better
professional standards in the army. On February 21, 1903,
in an elaborate ceremony, the Secretary of War laid the
cornerstone of the new Army War College.6 This act

,

emphasised the lack of general staff training in the army.
Despite this problem, Root remained confident the army's
problems had been resolved.

In his final report as

secretary of war, he ignored the inexperience of those
posted to the general staff and congressional opposition
to change. He confidently asserted:

"I do not think that

any important legislation regarding the army will be
advisable for some time to come."7 The Secretary of War
underestimated the confusion which existed in the army,
even among supporters of change,

over the function of the

war college and the general staff.

Ignorance hindered the

effectiveness of army reform. Root remained convinced the
worst problems in the army were settled. General Carter,
increasingly apprehensive about the ambiguous wording of
the General Staff Act, was less certain. The General
encouraged Root to promote public support for military
reform,

by publishing the works of Emory Upton.8
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The improvement in Anglo-American relations
continued.

In late 1902 the British government responded

to the military inadequacies revealed in the Boer War. Two
royal commissions studied the militia and regular army.
The flaws uncovered were similar to those reported in the
American army at the end of the Spanish-American War. The
Esher Commission reported on regular army failures in
planning,

logistics, training and even marksmanship.

It

was revealed to the King that the best twelve shots in the
army,

fired over 1,200 rounds,

210 yards,

at targets from as close as

and only scored ten hits. Lord Esher commented

drily to the King,

"It was not thought desirable that this

record should appear in the printed evidence."9 As in
America,

British military reformers concluded that

individual gallantry was no substitute for training and
staff planning.

Supporters of reform in both countries

advocated a modern army with a staff to coordinate its
actions,

a reserve linked closely to the regular army,

and

the ability to increase greatly reserve and regular forces
through volunteers.10 The debate on British military
reform emphasised the new Anglo-American relationship with
information on military reform freely passed between
prominent American and British officials. Root was in
frequent contact with his British counterpart H.O. Arnold
Forster and First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee.11 Root
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underlined the links between American and British military
reformers when he wrote some years later to Spencer
Wilkinson:
I do not forget, although I dare say many people do,
what a great part your little book, The Brain of the
A r m v . played in bringing to pass that both countries
had some sort of an institution of that kind [general
staff] in existence when the sudden emergency came.12
In February 19 03 war broke out between Japan and
Russia over control of Korea and its strategic ports of
Dairen and Port Arthur.

Initially one assumed Russia,

a

European power with superior forces, would easily defeat
the oriental Japanese. The war was ignored by most AngloAmerican officials.

Early Japanese success due to inept

Russian military leadership,

however,

attracted the

attention of many foreign observers.13
In the Philippines American army commanders were
increasingly uneasy after Japan easily defeated the
Russian pacific fleet.

In Washington,

the attention of

Roosevelt and Root again turned to the islands, provoked
not by the emergence of Japan,
Commanding General,
the Philippines,

but by General Miles. The

demanded publication of his report on

suppressed during the legislative battle

over the General Staff Act. Miles accused Brigadier
General Funston of ordering prisoners shot; Generals
Chaffee, Hughes,

and Smith,

of authorising unnecessary

torture; and various junior officers of abusing
prisoners.14 The charges of maltreatment included the
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water cure inflicted upon three priests who subsequently
died. This torture involved shoving a hose down an
individual's throat and repeatedly filling their bodies
with water. Roosevelt and Root attempted to delay the
publication by ordering Miles to provide copies for the
War Department and army headquarters in Manila. The
General had to comply and publication of the report was
further delayed.15
On March 17,
Herran Treaty,

1903 the Senate had ratified the Hay-

but the Columbian government in the

meantime had begun to procrastinate over the agreement.
This delay to the Panama Canal irritated Roosevelt and his
Neo-Hamiltonian allies.

Congress alleviated this

disappointment with continued support for Neo-Hamiltonian
legislation. The army and the navy both secured large
budget appropriations.16 In the War Department, Root
continued the preparations for implementation of the
General Staff Act. A review board was established to
select candidates for the forty-two staff positions
available,

chaired by Major General Young with Chaffee,

Bates, Randolph,

Carter,

and Bliss committee members and

Major H .A . Greene as committee recorder. Any officer who
was a service school graduate, who displayed
administrative ability,

or who held the Medal of Honor was

considered for General Staff dut y . 17 The quality of
officers selected among the lower grades was remarkably
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high: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Barry, Major George
Goethals,

Captain John J. Pershing,

Captain Peyton C.

March, and Captain Joseph T. Dickman - all appointed to
the staff - later became successful general officers.18
Major General Young was selected as the first chief
of staff with Corbin as his deputy. Carter and Randolph,
the chief of the artillery, were selected as assistants.
The choice of Young was a political compromise. Roosevelt
and Root were aware that many opposed promotion by merit
and the general staff. By appointing a career officer,
Roosevelt and Root hoped to diffuse criticism of reform.
The reformers were bitterly resented throughout the army.
None had served in the Civil War, all had powerful
political friends,

and all had served longer in staff or

army schools than in operational commands.

Carter and

Wagner were derided for having "written books about
conflict" rather than serving in the field; Wood was
dismissed as "that doctor," and Bliss was widely regarded
as a "pussy-footing academic."19
In contrast General Young had been promoted through
the ranks.

Born in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania in 1840, Young

had joined the army as a private at the start of the Civil
War.

In September 1861 he transferred to the cavalry.

During the Civil War he was promoted four times and fought
in most of the big battles in the East. At Gettysburg he
was wounded by a musket ball, which left his left elbow
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permanently crooked.

He successfully hid the injury from

the army for thirty years. Appointed captain in the
cavalry in 1866, he served throughout the West for the
next thirty years.

In 1897 he was appointed colonel of the

3rd Cavalry. He served as Roosevelt's brigade commander
during the Spanish-American War. Roosevelt liked Young and
thereafter took an active interest in his career.

Young

attended the German manoeuvres in 1902, was the first
president of the war college,

and chaired the selection

panel for the general staff.20 Roosevelt and Root hoped
these appointments would prepare Young for his new role as
chief of staff. Young never attended West Point or any of
the service schools during his army career. A good
soldier, he was to prove an inadequate chief of staff.
This attempt to make Root's army reforms more palatable to
many career soldiers weakened the effectiveness of the
general staff and war college.
Root remained confident the army reforms would ensure
an effective military system. The decision by Inspector
General Breckinridge,

a strong opponent of reform,

to

retire early, was taken as evidence that the
reorganisation would work. Officers supportive of the
changes already commanded the Artillery,
Ordnance Department,

Signal Corps,

and Judge Advocate General's Office.

Breckinridge's retirement gave Root a further opportunity
to strengthen support for the new system.21 On March 17
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the Secretary of War wrote a long letter to the Washington
Times outlining the various changes in army organisation.
He attacked critics of reform claiming the changes were a
natural extension of those begun by Generals Scott, Grant,
and Sherman. He again stressed preparedness,

as the

prudent and efficient response to future conflict,

and

concluded the war college and general staff would soon
prove to be indispensable.22
Confident the army reorganisation would prove
successful,

Root pressed Roosevelt to let him return to

his law practice in New York. The President was reluctant
to let the most successful member of his cabinet leave and
tried to persuade Root to remain in office until the
presidential election the following year. The Secretary of
War insisted he be allowed to leave as soon as possible.
Roosevelt wrote to Taft, governor of the Philippines,
asking him to return home and replace Root.23 Taft
consulted his family and then wrote to the President that
he had "no knowledge of army matters and no taste for or
experience in politics."24 Roosevelt continued to press
Taft to take the post. On April 18,
opponent of reform,

1903 another staunch

Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington,

announced his retirement.

Root,

regarded this as further

evidence that army reorganisation was gaining wider
acceptance.2^ Confident of success he pressed Roosevelt to
announce a new secretary of war.
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The Secretary of War ignored continued confusion
among officers over the role of the general staff and war
college.

Bliss, a noted supporter of reform,

struggled to

define the purpose of the Army War College and contacted
his old colleagues at the Naval War College for advice.26
Carter and Wood,

important champions of reform,

sought

field commands in the Philippines to improve future
promotion chances. Root c o n v i n c e d Carter to remain as
assistant chief of staff for six months.

Carter's

professional rival, Leonard Wood, was assigned to the
Philippines. Wood left for Manila via Europe, North
Africa,

and India.27 In May 1903 Wood arrived in Egypt,

where he spent two weeks with Lord Cromer who headed the
British protectorate.

Wood sought to learn from him and

from other British colonial officials in Aden and India,
all he could about colonial government. The General was
well received by British officials throughout his trip,
which emphasised the cordial relations between NeoHamiltonian Republicans and the British establishment.28
In Washington Roosevelt's administration continued to
defend American expansion abroad by announcing plans to
fortify Hawaii against attack. The attention of the
Secretary of War and President remained focused on the
Pacific as General Miles returned from his world tour and
published his report on atrocities in the Philippines.
Published first in the Armv and Navv Journal on May 2, the
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report soon appeared in the national press.29 The General
accused the army of illegally occupying church property,
inflicting water torture on prisoners,

and having

indiscriminately killed innocent civilians. He was
particularly critical of the actions of Generals Chaffee,
Bell,

and Smith after the Balangiga Massacre. Miles

denounced General Bell for implementing a policy of
concentration, which placed villagers in crowded camps
with little food, while those outside the camps were
killed.

Taft supported these claims and estimated 75,000

people had died of disease and that ninety percent of
livestock had been slaughtered due to indiscriminate army
policies.30
Roosevelt, Root,

and many army officers were furious

at these attempts to re-open charges of army atrocities in
the islands. The President wrote angrily to Root:

"I think

that Miles must be given more credit for more low cunning
than we thought. What an irredeemable blackguard and
scoundrel he is, and how the jacks and fools do take to
him!" He continued attacking Miles's character and
demanded he be clearly vilified for challenging American
imperial aspirations.

The President concluded:

"He has

played the part of traitor to the army and therefore to
the nation. His intriguing disloyalty should be manifest
so that there can be no mistake about it in the future.1,31
Chaffee refused to comment on the allegations,

but, at a
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banquet in his honour he described Moro tribesmen as
"150,000 Muslim agricultural savages," and taunted Taft's
policy of local consultation saying:

"They do not wish us

to come into contact with them, but we love them and are
going to tell them so."32
Even bureau chiefs, who normally supported Miles,
refused to endorse his criticism of the army in the
Philippines. Many appointed by Root had no sympathy for
the Commanding General, but even among long-serving staff
officers, his comments provoked anger. Commissary General
Frank Weston was furious at claims his department supplied
sub-standard rice to concentration camps in the
Philippines. Judge Advocate General Davis announced there
was no basis for charges against the army, and other Root
appointees such as Crozier and Gillespie rebuked Miles in
the press.33 Neo-Hamiltonian concern that the charges by
Miles would increase opposition to U.S.
unfounded. Many papers,

imperialism proved

aware of Miles's self-centred

manipulation of information in his quest to become
president, dropped the story. As early as April 1902, the
New York Times had dubbed him "Miles Gloriosus" in an
article attacking his self-centred promotion of his own
affairs. The legitimacy of many charges he made were
dismissed by an apathetic public as the desperate attempts
of a man trying secure a presidential nomination.34
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Progress continued on implementing Root's army
reforms.

In June the first joint army-navy manoeuvres took

place. Bliss produced a report on the functions of a
general staff to help Young understand his new role. Root
was concerned at the inability of army officers to
understand the application of the new institutions. He
directed Bliss to send his report on the general staff to
all bureau chiefs.35 The Secretary of War asked Bliss to
prepare a further report on the use of the army war
college. Root hoped these reports would eliminate
uncertainty surrounding the use of his reforms.36 In midJune Roosevelt approved the assignment of all general
staff officers. Young was confirmed as chief of staff,
Corbin as his deputy,

Carter as assistant chief of staff,

and Bliss as head of the army war college. Root realised
that Corbin was better qualified to be chief of staff, but
the Adjutant General was not popular in the army,

or with

the president. A strict disciplinarian who believed in
professional soldiers, he upset Roosevelt with comments
denigrating the contribution made by volunteer forces
during the Spanish-American War.37 Root hoped Corbin and
Carter would be future leaders of the general staff, once
Young and Chaffee had their chance.38 In late June, Root
announced he would leave Washington in August to attend
another session of the U . S .-Canadian Boundary Commission
in London.

239

In the new American colonies, Taft and other
reformers continued to create American institutions to
promote democracy and capitalism.

In the Philippines, Taft

encouraged the construction of schools and the teaching of
English.

In Puerto Rico, on June 17, 1903 a university was

established. The administration encouraged free trade with
Cuba, while discouraging trade between the new
protectorate and Europe.39 Columbia continued to hesitate
in ratifying of the Hay-Herran Treaty, which infuriated
Roosevelt. He wrote to Hay:

"I do not think the Bogota lot

of obstructionists should be allowed permanently to bar
one of the future highways of civilisation."40 In July
1903 at an informal meeting of Panamanian businessmen in
New York, agents of the Panama Canal Company and army
officers,

agreed on a way out: the secession of Panama

from the Republic of Columbia. The solution was
"unofficially" accepted by Roosevelt and Hay, and plans
were laid to start a revolution in Panama.
The continued extension of U.S. trade in the
Americas, determination to construct a Panama Canal, and
development of colonies, underlined the dominance of NeoHamiltonian ideas in American foreign policy. Almost two
years earlier, Root had outlined these goals, which
stressed the continuity in Neo-Hamiltonian foreign policy,
to Charles Gardiner. The Secretary of War supported
Gardiner when he asserted:
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The Americas and the Pacific will be the future trade
battle ground of the world. Our advantages for the
trade of the Orient are already greater than any
European power, because of our long Pacific
coastline, our possession of Hawaii, the Philippines,
the Aleutian islands and our foothold in Samoa. The
isthmian canal will still further strengthen our
natural advantages so that our holding the leading
place in the trade of the Orient, as we have recently
attained to that of the Western world is
inevitable.41
In the Philippines, Taft, having sought the advice of his
family,

accepted the appointment as secretary of war. He

wrote to Root, however, asking him to delay his
resignation until the spring of 1904 to which the
Secretary of War reluctantly agreed. Taft explained that
his determination to implement reform was the reason for
delay. As governor of the Philippines, Taft was involved
in implementing a new criminal code, an internal revenue
act, districting of the islands for legislative seats,

and

creating a land regulation act for settlement and sale of
lands. Taft hoped to have these measures in place before
he returned home.42
In the War Department changes in personnel and
confusion over the exact role of the general staff
continued to cause problems. Assistant Secretary of War
William Cary Sanger, who had worked on the Dick Act,
decided to retire. An expert on militia organisation and
staunch supporter of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he was hard to
replace. Retired General Robert S. Oliver was appointed as
the new assistant secretary. Oliver,

like Sanger, was from

New York State. He was a Republican with strong Neo-
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Hamiltonian links, which included his brother-in-law
Joseph Choate, the American ambassador to France and later
to Britain.43 The inexperienced Oliver was almost
immediately appointed acting secretary of war, due to
Root's imminent departure for London. The first
operational months of the general staff were overseen by
an inexperienced acting secretary of war. Root did not
return from the meetings on the Alaskan Boundary
Commission until late October 1903.44 The confusion over
the role of the general staff intensified. Bureau chiefs,
including Paymaster General Bates, the new Inspector
General Brigadier General G.H. Burton, and the Chief of
Engineers Brigadier General Gillespie,

complained about

poor representation on the general staff. No constructive
relationship developed between the staff bureaus and the
general staff. Bureau chiefs demanded more men, money, and
resources. Only Chaffee, Corbin, Carter, and Crozier
openly supported the general staff. Corbin and Chaffee
advocated promotion for general staff officers to increase
their authority, while Crozier and Carter suggested
clearer wording of legislation to stress general staff
preeminence.45 The President added to confusion over
general staff functions by failing to give clear direction
and blandly called for practical efficiency,

and not

theory, to be the goal of the War Department.46
Inexperienced in staff work, most of the officers assigned
to the general staff remained uncertain of their new role
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within the army. The War Department attempted to explain
new duties, by providing each officer with a copy of
Brigadier General Theodore Schwan's report on the German
army. Published in 1894 and entitled "The Organisation of
the German Army," this inadequate guide was all that was
available to new staff officers.47
Outside the War Department criticism of Root's army
reforms continued among congressmen,

local politicians,

and some newspapers. The New Orleans Times-Picavune summed
up the fears a strong federal army still caused among many
people:
It is already clear that the people behind the
General Staff idea are preparing to create a
military oligarchy within the army that will
override all the various bureaus of the War
Department and dominate everything within the army
that is worth dominating. In a word, the Chief of
Staff will be practically the Commanding General of
the Army - not nominally as General Miles has
been, but actually. The Chief of Staff should have
no such extensive powers as the new regulations
propose to give him, particularly over troops
actually on the scene. It is entirely unsafe to
give a chief of staff resident in Washington the
power to negate movements of generals commanding in
the field.48
Despite these problems implementation of R o o t 's army
reforms continued. A joint army-navy board was created to
promote greater inter-service cooperation which was a
major problem in the Spanish-American War.49 Root and
Roosevelt agreed on a program of army promotions over the
next two years to advance officers supportive of army
reform including Corbin, Wood,

and Carter.50
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On August 8, 1903 Lieutenant General Miles retired
from the War Department. Roosevelt, who loathed Miles for
his opposition to army reform, criticism of imperial
expansion,

and personal attacks on his war record refused

to publish the normal glowing retirement tribute of
service. Many Congressmen and Civil War veterans were
angered by the failure to acknowledge Miles's retiral and
demanded a proper tribute. None was forthcoming. Root
wrote to the President in support of his stand:
.... If he had been a good officer in that position
(Commanding General) faithful, loyal, useful, the
holding of the position would have entitled him to
higher consideration, but he has been a bad officer,
unfaithful, disloyal, injurious to the service,
worthy of blame rather than praise, it seemed to me
the mere holding of the office entitled him to no
more favourable treatment....
These sentiments were endorsed by Roosevelt,

and Miles's

last communication was dismissed by Root, when he stated
bluntly:
.... You will see that he proposes to abandon five
regiments of cavalry and turn them into bicycle,
motor cycle, and automobile regiments. Colonel
A.A. Pope, one of the General's closest friends ...
who has just written a very violent letter
regarding the retirement order, is one of the
leading bicycle and automobile manufacturers of the
country . ...51
In retirement, Miles continued to oppose reform and acted
as an adviser to congressmen resisting army reorganisation
plans.
On August 15,
commanding general,

1903, the official transition from
to chief of staff took place. Young

244

became the first American chief of staff. A few days later
Root publicly announced his intention to resign from the
War Department on January 31, 1904.52 On August 21 Root
left New York with his family, bound for London and his
work on the Alaskan Boundary Commission.53 Before he left,
he addressed the new general staff at a dinner held in his
honour.

In a typical Neo-Hamiltonian speech he attacked

those who wished to rely on individualism, volunteerism,
and localism. Progress was defined in terms of
organisation - such as business trusts or the new general
staff - which allowed professional individuals to advise
government which ruled the masses. The war college
provided the means to educate a new professional officer
corps. The general staff allowed professional officers to
direct the army under the secretary of war and president
(see Appendix 2). Root concluded by praising Young and
Corbin for the sacrifices they had made to help reorganise
the army.54 Corbin was unhappy at not being promoted to
chief of staff. As deputy to Young he had lost much of his
old power.

Secretary of State Hay, Lieutenant General

Schofield,

and Root pressed Roosevelt for assurances that

Corbin would be appointed chief of staff in the future.
The President, despite his own dislike of Corbin, agreed
to consider his appointment after the retirement of Young
and Chaffee.55
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Section two of the General Staff Act defined the four
main goals of the general staff as: planning for national
defence,

issuing reports on military readiness for

operations,

providing expert advice to the secretary of

war and field commanders while coordinating all action in
the field,

and performing any other military duties

assigned to it by the president.56 This broad definition
of general staff activities and ignorance of staff
officers produced an ineffective general staff.
later General,
staff,

Peyton March,

Captain,

a member of the first general

later claimed no one knew what to do. Numerous

committees studied all aspects of the army without any
guiding principle

(see Appendix 3). March only discovered

how a general staff actually worked when, as military
attache in Japan, he was able to observe it work in the
Russo-Japanese Wa r . 57 The new General Service and Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth,

also had an inauspicious

start. Bell, the commandant designate, was delayed in the
Philippine Islands and only arrived in July 1903. He
discovered officers attending the college had spent the
year drinking,

gambling,

and hunting. Half the class had

failed over half the college exams. Annoyed by this
failure to take education seriously the war department
disciplined the worst offenders.

Bell a strong supporter

of a professional officer corps finally forced army
officers to apply themselves.58
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The general staff continued its struggle to define
its purpose.

Information was collected from the Board of

Ordnance and Fortifications,
and Infantry Boards,
duties.

and the Artillery,

Cavalry,

in an attempt to define General Staff

Young left Washington for Newport, Rhode Island to

visit the Naval War College and discover how it
operated.59 On his return to Washington he discovered
Corbin had issued orders without his approval.

Young

rebuked Corbin, the only senior officer with practical
knowledge of army administration,

who then requested a

transfer.60 In October 1903 Corbin was appointed Commander
of the Department of the East and Chaffee became Deputy
Chief of Staff.61 The failure of Corbin to accept his
demotion further reduced the effectiveness of the general
staff. Chaffee an aging Civil War veteran was untrained in
army planning or administration.

Roosevelt underlined his

great influence on army reform by transferring Corbin and
promoting Chaffee while Root was in London.
was impressed with Chaffee,
service in the Civil War,

The President

especially his distinguished

Cuba, the Boxer Rebellion,

and

the Philippines. He hoped this appointment would end
suspicion and jealousy directed at the general staff by
many career army officers.62
In late October Root left London to return home. The
negotiations on the Canadian-Alaskan Boundary had been
concluded. The American negotiating team got nearly all
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the territory they demanded. The Canadian government was
furious, but the treaty was further evidence of the
British desire - even if it annoyed an important Dominion
- to improve relations with America. Root met H.O Arnold
Forster and Spencer Wilkinson during his visit as the
exchange of information on military reform continued.63
The Secretary of War was disappointed at the performance
of the general staff during his absence. He remained
confident, however, that it would,
would be well.

"find itself," and all

In a letter to Schofield, he claimed that

the major defects had been corrected,
was no longer,

and that the army

"like a railroad without a general

manager."64 Root enjoyed the lavish praise he recieved for
the successful passage of army reform. He was described as
a "Hamiltonian genius" by supporters and was widely
regarded as the ablest member of the President's cabinet.
The Secretary of War remained determined to leave public
life, however,

and refused to continue as head of the War

Department or to stand as the Republican candidate for
governor of New York.65
Convinced the army had the necessary institutions to
perform effectively,- Root focused during his remaining
weeks in office on the problems of America's merchant
marine. He supported criticism by businessmen of
government decisions which failed to develop the merchant
navy. American shipping was essential to commercial
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supremacy in the Pacific and Caribbean. Root joined
Senator Marcus Hanna, William Henry Vanderbilt,

and others

in demanding government support for this strategically
important industry. These men criticised the decline in
American merchant shipping from 2.5 million tons in 1865
to under 1 million tons in 1902; the high running costs
faced by ship owners;

and evidence that sixty-five percent

of all American exports were carried by foreign ships.
Politicians and businessmen determined to promote American
expansion overseas found such figures unacceptable.66
Roosevelt's administration received more bad news
from the Philippines but better news from Panama.

In the

Philippines, Wood reported renewed fighting against
Islamic Moro tribesmen in response to piracy and theft.
The offensive on the islands of Mindanao and Jolo was
conducted with advice from Governor Birch, the senior
British official in North Borneo, which again underlined
the development of Anglo-American cooperation.67 The
administration received happier news from Panama. On
November 4, 1903 General Huertas,
firemen and railroad workers,
independent from Colombia.

leading a force of

declared Panamanian

The American navy stood by to

prevent any Colombian intervention. Two days later,
Secretary of State Hay announced American diplomatic
recognition of the new state. A new Panama Canal treaty
was quickly concluded. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty
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guarantied the United States a hundred year lease of a ten
mile canal zone,

for a lump sum of $10 million and an

annual rent of $250,000.

Colonel,

later Major General,

George Goethals was appointed chief engineer of the new
canal project, due to be completed in 1914.
In America, Young and Bliss endeavoured to clarify
the functions of the War college and general staff. Bliss
published a further report on the war college. The report
was influenced,

both by his own service in the Naval War

College and his knowledge of American railroad
organisations which he greatly admired.68 The Chief of
Staff devoted his time to replacing the old departmental
army commands with a new divisional structure. This was
the last attempt by Young to reorganise the army as he
keenly awaited his retirement.69 In late November, Root
and Young published their last annual reports.

Both men

remained confident the army reorganisation would prove
successful.

Root, delighted with the passage of the

General Staff Act and Dick Act, continued to underestimate
the animosity this legislation provoked among congressmen,
middle-ranking officers,
December,

and many staff officers.70 In

Carter, Root's military adviser and author of

reform legislation, was posted to the Philippines. The
General was keen for a field command to ensure future
promotion,

but his untimely departure caused more upheaval

in a general staff unsure of its purpose.7 ^ Root's
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attention was diverted both by events abroad and by
domestic politics,

and he failed to realise the general

staff needed further guidance.
The surprise success of Japan in the Russo-Japanese
War and the American acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone
forced Root to concentrate on events abroad and not on
defining clear general staff objectives.

In response to

the expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific, American
forces established garrison forts at Yavisa and Santa
Maria in Panama.

Congress recieved plans for harbour

defences in Manila and a new naval station at Subic Bay in
the Philippines from Secretary of the Navy Moody and
Secretary of War Root.72 Roosevelt also pressed Congress
to promote his friend Leonard Wood to major general. The
attempt to promote Wood was unpopular with many army
officers and congressmen,

due to his rapid promotion from

captain to brigadier general.

Congressmen hostile to Wood

accused him of corruption in Cuba and attempted to
misrepresent testimony in his favour. Defending Wood and
arguing for his promotion involved Root in many timeconsuming visits to Congress.73 The inability of the
general staff to perform as expected finally attracted
Root's attention,

as pressure to provide an accurate

assessment of American defence needs in the Pacific
increased.

In late November 1903, Root authorised the

creation of a new three-man board to consider army
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administration made up of Brigadier General Fred C.
Ainsworth,

Bliss, and new Adjutant General Colonel Hall.

Fred Crayton Ainsworth was popular with many
Republican and Democratic politicians. Born in Woodstock,
Vermont in 1852, Ainsworth joined the army as a contract
surgeon in 1874. He was appointed to the Surgeon General's
Office in 1886 after service in Alaska,
Arizona.

Oregon, and

In July 1889, he was placed in charge of the

Record and Pension Division of the Surgeon General's
Office and Volunteer Enlistment Branch of the Adjutant
General's Office.

In 1892 he was promoted to colonel and

head of the new Record and Pension Office.74 This bureau
was responsible for individual Civil War records and
approved all war pensions. Thousands of pension claims
were made each week during the 1870s, and 1880s, and the
bureau failed to keep pace with demand. Ainsworth
introduced a new system of record keeping which reduced
the backlog of claims.

Congressmen were delighted that

they could quickly secure pensions for prominent
constituents and praised the "business methods" of
Ainsworth.75 In 1898,

all military service records for all

American wars were transferred to Ainsworth's department.
The Record and Pensions Office took on these extra duties,
yet under Ainsworth's leadership, reduced its staff from
300 in 1894, to just forty-two in 1902.

In recognition for

his service he was promoted to brigadier general in March,
1899.76
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Ainsworth wanted to extend his authority to control
all army records, many of which were held by the Adjutant
General's Office.

Corbin, while adjutant general, resisted

any attempt to weaken the power of his department. As a
member of Root's committee on army administration,
Ainsworth again suggested all records be placed under his
control. He argued the general staff reduced the role of
the adjutant general's office,

since many of its command

functions were now performed by the general staff. Only
its role as keeper of army records,

such as orders issued,

remained intact. Colonel Hall, unlike Corbin, was not
disposed to challenge these assertions or Ainsworth's
proposal that all records be placed under his control.
Ainsworth cleverly manipulated Roosevelt and Root's
admiration of business methods by suggesting that his
ideas matched those occurring in business organisation.
Root encouraged Hall to accept the offer and promised him
a promotion to brigadier general if he accepted. The
merger centralised army records, and rewarded Ainsworth,
man who apparently represented professionalism and
business efficiency. Root hoped this amalgamation would
provide the general staff with a secretary who would act
like the secretary to a company board of directors.77 In
early January 1904, Congress confirmed the abolition of
the office of adjutant general and the appointment of

a
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Ainsworth as military secretary.

Carter, already on his

way to the Philippines, wrote to the Secretary of War in
alarm at this extension of staff bureau power. Root
dismissed this warning,

confident this measure would

relieve the general staff of administrative detail and
allow it to function as he envisaged.78
On January 9, 1904 Lieutenant General Young retired
as chief of staff. A distinguished Civil War and SpanishAmerican War veteran,

he struggled for six months both to

defend the general staff from its detractors and to define
its function.79 At the end of his career, with no staff
training, he found it impossible to create an effective
general staff. Major General Adna Chaffee,

another career

soldier equally ill-equipped to be chief of staff,
replaced Young. Carter, Wood, Bliss, Wagner,

and other

knowledgeable officers were still too junior in rank to be
appointed chief of staff. Congress, under pressure from
those who opposed promotion by merit,

continued to reject

the promotion of Wood and other army reformers.80 Chaffee,
like Young, was a strong character,

able to assert his

authority and defend the general staff from its critics.
Untrained in staff work, however, he was unable to provide
the general staff with the necessary guidance as to its
role within the army.
The new Chief of Staff enjoyed close links with
senior British officials,

including First Lord of the
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Admiralty Arthur Lee and Field Marshal Earl Roberts of
Khandahar.

Chaffee had first met Lee in Cuba in 1898 and

met Roberts, Lee, and other senior British officials many
times during the next few years.81 As commander of
American forces during the Boxer Rebellion, he enjoyed
prolonged celebrations with British officers, when his
promotion to major general was announced during the march
to Beijing.82 Chaffee replaced MacArthur as commander of
U.S.

forces in the Philippines immediately after the

liberation of Beijing. A staunch imperialist, he
ruthlessly crushed opposition in the islands,

and

encouraged American citizens to settle in the archipelago.
Roosevelt and Root approved of such policies,

and Chaffee

was rewarded with promotion to chief of staff.
Chaffee, while commander in the Philippines, had
learned to distrust the Japanese. The General was aware of
Japanese attempts to aid the rebel forces in the
Philippines and as chief of staff,

remained deeply

suspicious of their future intentions.

In one letter he

wrote:
....The Asiatic will never love the European or
American. He may be, perhaps, put in a situation
which will force him to say he does, but you may be
certain he does not. The Japanese are very friendly,
but they do not like Europeans or Americans when it
comes to a matter of like or dislike; they tolerate
us, so to speak, but the feeling is different from
the feelings existing between Europeans and other
Europeans, Americans and Europeans, and vice versa.
The Japanese smile when we tell them our affairs in
the Philippines will soon be settled to our
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satisfaction; they do not believe us for the reason
that they think they know the islanders better than
we do. They talk of a time when it may be necessary
to put a hundred thousand men in Formosa. They do not
adopt a humane policy, but crush resistance....83
The success of Japan against Russia in Korea and
Manchuria reinforced fears of Japanese intentions among
senior American officials. As relations with Japan
deteriorated, those with Britain continued to improve.
Root continued his exchange of information on army reform
with British officials.84 In the Philippines,
commander of the province of Southern Luzon,

Wood,
reaffirmed

his friendship with British colonial officials in a letter
to his friend, J. St. Loe Strachey.85
In early 1904, Lincoln Steffens,

a powerful critic of

those using business as a model of efficiency, published
The Shame of the C i t i e s . The book advocated civic reform
to challenge graft, privilege,

and corporate corruption.

Although the book did not directly attack free market big
business,

Steffens and other "muckracking journalists"

soon specifically identified the deficiencies of business
management in other works.86 In 1906 William Hard reported
in Making Steel and Killing Men that forty-six men were
killed in one year at a Chicago-based U.S.
The American railroad industry,

Steel Plant.

often the focus of great

praise among army reformers, was criticised for poor
safety standards that killed 328 workers each year.87
This criticism of American business,

and by implication
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its management record,
Roosevelt.

attracted the attention of

Increasingly the President was less willing to

accept the glowing praise which business management
received from Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Roosevelt
considered federal regulation of business to promote
efficient use of resources,

and tighter laws on safety at

work. The willingness of the President to consider greater
government regulation of business,

increasingly disrupted

relations with his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. Root,
Wood,

Lodge,

and others wanted defence and foreign policy

controlled by strong central government but were less
enthusiastic over proposed government regulation of
American business. Over the next few years these differing
views increasingly divided Roosevelt and his followers
from Neo-Hamiltonian and more conservative Republicans.
On February 7 Root gave his last interview as
secretary of war. He recommended the continuation of the
staff-line detail system, more promotion by merit,
army-militia manoeuvres,

a larger war college,

increases in the artillery.

joint

and further

He praised the civic reforms

in Cuba and staunchly defended the acquisition of the
Philippines,

asserting that:

... our trade will increase as the processes of
civilization go on in the islands, and particularly
if the tariff on Philippine goods is reduced. The
Filipinos are now acquiring wants. You cannot sell
hats to bareheaded people any more than you can sell
trousers to people who wear breechclouts. As the
people become more advanced their wants will become
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even greater and more varied. Civilization and trade
move together serving them and ourselves.
He continued in words that echoed the views of the social
reformer and evangelist Josiah Strong:
....But there are profits which cannot be cast up
at once in dollars and cents. Our future relation
with the Philippines will give us an immense
advantage in the vast Pacific trade which must
come into being. That fact is inevitable. But we
have planted our civilization in the Philippines;
we are teaching the people to love our institutions,
and wherever we lift up the weak and ignorant people
and teach them our ways we are serving ourselves

...88
A few days before he left office, Root received a
final letter from Carter,

still enroute to the

Philippines. The letter repeated the warning that the
Military Secretary's Department threatened army reform.
Military Secretary Ainsworth opposed promotion by merit
and staff-line interchange,

and he sought to limit the

powers of the general staff. Ainsworth was a close friend
of the new Commissary General and other staff chiefs,

and

Carter feared a new alliance of bureau chiefs against army
reorganisation.89 Root ignored these warnings and remained
confident of success.
In mid-February Taft replaced Root as secretary of
war. Taft was a civilian ignorant of both army matters and
the procedures of the War Department. His nomination took
place in a presidential election year,

and, unlike Root,

he found little time to familiarise himself with the
problems and responsibilities of his new post.

Confronted
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with the demands of the presidential nomination and
electoral process, he was happy to rely on the able
administrative abilities of Ainsworth, who made himself
readily available to the beleaguered secretary of wa r . 90
In Congress, Roosevelt found his authority weakened as the
election approached. The promotion of Wood was further
delayed by jealous middle-ranking officers.

In a harsh

attack on promotion by merit, an anonymous letter to
Senator Proctor summed up the feelings of many officers:
Among recent nominations, I will mention those of
General Wood to be major general; Generals Carter,
Bliss, Barry and Mills to be brigadier generals.
Each one of them, except Mills, was a staff officer
and non-combatant when appointed general, and have
not risked their skins to bullets, nor the health of
their bodies by work in the field in Cuba or the
Philippines .... Ninety-nine per cent of the army ...
know there are far better and more efficient general
officers than General Wood.
The officer continued his attack on promotion by merit,
claiming combat veterans were ignored. He concluded with a
specific attack on Wood:
But for the extraordinary promotion General Wood has
already received, he would be a doctor in the
Medical Department of the army, along with his
classmates .... If Doctor Wood should receive an
appointment of major general in ten years, he will
then have received a greater reward than any
officer of the United States Army ....91
The frustration felt by middle-ranking officers at their
own slow promotion hampered the advancement of Wood,
Carter,

Bliss,

and other able officers for some time to

come. The close association between reform-minded officers
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and Neo-Hamiltonian politicians made these officers
unpopular in the army,
Congress.

and politicised their promotions in

Despite these problems, Wood was promoted to

major general on March 14, 1904. Republicans staged a
surprise vote in Congress, which caught opponents unaware,
and his promotion was easily confirmed.92
By the spring of 1904, the Russo-Japanese War
concerned both London and Washington. The comprehensive
destruction of the Russian Asiatic Fleet at Port Arthur by
an oriental power was greeted with alarm.

In Britain the

Admiralty announced the Royal Navy would match FrancoGerman naval forces in the Pacific.

Significantly,

no

mention was made of any British response to American naval
forces in the region.93 Britain remained ambivalent over
the surprising success of Japan against Russia.

In 1902

the British government signed an Anglo-Japanese Treaty to
undermine any Russian threat to India. Japanese intentions
to control Manchuria and Korea, however,

increasingly

alarmed the British Foreign Office and the American army
in the Philippines.94 In London political pressure to
achieve military preparedness increased. Lord Esher
proposed his new plan to reform the British army. A
general staff,

chief of staff and increased authority for

the Committee for Imperial Defence were recommended.95
Root congratulated his British colleagues in adopting the
military organisation best suited to Anglo-American
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democracy. He reminded his British friends that neither
the United States nor Great Britain could adopt
continental European ideas of military ascendancy over the
political process.96
In America Ainsworth continued to strengthen his
position as military secretary. Taft and Roosevelt
accepted Ainsworth's contention that the military
secretary should be one rank above other bureau chiefs.
Despite objections from Root, Congress approved the
promotion of Ainsworth,
major general.

Carter,

who became military secretary and
now commander of American forces in

the Department of Visayas in the Philippines,

pressed Root

to oppose Ainsworth's increasing authority. The former
Secretary of War, however, was confident Ainsworth would
relieve the general staff of administrative duties,
allowing it to concentrate on strategic planning and other
more worthy goals.97 Chaffee,

the new chief of staff, was

suspicious of Ainsworth and sought to limit his power
within the army.98 The Military Secretary responded by
enhancing his reputation through referring all matters
likely to cause difficulty to the assistant secretary of
war.

In this way he promoted the belief both in the War

Department and in Congress that he was a man who got
things done since he was never associated with failure.
Ainsworth manipulated Army pension awards, which his
office controlled,

to promote himself in Congress.99
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Ainsworth's reputation continued to prosper. Taft, hardpressed by Roosevelt's re-election campaign,

increasingly

delegated decisions to the Military Secretary. Chaffee,
the chief of staff, and Commandant Bell at Fort
Leavenworth,

now paid for undermining Taft's efforts in

the Philippines.
In the Pacific, concern over Japanese expansion
continued to increase.

In May 1904 Japan scored a second

convincing victory over the Russian navy. The Russian
Baltic Fleet sailed around the world to avenge the
destruction of their Asiacic fleet. The fleet was
intercepted and destroyed in the strait of Tsushima.100 In
the Philippines, Wood supported Rear Admiral William M.
Folger, who responded to news of the Japanese victory by
recommending a permanent naval base be established at
Subic Bay.

It was hoped that this new naval facility would

protect U.S.- Asiatic trade,
commitment to the islands,

underline the American

and serve as a warning to

Japan.101 Wood warned that America was threatened if Japan
dominated Korea and Manchuria and suggested international
action to limit Japanese expansion.

In an oblique

reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, he
dismissed the prospect of British support for Japan:
Whatever be the results of the fighting or the
length of the war, the principal nations of the
world cannot remain indifferent to the arrangements
that must finally be concluded. The same reasons that
would influence the powers in restraining Russian
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aggrandizements at the cost of Chinese dismemberment
and Korean vassalage in case of unqualified success
of Russia, would cause them to take action to limit
Japan's aspirations were her successes unqualified
and her desires excessive.102
In the Caribbean, the Japanese success led Roosevelt
to press for an early completion date for the Panama
Canal. On May 9 the Isthmian Canal Commission was placed
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Goethals,
who was responsible directly to the Secretary of Wa r . 103
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In the Caribbean, America continued to strengthen its
control over the sea lanes between America and Panama, as
the British decided to withdraw,

(see Figure 2). In

London, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher replaced Walter Kerr as
first sea lord at the Admiralty.
senior admiral,

Fisher, as B r i t a i n ’s

recommended that British forces be

withdrawn from the Caribbean and North America for service
at home or in the Mediterranean.

By the winter of 1904 the

Royal Navy base at St. Lucia was under orders to close,
and most of the ground and naval forces in Halifax, Nova
Scotia and Bermuda had been withdrawn.104 The new
supremacy of the United States in the region was
emphasised by American intervention in Santo Domingo and
the subsequent "Roosevelt Corollary." In the summer of
1904,

Santo Domingo faced demands for debt repayment from

Germany,

Italy, and Spain. The island's president,

F. Morales,

Carlos

offered to turn all custom houses and forty-

five percent of all excise duties over to America,

if

Roosevelt would save the island from its creditors. The
President agreed in order to obstruct European powers from
interfering in the island. Roosevelt justified American
intervention through the "Roosevelt corollary," which he
attached to the Monroe Doctrine. The amendment authorised
American intervention in any state in the Western
Hemisphere, which failed to meet international
obligations. The President agreed in order to obstruct
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European powers from interfering in the continent.105 This
arbitrary act emphasised the determination of Roosevelt
and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies to secure American
preeminence in the Caribbean, Latin America, and, with the
opening of the Panama Canal, the Pacific.
In Washington the army continued its struggle to
define the functions of the general staff and war college.
In May 1904 Colonel Arthur Wagner and Brigadier General
Bell planned to reorganise the General Service and Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth. A new syllabus was introduced
based upon the "applicatory method" favoured by Wagner and
his teaching colleague Eben Swift. Classroom teaching was
combined with practical map problems, tactical rides, and
campaign planning.

Swift, head of the Department of

Military Art, emphasised grand tactics, general staff
duties, original research in strategy and military
history,

logistics,

and military geography.106 In June

Bliss unsuccessfully attempted to define the relationship
between the new military secretary,

chief of staff, and

secretary of war. Congress added to the administrative
confusion by announcing that the military secretary could
report directly to the secretary of war on questions
originating in his office, without informing the chief of
staff.107 Taft,

confronted with the demands of

electioneering,

overall responsibility for the army,

colonial administration and civil reform,

and command of
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the Panama Canal project, delegated more work to the
efficient Ainsworth.108 The general staff found its
authority slowly eroded both by Ainsworth and Taft's poor
regard for Chaffee and Bell.
In late June 1904, the Republican National Convention
selected Roosevelt as its presidential nominee with
Charles W. Fairbanks as the vice-presidential candidate.
Two weeks later, the Democratic party met to finalise
their party manifesto and select a presidential candidate.
William Jennings Bryan, the party's candidate in 1896 and
1900, did not seek the nomination and supported the
candidacy of publisher Randolph Hearst.

Instead of Hearst,

Alton B. Parker from New York was nominated, with Henry G.
Davis from West Virginia as his running mate. The
convention did adopt Bryan's policies on anti-imperialism,
anti-trust measures,

and direct election of senators.

In

his speech to the conference Bryan attacked Roosevelt as a
dangerous militarist and imperialist. He pleaded with the
conference to nominate "a pilot," who would lead the party
"away from the Syclla of Militarism without wrecking her
upon the Charybdis of Commercialism."109
The presidential campaign got off to a slow start.
October, however, Miles denounced Roosevelt as a
militarist.

Parker, the Democratic nominee, demanded

independence for the Philippines and condemned the
acquisition of the Panama Canal strip.

In spite of these

In
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charges, Roosevelt he was easily re-elected.110 The
electoral vote gave Roosevelt over 7.5 million votes;
Parker nearly 6 million votes; and Eugene V. Debs, a
Socialist candidate,

over 4,000,000 votes.

It was the

largest margin of victory since 1872. In Congress the
Republican Party maintained its fifty-seven to thirtythree majority in the Senate and picked up forty-three
seats in the House for a 250 to 136 majority. The policy
of American expansion overseas was again vindicated.
Roosevelt, who had replaced the assassinated McKinley, had
won a presidential election in his own right. Flushed with
victory, Roosevelt announced that under no circumstances
would he be a future candidate for president. The
President later bitterly regretted this categorical
statement.111
In the winter of 1904 the Committee for Imperial
Defence in London approved Admiral Fisher's proposals for
a complete British withdrawal from the Caribbean and
Canada. The decision reflected concern over German
military expansion in Europe and increasing Anglo-American
cooperation.
college,

In America Bliss, the head of the army war

emphasised increasing Anglo-American friendship

with a report to the Joint Army-Navy Board which
identified Japan, Germany, and Russia,

as likely future

enemies.112 In December 1904 Admiral Fisher summed up the
new international order when he wrote in a confidential
memo:
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A new and definite stage has been reached in that
evolution of the modern steam navy which has been
going on for the last thirty years, and that stage
is marked not only by the changes in the material
of the British Navy itself, but also by changes in
the strategic position all over the world arising
out of the development of foreign navies. To the
west, the United States are forming a navy the
power and size of which will be limited only by the
account of money that the American people choose to
spend on it. To the east, the smaller but modern navy
of Japan has been put to the test and has not been
found wanting ... and a new German navy has come into
existence.113
By the end of 1904 the United States and Great
Britain had an informal alliance based upon a recognition
of the limits of British power and a common concern over
German, Japanese,

and Russian territorial and military

expansion. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans had achieved many
of their original policy goals. The American people had
repudiated anti-imperialism in the election; the United
States had extended its influence in the Caribbean and
Pacific; and American investment and trade overseas
continued to increase rapidly. Neo-Hamiltonians were
confident that their policies would continue to prosper
for another four years under President Roosevelt.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL SUSPICION AND
FEAR OF JAPAN
American military and foreign policy in the period
1905 to 1908 was dominated by concern over the intentions
of Japan in the Pacific. America was determined to assert
control over that ocean, and the actions of the Republican
administration in the Caribbean,

Central America,

and the

Philippines reaffirmed the importance of this goal. The
failure of Root's army reforms to deliver

promised

military efficiency made certain that army reorganisation
remained an important political issue. Conservative and
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued to believe business
organisation represented efficiency and progress.
Roosevelt and others, however, were less impressed with
business organisation as reports of industrial
incompetence,

dangerous working practices,

and

threats to

public health by the drive for short term profit appeared
with alarming regularity.

In 1905 Charles Evans Hughes

uncovered serious mismanagement in the three largest
insurance companies in America. The companies used money
to purchase political favours and to deal illicitly with
financial houses on Wall Street. This scandal was followed
by reports exposing flagrant abuses of public health by
several food and pharmaceutical companies.1
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The President reacted by supporting greater
government regulation of business and the economy. The
willingness of Roosevelt to sanction government regulation
of business alienated Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who
only supported strong government for defence and foreign
policy. This philosophical division on the role of
government ultimately divided the Republican Party and
weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in
American politics. Taft, the new secretary of war,
strugging under a large and diverse workload, was unable
to resolve the continued organisational problems in the
army. An influential member of Roosevelt's cabinet, his
presence weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas,
which he had always supported only with reluctance.
American foreign policy in the spring of 1905 was
dominated by worries about Japanese expansion,
over events in Morocco,

concern

and the continued attempt to

strengthen American influence in the Caribbean.

In late

January a protocol was signed with the Dominican Republic
in the Caribbean.

The agreement gave America control over

Dominican custom houses,

foreign affairs,

and defence

policy ensuring that the United States had effectively
acquired another Caribbean protectorate.
In Washington the German Ambassador Speck von
Sternberg sought to involve America in the Moroccan
Crisis. The ambassador claimed Germany wished free trade
in the region and was being excluded by an Anglo-French
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agreement. He challenged America to support free trade in
this part of North Africa. The President instructed Taft
to contact the British ambassador and explain German
concerns, but he refused to support the German demand for
free trade. The event underlined both Roosevelt's
willingness to overburden Taft with affairs unconnected
with his office and continued Anglo-American friendship.
The American government happily endorsed the British
demand for free trade in China yet rejected the German
request for free trade in Morocco.2
Throughout the late spring and early summer,
Roosevelt and his advisers worried about Japanese
expansion in the Pacific. This concern was provoked by the
comprehensive defeat of Russian naval and ground forces by
Japan. The President and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were
concerned that Japan would challenge America's attempt to
secure commercial domination in the region.

In Roosevelt's

cabinet suspicion of Japan was common. On July 1, 1905
Secretary of State John Hay died. Anti-Japanese feeling in
the cabinet, however,

increased when Elihu Root replaced

him. Despite opposition from his wife and a reluctance to
return to public office, Root agreed to become secretary
of state. As secretary of war, Root knew of Japanese
attempts to undermine American influence in the
Philippines,

and thereafter he always distrusted Japan.

Philander C. Knox, the attorney general,

and all senior
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generals in the army,

shared Root's suspicion of Japanese

intentions. Only Taft, the Secretary of War, remained
convinced that Japan posed no threat to American expansion
in the Far East.3
In the Philippines the policy of benevolent
assimilation continued.

Public education enrolled less

than 100,000 in 1898 but reached 521,000 in August 1905.
The teaching of English and civics received priority in
the new system. Roosevelt ordered the colonial government
to encourage business as much as possible.4 New taxation
and fiscal policies were introduced to encourage local
business and investment from America. Wood left the
Philippines in June 1905,

for minor surgery in Boston and

a holiday with his friend, the President.5 Bliss, head of
the war college, asked for a transfer to the Philippines
to enhance his promotion prospects and was placed in
charge of the Department of Mindanao.6 He arrived to find
Corbin, the army commander in the islands, deeply unhappy.
The former Adjutant General,

ordered to the Philippines

after relinquishing command of the Department of the East
in New York, disliked the humid and isolated Manila. He
and his wife missed Washington and New York. The
announcement that Major General John C. Bates would
replace Chaffee as chief of staff in January 1906 further
depressed the isolated Corbin.
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Bates,

like Young and Chaffee, was a career soldier

and Civil War veteran with no staff experience or training
in military schools.7 The decision to promote Bates
reflected the attempt by Roosevelt to negate criticism of
the general staff by appointing a senior combat veteran
chief of staff. This policy encumbered the general staff
with a commander who was invariably at the end of his
career. Young, Chaffee, and Bates were all too old to
serve a full four-year term as chief of staff, and their
combined service as head of the general staff covered only
twenty-seven months

(see Appendix 4). On June 24 at

Asheville, North Carolina, Colonel Arthur Wagner died of
tuberculosis. The untimely death of Wagner,
supporter of military reform,

a staunch

and promotion of Bates, were

serious set-backs to army reform.8
On June 30, 1905 Taft published his first report as
secretary of war. He recommended tighter educational
testing for junior and field grade officers and dismissal
from the service for lieutenants who failed basic course
work.

Captains and majors who failed to apply themselves

at service schools should be retired to speed up middleranking promotions. The Medical Bureau gained one hundred
and thirty new medical officers to end the army practice
of relying on civilian contract surgeons. The Artillery
Corps was to be increased by 6,500 men. Taft noted twentynine National Guard officers attended regular army service
schools for the first time. The Secretary praised the work
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of the Army War College, which produced a full study of
the recent Russo-Japanese War including lectures on the
Japanese army and its general staff.9 These studies
emphasised concern in the army over Japanese intentions,
while the events of both the recent Boer War and GrecoTurkish War were largely ignored.
The possibility of Japan gaining complete control of
Korea and Manchuria worried Roosevelt. The President
offered to hold the peace conference between the two
powers. Both states accepted the American offer, and the
peace conference convened in late August at Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. The Russian negotiator was Foreign Minister
Sergei Iulevich Witte, while the victors were represented
by Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro. At the
conference Japan failed to obtain either an indemnity from
Russia or any territory apart from Karafuto, a paramount
position in Korea. Japan was granted the South Manchurian
Railway concession. Komura returned to Japan to discover
the premier, Taro Katswa, ready to sell the railroad to
American millionaire E.H. Harriman. The negotiated sale
only failed when Komura threatened to resign,

and the

railroad remained under Japanese control. When the
contents of the treaty became known in Japan,

anti-treaty

demonstrations erupted into rioting, which included an
assault on Komura's home. The dominant figures in the
Japanese army,

including senior General Yamagata Aritimo
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and his aide Colonel Tanaka Giichi - later war minister
and prime minister of Japan in the 1920's - were furious
that Japanese treaty gains had not been greater.

Senior

officers in the Japanese army general staff urged the
premier to approve a policy of expansion on the Asian
continent,

Southeast Asia, and Latin America.10 These

plans placed Japan in direct conflict with Neo-Hamiltonian
wishes that America dominate the commerce of Latin America
and the Pacific. Roosevelt was delighted with the outcome
of the peace treaty - that saw him awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize -- for limiting Japanese territorial gains in a
region where America wished to expand.
In America the leading Democrat, William Jennings
Bryan, announced his intention to go on a world tour. He
left San Francisco in early September for his first stop,
Japan. Unlike most Republican politicians and business
leaders, Bryan maintained his faith in international
reasonableness and cooperation.

In Japan he received a

warm welcome and was assured that the Japanese felt
nothing but good will towards America.11 The perception
Bryan and many Democrats had of Japan highlighted
fundamental differences between Republicans and Democrats.
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, had no faith in international
agreements and firmly believed that power and wealth
depended upon securing overseas markets from hostile
foreign powers.

In such a world, military preparedness was
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essential. Democrats, who endorsed international
cooperation and relative isolation, rejected this view and
continued to support volunteerism and local control within
the army.
In the summer of 1905 Roosevelt instructed Taft to
review American coastal defences. The last comprehensive
report had been by the Endicott Board commissioned by
President Grover Cleveland in the 1880s. The Taft Board
issued its report in the Autumn of 1905. Boston, New York,
and San Francisco were categorised as of primary
importance. The committee recommended Guantanamo in Cuba,
and Subic Bay in the Philippines, be added to this list.
The second recommendation categorised Panama and Alaska as
important as continental America for defence purposes.
Pearl Harbour, Manila Bay, Guam, and the Aleutian Islands
were important but less so than those in the other two
categories. Roosevelt used events in the Russo-Japanese
War to justify this reappraisal of coastal defence. The
President argued that the Japanese surprise attack on Port
Arthur underlined the need for secure fleet bases while
Russian defeat required a greater American presence in the
Pacific to counter Japan.12
In the Philippines,

Corbin's misery was compounded by

the discovery of a heart condition, which required him to
take several month's leave in Australia.13 Roosevelt
offered Wood, now fully recovered from his operation, the
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chance to replace Corbin as head of the Philippine
Division. Wood accepted and sailed from New York on August
23, 1905. As with his previous trip to the Philippines,
Wood elected to go via Europe, the Suez Canal, and India.
The General again spent considerable time with British
colonial administrators,
Gibraltar,

including the governors of

Egypt, Australia,

and Hong Kong.14 Roosevelt

also decided to recall Brigadier General Carter from the
Philippines for a new posting in America.15
In Washington concern over German intentions world
wide abated as attention focussed on Japan. Root, however,
like his predecessor John Hay, remained suspicious of
German attempts to expand trade in Latin

America. As

secretary of state, he instructed the American ambassador
in Berlin to be uncompromising in the negotiations over
the commercial treaty between the two nations.16 In Europe
relations between Britain and Germany continued to
deteriorate.

Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane, who

replaced H.O. Arnold Forster in the spring of 1905,
responded by implementing British army reforms. The
planned general staff was created, the Committee for
Imperial Defence gained greater authority over colonial
defence,

and a British Expeditionary Force was established

for rapid deployment in Europe.17 Haldane noted the
influence of Root on these British reforms:
Really you know I do not need to know anything
about armies and their organization for the five
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reports of Elihu Root, made as Secretary of War in
the United States are the very last word concerning
the organisational place of an Army in a democracy.18
In America the struggle to apply Root's army reforms
continued within the army. The first extensive joint armynavy exercises took place in the Chesapeake Bay in the
autumn of 1905. These joint manoeuvres were designed to
encourage inter-service cooperation which had failed so
badly in the Spanish-American War. Unfortunately this
first exercise provoked such fierce inter-service argument
over who won the various engagements that Taft felt
compelled to ban any further joint manoeuvres.19
Throughout the winter of 1905 the general staff continued
its struggle to assert its authority over staff bureaus.
Taft,

swamped with work, was unable to provide the

necessary political support the general staff required.

In

1905 the secretary of war had been secretary of state for
one month, was placed in overall command of the Panama
Canal project,

and was pro-tem president of the senate

whenever Roosevelt was away. Overworked, Taft rarely
mentioned the War Department in his correspondence.20 Root
relieved Taft of most foreign policy concerns.

In late

November the Secretary of State wrote to Ambassador Henry
White in Italy, outlining the American position in the
continuing Moroccan Crisis. Root instructed White to
support broadly free trade in North Africa,

but under no

circumstances was he to jeopardize the growing alliance
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between Great Britain and France. The Republican
administration valued the "Entente Cordial" as a useful
counter to the emerging industrial and military power of
G e rmany.21
On October 24, 1905 Major General Wood arrived in
Manila and assumed command of all American forces in the
islands. Corbin, who was still unwell,

remained in

Australia.22 In early December Wood sent his assessment of
the international situation in the Pacific to Roosevelt.
The General indicated his great concern over Japanese
expansion. Wood pressed the President to authorise more
fortifications for the Philippines and for the Sandwich
Islands, which he claimed Japan was ready to seize. He
continued:
The Japanese are very rapidly refitting captured
Russian battleships, which appear, in many instances,
to have been only moderately injured, and they will
soon have a large fleet here .... We should
concentrate our defensive work at Manila, and put the
immense fund we intended to spend, not into works
spread over the islands, but into a fleet of
battleships, especially designed for duty in this
part of the Pacific. If we control the sea, no one
can bother us here, once we lose it, the islands are
gone with the exception of Manila, which we could
hold for a while if well prepared. I believe in a
good army, but we must have a strong Pacific Fleet if
we are to hold these islands, maintain prestige in
the Orient, and develop our trade. Very few people
who have lived in the East ... take any stock in the
idea that we shall be left free to work our will
here. Japan is very anxious to be the new England of
the East. She has unlimited cheap coal and cheap
labour, and will soon be able to manufacture goods as
well as we can ....
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Wood concluded by warning Roosevelt of the security
dangers and racial problems posed by admitting Japanese
workers to America. He strongly recommended tougher
immigration controls.23 A month later Wood received the
President's reply. Roosevelt endorsed the proposals to
fortify the Sandwich Islands,

increase the Pacific Fleet,

and tighten immigration controls over Japanese and Chinese
labour. The President, however, thought Japan's attention
would be directed towards Korea and Manchuria for some
time to come, and he dismissed claims that the Philippines
were in imminent danger.24
On January 16, 1906 Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee
retired as chief of staff. A tough career soldier, he had
kept control of the staff bureaus through his strong
character.

Chaffee retired a few weeks early to allow his

friend, Major General John C. Bates, the chance to serve
briefly as chief of staff before he too retired. Roosevelt
announced that Corbin would replace Bates and serve the
first full four-year term as chief of staff.25
Unfortunately,

Corbin was unable to accept the appointment

due to his deteriorating heart condition. At the end of
January,

Corbin returned to Manila from Australia.

In

Manila he formally handed command of the islands over to
Wood.26 The former Adjutant General set sail for home. On
his return home, he suffered partial paralysis of his left
arm and was offered command of the Northern Division in
St. Louis, Missouri. A few months later Corbin retired

291

from the army and in 1909, he died while undergoing heart
surgery in Baltimore.27
The inability of Corbin to accept the appointment as
chief of staff was a set-back to the implementation of
army reform. Corbin was de facto chief of staff during the
Spanish-American War, was an able Adjutant General,

and

supported Root's army reforms from the beginning. He was
the only senior officer with the necessary practical
experience both to successfully serve as chief of staff
and to guide the General Staff towards its proper
function. His ill-health deprived the army of crucial
experience when it was most needed. Major General Bates, a
company commander in the Civil War, regimental commander
in the Indian Wars, and brigade commander in the
Philippines, readily admitted his lack of professional
training,

business experience, and education.28 The final

act of a distinguished service career his appointment
allowed Ainsworth to enhance his authority.
On March 23 Congressman Frederick Gillette wrote to
Secretary of War Taft with a common complaint about
Ainsworth's misuse of power. He described how the Military
Secretary rejected a requested army discharge for the son
of an influential member of his constituency. Three weeks
later, the Congressman discovered Ainsworth authorised the
army discharge at the request of Senator Crane.29 These
arbitrary decisions,

based upon Ainsworth's personal
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whims, became increasingly common over the next few years.
Taft, confronted by a large and diverse workload ignored
others' criticism of the Military Secretary and continued
to give him greater responsibility. The Secretary of War
undermined Root's general staff reforms by putting
Ainsworth in charge of the War Department during his
frequent absences. This decision made the chief of staff
responsible to a bureau chief: the exact opposite of what
Root had intended in the General Staff A c t . 30
Roosevelt was entrusting Taft with too many diverse
functions, which prevented the Secretary of War from
gaining necessary experience to control the War
Department. Taft found himself constantly harried by a
president worried over Japanese intentions in the Pacific,
the construction problems created by the Panama Canal, and
the problems of colonial administration.31 In early 1906
Taft's problems increased when rioting broke out during
mid-term elections in Cuba. President Estrada Palma
requested American troops to restore order in the island.
The War Department was considering this request when, on
April 16, the San Francisco earthquake presented further
problems.32 Taft was also concerned about his weight;
which had reached 326 pounds during his time as governor
of the Philippines. Advised to lose weight, Taft spent
several hours each day doing physical exercise, which
further reduced time spent in the War Department. The
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diverse problems confronting the Secretary of War
prevented his considering why Root's army reforms had
failed.33
The President was also distracted from the continued
problems in the army by new domestic concerns. Upton
Sinclair in The Jungle publicised tainted meat sales by
Chicago meat-packing companies. The book added to mounting
evidence which revealed a complete disregard for public
health by American companies. Army reform was no longer a
central priority of the administration. Roosevelt focussed
increasingly on the creation of stronger federal agencies
to deal with commercial greed. The passage of a Pure Food
and Drug Act, which tightened government controls over
American companies,

emphasised the new priorities of

Roosevelt's administration.

Increasingly Roosevelt

regarded the construction of a strong Pacific Fleet and
completion of the Panama Canal as the only important
defence priorities of the administration.34 In late spring
Corbin wrote to his friend Wood of the organisational
problems still confronting the army. He concluded that
Secretary of State Root knew more about the continued
problems in the army than either Roosevelt or the
overworked T a f t .3 5
In April 1906 Roosevelt decided to appoint J.
Franklin Bell to replace Bates as the first four-year
appointee as chief of staff. Bell had impressed the

294

President with his service in the Philippines, which
included a Congressional Medal of Honour for distinguished
gallantry in action near Porao, Luzon.

In 1902 he returned

from the Philippines to command the staff college at Fort
Leavenworth. He successfully introduced Root's educational
reforms and received great praise from the Inspector
General's Office for his role in promoting army education.
Born in 1856, he was the first soldier who had not served
in the Civil War and the first graduate of West Point to
be appointed chief of staff.36 Supporters of army reform
were delighted that a younger, professionally trained
soldier was to be chief of staff. The decision, however,
promoted an officer who had been openly critical of Taft's
policies in the Philippines, which strengthened
Ainsworth's position within the War Department. Root
pressed Roosevelt to appoint Carter assistant chief of
staff,

commandant of the war college,

or Superintendent of

West Point. These requests were rejected by the President.
Carter, the architect of general staff legislation and
critic of Ainsworth's increasing power, was appointed
commander of the Department of the Lakes in Chicago.37
Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued
to promote American control over Latin America,
Caribbean,

the

and the Pacific. The President sent Secretary

of State Root on a prolonged tour of Latin America to
encourage closer relations with the United States.

In
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Cuba, protests against President Palma erupted into open
warfare in August 1906. Roosevelt, keen to intervene,
waited until President Palma asked for help. The General
Staff proved its value when it responded quickly to a
request from Taft for a plan to send American troops to
the island.

In contrast to the haphazard American invasion

of Cuba, Bell announced 6,000 troops could be sent to
Havana in one week, and over 24,000 men could be in Cuba
in one month.38 The willingness to consider military
intervention in Cuba,

combined with American control of

Panama and the Dominican Republic, underlined the
commitment to extend American influence in the Caribbean.
In the Philippines Wood asserted American authority both
by attacking rebel natives and preparing for war with
Japan. Wood and his deputy Bliss organised 8,000 American
troops to end the piracy and jungle raids conducted by
Moro tribesmen in Mindanao.39 As commander in the islands
he expressed concerned at expanding Japanese and German
influence world-wide.

In a letter to Major Higginson, he

endorsed British concerns over German industrial
production and the possible threat Japan posed to AngloAmerican Pacific trade.40
The new Chief of Staff, Bell was determined to
implement Root's vision of army reform. He initiated
several new ideas which included a departmental structure
of army command to replace the divisional structure,

the
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abandonment of fixed-term appointments in the Ordnance
Bureau,

and the creation of seven new manoeuvre camps for

joint army-National Guard exercises.41 Bell's confidence
quickly evaporated, however, when confronted by the
intriguing bureau chiefs and the indifference of Taft.
Increasingly,

Bell relied on the devious Ainsworth, who

became his chief adviser on the political intricacies of
the War Department.42
In September 1906 Roosevelt approved the deployment
of American troops in Cuba. The President appointed Taft
the new governor of the island to replace the beleaguered
Palma. The Secretary of War snubbed Bell and appointed
Ainsworth acting head of the War Department during his
absence.

Bell, began to lose confidence in his ability as

chief of staff as he realised he faced a secretary of war
and staff bureau chiefs hostile to him and his office.43
Root was increasingly concerned at the growing power of
Ainsworth in the War Department. He suggested Carter be
appointed head of the Army War College to provide help for
Bell and support for the General Staff. Taft and Roosevelt
ignored this request and appointed Brigadier General
William Wotherspoon head of the War College.44 Carter
remained in Chicago,

isolated from the army command in

Washington.
In the Philippines the arch-imperialist Wood received
a visit from Bryan and his wife as part of their world
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tour. The couple had visited Korea and China after their
stop in Japan and were keen to see America's new colony in
the East.45 In Manila Bryan reaffirmed his opposition to
imperial expansion and military preparedness. Wood
recorded the speech in his diary and, with some
satisfaction, the reaction of Mrs. Bryan:

"Mrs Bryan ...

said that whatever his views were in regard to the
Philippines it was evident the people of the Moro Province
were not yet ready for self-government." The General was
happy to agree with Mrs. Bryan and noted:
sensible,

"Mrs. Bryan is a

level-headed appearing woman and I have no doubt

has a restraining influence on her husband."46 In late
autumn, Bryan and his party left the Philippines for
India, the next stop on their world tour. Unimpressed by
Bryan's arguments, Wood continued to press for new
defences in the islands,

including a new fort to be called

Fort McKinley in Manila.
In Washington Roosevelt struggled to gain
Congressional approval for Wood's new fort, and a bigger
Pacific Fleet. On December 20 he notified Wood that he
hoped to have the measures approved in the defence
appropriations for the spring of 1907.47 Root returned
from his tour of Latin America,
December,

and in a speech in mid-

before the Pennsylvania Society of New York, he

reaffirmed the Neo-Hamiltonian goal of overseas expansion.
He robustly defended the creation of strong central
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government in defence and foreign policy,

achieved through

professionals who advised the political executive. Only
this system could guarantee the efficiency required to
succeed in a highly competitive world. Root defended
attempts to professionalise the army and the State
Department. He denounced those who supported political
power at the local level, endorsed volunteerism over
professionalism, and opposed American expansion overseas.
Neo-Hamiltonian ideas must succeed to insure American
independence,

economic growth, and freedom.48 From India

Bryan rejected Root's ideas. The Democratic leader,
speaking in Bombay,

criticised both the morality of Anglo-

American imperialism and refuted its claimed economic
bene fits.49
In the spring of 1907, the new congressional session
approved several policies regarded as vital by Roosevelt
and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies.

It ratified Roosevelt's

agreement with the Dominican Republic, approved funds for
new fortifications in the Philippines, and authorised a
larger navy. Responding to pressure from Wood, Roosevelt's
proposal to limit Japanese immigration was also accepted.
War with Japan seemed imminent, and a classified
memorandum circulating among senior officials,

emphasised

this view:
.... Japan's ambition, to accomplish which she is
doing everything possible, is to be the sole lord
and owner of the Orient, and this is the reason why
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she formerly subjugated Korea and in our days
dominates China. Russia proposed and tried to
conquer a dominion in the Orient and we have
already seen what Japan did to stop her. The
United States desired to mix up the Philippines,
and, as the Philippine Islands are on the map of the
Orient where Japan has harboured resentment against
the United States - resentment that is constantly
intensified on account of the question aroused by the
intervention of the Americans in Manchuria and the
new restrictive measures adopted against Japan in
Am e r i c a .
We must therefore confess that war will come
without fail .... Japan will not wait for the
opening of the Panama Canal, which would make the
Americas powerful in the Orient .... Whether we
desire it or not, we shall see ourselves involved
in the struggle

... we must think what to do.50

In early April, Wood wrote to Colonel Hugh Scott,

a

future chief of staff, claiming Japan was ready to attack
the Philippines.51 A few days later, he wrote to Secretary
Taft, demanding greater preparation for war. The General
denounced the anti-imperial lobby in America for
encouraging Japan to believe that the U.S. would
relinquish the islands without a fight. Wood dismissed the
idea that Great Britain would aid Japan under the terms of
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He assured Taft that the
treaty applied only to Russia and that America would fight
an internationally isolated Japan.52
Roosevelt and his administration were determined to
defend American overseas interests in the Pacific,
Caribbean,

and Latin America. On March 17 the President

underlined this commitment to protect American influence
abroad when he ordered U.S. Marines to intervene in
Honduras to restore political stability.
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The prospect of imminent war with Japan forced
Roosevelt to reconsider the failure of the General Staff
to perform as expected. Root and other army reformers
gained the attention of the President for the first time
in many months. Ainsworth was criticised for wielding too
much power in the War Department and undermining the role
of the General Staff. The President agreed to abolish the
post of military secretary and to re-appoint Ainsworth
adjutant general.

In an attempt to increase the authority

of the chief of staff, Bell was promoted to Major General,
the same rank as held by Ainsworth.53 A planned
reorganisation of the artillery was approved. The
Artillery Corps, created by Root's Army reforms of 1901,
was split into a new two-part structure based around coast
and field artillery. The sudden flurry of military reform,
however,

soon ended as Roosevelt's attention again

focussed on domestic regulation of big business.54
Roosevelt joined an increasing number of people
unwilling to accept that business had proven a leader in
organisation and efficiency. Henry James, who had returned
to America after a twenty year absence in Europe,
criticised his homeland in The American S c e n e . He attacked
modern America as a nation based upon violence, plunder,
and commerce.

Science and technology had been made

subservient to a short-term profit motive which destroyed
human values.55 The attacks on business greed and
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inefficiency by James, Upton Sinclair,

and others

challenged the Neo-Hamiltonian view that business
organisation represented the pinnacle of progress.
Nonetheless, Root reaffirmed his support for strong
central government served by professionals with control
over defence and foreign policy but limited intervention
in the economy.

Increasing international competition

required a strong, well-briefed government, while big
business a symbol of efficiency needed little government
interference.56 These Neo-Hamiltonian views clashed with
Roosevelt's wish to introduce government regulation of
business. The use of business organisational ideas
continued to flourish, however,

and in the summer of 1907,

Des Moines Iowa introduced corporate, planned city
government.

Based upon an idea first implemented in

Galveston, Texas in 1900, the development of corporate
city government was regarded as an efficient response to
both local corruption and the increasing functions of city
g overnment.5 7
In late June Roosevelt invited senior army and navy
officers to Oyster Bay for discussions on the measures to
be taken if Japan launched a sudden attack. The conference
decided to fortify Oahu in the Hawaii Islands and
establish a naval base at Pearl Harbour.^8 In an attempt
to convince Japan of American military power,

it was also

decided to send an American fleet on a world cruise. The
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President ordered sixteen battleships and cruisers
accompanied by four destroyers to assemble for the cruise.
The whole fleet was painted white to attract publicity and
soon became known as the "Great White Fleet." The ships
visited Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to
emphasise the American commitment to the Pacific.59 Bell,
the chief of staff, was not invited to these discussions,
which undermined his authority and that of the General
Staff.

In the War Department Taft continued to appoint

Ainsworth in charge during his long absences,

leaving Bell

anxious over his inability to establish his command
authority. Bell, unlike Chaffee,

lacked confidence in his

ability and was unable to break with Ainsworth, who
continued to increase his authority and reputation at
Bells expense.60
The Japanese war scare continued throughout the
autumn of 1907. Brigadier General Pershing, regarded as
one of the army's finer commanders, was posted to the
completed Fort McKinley in Manila. Wood criticised the new
naval base at Subic Bay and wanted American resources
concentrated in Manila and at Pearl Harbour.

In an angry

comment in his diary, he predicted that scattered American
forces would easily be defeated and that the Philippines
would fall within seven days of a Japanese assault.61 On
October 11, 1907, Captain James H. Reeves, the military
attache in Beijing, warned of continued Japanese
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commercial and military expansion in the region. He
reported the arrival of 15,000 Japanese troops in
Manchuria and claimed it was effectively a Japanese
province.62 By the Winter of 1907, no Japanese invasion
had materialised,

but concern over Japanese intentions

remained high.
The prospect of war emphasised the poor performance
of the general staff. Root, Wood, and Carter were
concerned at the inability of Bell or Taft to control
Ainsworth and to assert the primacy of the General
Staff.63 Captain Frank R. McCoy, the President's military
aide, claimed Bell was most garrulous, which irritated the
impatient Roosevelt who stated:
would stay all day,

"He talks too much and

I never can get rid of him." The Chief

of Staff was increasingly unhappy and unwell. He felt
isolated as the President avoided him by sending
instructions through either McCoy or Army War College
President Wotherspoon. Bell never understood this conflict
of character and was further handicapped by bureau chiefs
who,

inspired by Ainsworth's example,

ignored his

authority.64 The Chief of Staff and Taft did implement one
major reform, when they established brigade posts,
regimental - and brigade - sized units, which allowed army
officers to train with large forces.65
In the spring of 1908, evidence of Japanese treachery
encouraged the belief that war with Japan was inevitable.

304

In early February, a confidential memorandum compiled by
Lieutenant Colonel Jones, chief of military intelligence
within the General Staff, was circulated among very senior
officials. The report detailed Japanese attempts to
destabilise American influence in the Pacific over a tenyear period. Roosevelt, Root, Taft, Bell, Wotherspoon,

and

Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf all received
copies. The report claimed Japan aided Filipino forces in
their war against America.

In 1896 Filipino nationalist

Jose Ramos, who fled the Philippines to escape the Spanish
authorities, was given political asylum in Japan. Ramos
encouraged Aguinaldo,

the main nationalist leader, to

forge links with Japan.

In June 1898 Aguinaldo sent two

trusted advisers, Nariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco, to
Japan for a series of meetings with senior officials.
Foreign Minister Mr. Askai, Assistant Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Fukushima, and several members of the
Japanese general staff promised to help the nationalists
against America. Throughout the autumn of 1898, Captain Y.
Tukizawa,

the Japanese military attache in Manila,

accompanied American forces in the Philippines and passed
information to Filipino nationalists. Other Japanese
officers acted as military advisers to Filipino forces.
In October 1900, General Trias, Aguinaldo's deputy,
approached the Japanese consul in Manila in an attempt to
secure arms shipments from Japan. The report claimed Japan
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complied with the request.

Ships in Shanghai and Hong Kong

were used to disguise arms shipments from Japan to
Filipino nationalists. Colonel Jones reported substantial
Japanese espionage at American bases and alleged that
Japan had topographical data and other information on the
new military instillations at Manila Bay, Subic Bay, Pearl
Harbour, Puget Sound,

and Monterey,

California. The report

concluded by warning that American security was threatened
by Japanese military expansion,
immigration to America,

its large merchant navy,

and control of Manchuria,

Formosa,

and the Pescadores Islands.66
This report greatly influenced the President and his
senior advisers.

It highlighted knowledge of Japanese

activities in the Philippines and explained the hostility
of the army command towards Japan. All senior officers who
commanded American forces in the Philippines knew of
Japan's aid to the enemy. The claims of Japanese espionage
were supported by an incident in India which occurred only
weeks after this report had been read in Washington. The
British authorities in Calcutta intercepted a package
bound for Japan. The parcel contained complete engineering
drawings of the fortifications of Corregidor,

the island

fortress which guarded the entrance to Manila Bay. The
plans revealed the exact height above sea-level of all gun
emplacements,

location of searchlights, position of fire

control stations, and extent of mine fields guarding the
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harbour entrance. British intelligence delivered the plans
to the American consul, which both underlined AngloAmerican cooperation,

and the limited nature of the Anglo-

Japanese Treaty of 19 02.67 Wood summed up to Roosevelt the
anger

directed at Japan and the determination to defend

Anglo-American interests in the Pacific:
.... There is a rapidly growing feeling among the
whites here that a definite issue with Japan is not
far off. She seems to be without any sense of
commercial honour, and her recent fortunate outcome
in her struggle with Russia has served to upset the
brown people throughout the East and bring a general
feeling of unrest, and I should not be at all
surprised to see the British- Japanese Alliance
broken off for good and sufficient reasons in the
very near future. Discrimination against British
merchandise and British merchants in the transport,
etc., is causing much discontent. It seems to me that
the best outcome for us would be an understanding
with England which would result in the maintenance in
the Pacific of fleets by each which united would
always be superior to the Japanese fleet. Japan
must be smashed at sea before long or white
influence in the East will be ended, and with it,
to a large extent trade. The Japanese are not
friendly to any white people and are looking
forward to the establishment of a policy on the
coast of Asia that will correspond very closely to
our Monroe Doctrine ....68
The increasing tension between Japan and America
alarmed the cautious Japanese Premier Taro Katsura. He
convinced the cabinet,

despite army protests,

to pursue a

policy of international cooperation with Europe and
America.

Japan was not ready for war against an America

supported by Russia and other European powers.

In such a

war, Britain would not support Japan, which reaffirmed the
limited nature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. By pursuing a
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policy of expansion as recommended by the army Katusra
emphasised Japan faced defeat and international isolation.
Katsura convinced a majority of his government to embark
on a new policy of international agreement. The army
opposed this policy. On February 18, 1908 a note was sent
to the American ambassador in Tokyo acknowledging American
immigration controls and agreeing to uphold them by not
issuing any more visas to Japanese labourers. The Japanese
government also initiated a series of diplomatic treaties
with the United States, Great Britain,

and France.

In

return for recognition of Japanese control of Korea and
Manchuria, Japan offered to accept American ownership of
the Philippines, French control of Indo-China, and British
ownership of India.

In the autumn of 1908, a U . S .-Japanese

treaty was formally concluded in the Root-Takahira
Agreement.69
The improvement in great power relations in the
Pacific convinced Roosevelt that Wood could be recalled.
In mid-February he announced that Wood would take command
of the Department of the East, after a six-month trip
through Europe including visits to the military manoeuvres
in Germany and France. Major General Frank C. Weston, the
former commissary general,

became the new commander in the

Philippines.70 In a final letter to Root from Manila, Wood
reaffirmed his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, the
benefits of controlling the Philippines,

and advantages

provided by American rule to the islanders.71
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In America, Taft began his campaign to secure the
Republican presidential nomination. Roosevelt initially
supported Root and hoped he could be convinced to run for
president. Root still determined to return to his law
practice in New York, was reluctant to accept. The
Secretary of War was viewed with suspicion by NeoHamiltonian Republicans. As governor of the Philippines,
and head of the War Department, he had often questioned
ideas of American racial superiority, the need for
military expansion, and the long-term benefits of
colonialism.

In an effort to secure Neo-Hamiltonian

Republican support in the Republican primaries, Taft made
several "Neo-Hamiltonian speeches." In business clubs in
Chicago,

Cleveland, Tacoma,

and Augusta, Georgia, Taft

gave the strongest endorsements of his career to
colonialism and military expansion. He attacked ideas of
"non entanglement" as outdated,

enthusiastically endorsed

the policy of a big navy, reaffirmed the importance of the
Monroe Doctrine and Panama Canal to America's defence,

and

promised merchant marine ship subsidies and support for
free trade in the Pacific.72 In domestic politics Taft
rejected further progressive reforms and pledged to
"perfect the now adequate machinery" of controls over
interstate labour and commerce. These views were endorsed
by Root, Wood, Lodge,

and other conservative and Neo-
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Hamiltonian Republicans.73 As Taft and Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans moved to a closer understanding, Roosevelt
increasingly alienated such party members with support for
Bryanite policies on the environment and further business
regulation.74 Increasingly, Roosevelt identified with
Republicans unwilling to accept business corruption, poor
safety standards, and destruction of the environment. This
group of Republicans included Charles Evans Hughes, Louis
D. Brandeis,

and Albert J. Beveridge, who rejected Taft as

too conservative.75
The organisational problems of the army continued.
Secretary of War Taft was distracted by his election
campaign, while improved relations with Japan removed any
urgency to solve the army's problems. Root continued to
press for Carter's appointment to the General Staff. Taft,
who disliked Carter, rejected the request,

and Carter

remained commander of the Department of the Lakes in
Chicago. The author of the General Staff Act was deeply
unhappy, and, despite support from Root and Young, he
became depressed by the failure of army reform and his own
career prospects.7 6
Wood,

Carter's great professional rival,

left the

Philippines in late February 1908. The former commander of
the Philippines made use of his return to America to visit
British colonial officials. These visits emphasised the
agreement between Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and the
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British colonial establishment to defend Anglo-Saxon rule
and free trade. He took tea in the Raffles Hotel Singapore
with the British high commissioner,

stayed with British

colonial officials in Ceylon, and spent time sightseeing
in Egypt with his friend Lord Cromer, the de facto ruler
of Egypt.77 In Gibraltar he was welcomed by the British
governor,

and, after touring Spain for two weeks, he

arrived in Britain.

In London he spent nearly eight weeks

with senior British military and government officials,
visited and dined with Lytton Strachey, Lord Curzon,
Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Howe, and the Colonial Secretary
the Earl of Crewe.78 With all of these men he discussed
the future security and trade of the Far East.
Wood sought backing for an unofficial Anglo-American
alliance against Japan.79 The strong association between
Wood and British imperialists highlighted Wood's personal
commitment to Anglo-American friendship, based upon free
trade and Anglo-American imperialism.

It also emphasised

the support such ideas enjoyed among Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans. The willingness of American envoys to extend
their visits in Britain, which rarely occurred on trips to
Germany or France, underlined the mutual advantages many
felt could be achieved through closer ties.
While Wood promoted Anglo-American friendship,

the

presidential election continued in America. Roosevelt
already privately regretted his public pledge that under
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no circumstances would he be a candidate in 1908.80 The
President continued to hope Root would stand in the
election,

but Root firmly rejected Roosevelt's proposal,

and the President reluctantly accepted that even "wild
horses wouldn't drag him into making a public campaign."81
The other Republican candidates, apart from Taft, were
Speaker of the House "Uncle Joe" Cannon and Charles Evans
Hughes. Roosevelt regarded Hughes and Cannon as too
independent from him and announced his support for Taft.
On June 16 the Republican Party Convention elected Taft as
its presidential candidate with conservative Jim Sherman
from New York as his running mate.82 Roosevelt received
the longest outburst of support at the convention,
provoked by a speech given by Henry Cabot Lodge praising
his presidency. Two weeks later the Democratic Party
selected William Jennings Bryan, giving him a third
attempt to win the presidency.
In the War Department,

the presidential election

deprived the General Staff of strong political leadership
and encouraged independent action among staff bureau
chiefs.

In July Taft resigned as secretary of war to

concentrate on his election campaign.83 On July 23, 1908
Roosevelt appointed Luke E. Wright,
Tennessee,

a lawyer from

to the post. Wright strongly supported Neo-

Hamiltonian policies of overseas expansion. The new
Secretary had three sons who volunteered for service in
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the Spanish-American War, was a member of the U.S.Philippine Commission between 1900-1904, and replaced Taft
as governor-general of the Islands in 1904, serving until
1906. A committed imperialist, he received an honorary
doctorate in law from Root's alma mater Hamilton College
in 1904. In 1906-1907 he served as American ambassador to
Japan during the "war scare" and advocated a tough line
against Japanese expansion in the Far East. Despite his
staunch support for American Imperialism, which made him
politically acceptable to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, he
had no knowledge of military affairs.84
Wright discovered a War Department unofficially run
by Ainsworth, while the chief of staff was ignored and
bureau chiefs did as they pleased. Bell had failed utterly
to assert his authority as chief of staff and, to compound
his misery,

it was discovered he had diabetes. His medical

condition accounted for much of his depressed state,
tiredness,

and wild swings of mood. Unfortunately this

diagnosis did not improve his character, which continued
to make him an ineffective chief of staff. Major Archie
Butt, the President's military aide, summed up the problem
in a letter to his mother:
.... General Bell talks so much that he gets on
peoples nerves. He always seems to be talking for the
benefit of someone in the adjoining room. I do not
see how he is going to last much longer. He has
crossed swords too, with General Ainsworth, a fatal
thing for anyone to do, especially one who does not
handle a rapier. Ainsworth attends to his duties so
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perfectly that it is a relief for anyone to approach
his office. He is deep and wise and kind, except when
he is crossed, and then the Assyrian could not come
down more swiftly, or more deadly .,..85
Supporters of army reform were encouraged, however, when
orders announced the return of Bliss from the Philippines
for reassignment in America.86 More good news followed
when the new Militia Act which had limited the President's
mobilisation of the National Guard to unit call ups during
war was offset by an unchallenged ruling by the attorney
general which reaffirmed the president's right to use the
Guard abroad.

Carter continued to be ignored by the

administration and, with the sudden death of his son,
lapsed into a deep depression over the prospects of
achieving military efficiency,
colonial expansion,

continuing American

or advancing his own career.87

In London Wood left his British colleagues and
travelled to France. Over the next four weeks he observed
French and German military manoeuvres. He renewed his
acquaintance with the Kaiser, whom he had met on a
previous visit in 1902, and dined with both the French
president and the German emperor. Wood made several
reports on the French and German armies, which
concentrated on their abilities in the field and not on
their general staff structures. The General,

like many

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, was concerned about German
economic expansion,

and the Kaiser's attempts to secure a

formal overseas empire. Germany was viewed as a commercial
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rival and potential enemy, and Wood welcomed the chance to
observe any weaknesses in the German army.88 On completion
of the German manoeuvres, Wood returned to London for
further meetings with British officials before setting
sail for New York in early September.
In September the election campaign had begun in
earnest. Bryan embarked on an extensive national tour
describing big business as "industrial despotism" and
attacking American imperialism for undermining individual
liberty. He denounced army reforms as militarism and,
citing his hero Jefferson, warned of the dangers to the
Republic posed by materialism and industrialisation.89 The
Jeffersonian ideology of local political control,

a

volunteer army, and an internationally isolated agrarian
republic,

continued to have wide public support.

In the

election of November 3, 1908 Taft won 321 electoral votes,
to Bryan's 162. In the popular vote, Taft won over
7,500,000 votes, while Bryan polled nearly 6,500,000.

In

the Congressional elections the Republicans maintained
their sixty-one to twenty-three Senate majority and 219172 House majority. The victory, however, was less
convincing than previous Republican triumphs. Taft's lead
over Bryan was only 1,200,000 million votes,

less than

half the margin Roosevelt achieved over Parker in 1904.
Colorado,

Nebraska, Nevada,

and Oklahoma all rejected

Taft, when they had accepted Roosevelt. The new President
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led an increasingly divided party, emphasised by telegrams
of congratulations from Progressive Republicans, which
demanded constructive but not conservative leadership.90
On November 9, less than one week after the election,
the new Army War College opened. The opening address was
given by Root to an audience that included Roosevelt,
Taft, Wright,

and Bell.

In his speech, Root attempted to

define the functions of the War College, War Department,
and General Staff. The former Secretary of War, however,
produced only a vague definition which only emphasised the
confusion which existed over army administration. The War
College was "to do the thinking for the army" while the
General Staff did the "studying of military science" and
the War Department handled administration.91 The speech
only emphasised Root's failure to communicate how he had
intended army organisation to perform.

In a major

omission, he also failed to stress the importance of
having General Staff officers in the field to ensure the
implementation of war plans.
Later that same day, Wood arrived in New York. He
travelled to Washington and spent the next week briefing
Roosevelt on his travels. The two men discussed Japanese
expansion and possible American responses, the continued
superiority of the German army, a closer alliance with
Britain, and Wood's proposal to popularise the idea of
military preparedness.92 Wood was appalled by the failure
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of

Bell as chief of staff, the power wielded by Ainsworth

in

the War Department, and the failure to implement Root's

army reforms as envisaged. To strengthen the General
Staff, he convinced Roosevelt to appoint Bliss as
president of the new War College. As the year ended, Wood
delivered his first public speech on military preparedness
to

the New England Society of New York. The speech warned

of

the dangers to American overseas trade if Japan

continued to expand its colonial empire and industrial
capacity. Wood regarded the world as having limited
resources and too many competitive empires, making certain
future world conflict. To protect American liberty and
economic growth, Wood recommended that the New England
Society endorse his proposal to train 50,000 volunteer
officers for service in a national emergency.93
The year closed with both Progressive Republicans and
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans uncertain what policies the
new President would adopt. Neo-Hamiltonians remained
convinced war was inevitable, with Japan the most likely
enemy.

In response Wood, Root, Wright,

and others were

determined to ensure that Taft supported a larger navy and
greater army efficiency. The new President must defend
United States territorial and commercial interests in
Latin America,

the Caribbean,

and Pacific.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW CITIZEN ARMY 1909-1912

American politics between 1909 and 1912 were
dominated by increasing division between Progressive and
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The philosophical and policy
differences between these two groups temporarily disrupted
the Republican electoral pre-eminence over the Democratic
Party. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, many personally
friendly to Roosevelt, rejected his domestic reform
program and sided with the conservative Taft.

In military

and foreign affairs, Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, which had
profoundly changed the agenda on these issues, retained
their dominant influence.

Intervention in China and

Central America underlined the commitment to asserting
American influence in the world.
In the army the concept of a broad-based citizen force reemerged.

The small professional army of 100,000 regulars

was regarded as inadequate. European and Japanese forces
had millions of trained troops and America needed to
respond to armies of this size. Neo-Hamiltonians suggested
short-term enlistments to create a trained federal
reserve,

increased money for the armed forces, greater

standardisation of National Guard and regular army
equipment, and more joint training exercises. The policy
proposed a trained professional elite which would command
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a large citizen army with basic military knowledge.
General Wood described the new policy as "military
preparedness," which encouraged mass mobilisation around a
professional core.
On January 28, 1909 Cuba once again achieved limited
self-government when American troops left after three
years of occupation. Root, writing to the sympathetic
newspaper The O u tlook, reaffirmed his commitment to
American intervention anywhere in the Caribbean or Latin
America to defend American interests.1 Taft, the
president-elect,

asked Root to remain secretary of state,

despite his strong views on asserting American economic
and military power abroad. The New York lawyer refused,
although as a favour to his party he agreed to his
appointment as the junior senator from New York. Root's
refusal to continue in the cabinet left James Wilson,

the

secretary of agriculture, as the only member of
Roosevelt's cabinet reappointed by Taft. General Wood
noted in his diary both the disappointment among the
"Roosevelt men" and the sudden realisation that Taft was
determined to assert his independence.2
In the War Department,

staunch imperialist and

supporter of military reform Luke Wright was replaced by
Jacob McGavock Dickinson. The new secretary was from
Columbus, Mississippi and was a graduate of universities
in Leipzig,

Paris, and New York. A corporate lawyer with a
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practice in Chicago, his only previous experience of
government office was two years as an assistant attorney
general,

and two years as a federal solicitor. Unlike

Wright, he had no commitment to American imperialism. His
appointment emphasised Taft's reluctance to accept the
Neo-Hamiltonian view of international relations,

that war

was inevitable and military preparedness essential.3 Taft
selected six other corporate lawyers for senior cabinet
positions including:

Philander C. Knox as secretary of

state, Franklin MacVeagh as secretary of the treasury,

and

George Wickersham as attorney general. These appointments
created a conservative administration,

impressed by the

achievement of American business and unsympathetic to
further domestic reform.4 On March 4, 1909 Taft was
inaugurated as president,

and his new administration

formally took power.
In the Philippines,

concern about Japanese intentions

continued among American officials,

especially when

Japanese espionage was again discovered on the islands. A
soldier, on duty as a photographer with the engineers, was
offered $25,000 by Japanese army officers for complete
photographs of the defences on Corregidor.

The soldier

agreed, but then took fright and reported the matter to
the authorities. A trap was set by the army, and two
Japanese officers were caught accepting photographs from
the soldier. The two Japanese officers were arrested,

but,
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having diplomatic immunity, they were later released.5 In
Washington Taft chose to ignore the incident, a decision
that angered senior army officers and Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans. The incident also revealed the inability of
the Japanese government,

led by Taro Katsura, to control

the Japanese army and its continued wish to create a
Japanese empire in the Pacific.
Major General Leonard Wood, now commander of the
Department of the East, was concerned at Taft's
willingness to compromise with Japan. He spent the summer
of 1909 in New York establishing himself as the leading
spokesman for Neo-Hamiltonian ideas.

In June he held

meetings with Root, Bliss, and Wotherspoon, where he
outlined his proposals for military preparedness and asked
for their support. Wood argued that the development of a
mass army, with a professional core, was essential to
defend American interests abroad.

In letters to army

colleagues, he denounced the failure to make the chief of
staff paramount in the army, and reaffirmed his belief in
the importance of American colonial possessions.6
Roosevelt announced his support for Wood's ideas, before
he left for a prolonged hunting trip in Africa.7
In late June Wood led the fight to continue the
labour exclusion laws affecting Japanese immigration and
again criticised Taft for his willingness to compromise
with Japan.8 Wood was utterly convinced his policies were
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correct,

and he personally attacked all those who hindered

their implementation. He joined the criticism of Bliss,
his deputy in Cuba and the Philippines,

for his failure to

end the periodic rebellions by Moro tribesmen in the
Philippines. Wood disliked any action which encouraged
anti-imperialist sentiment and he lectured Bliss for
being,

"unable to act decisively," and loving too much

"academic discussion."9 To strengthen the General Staff,
Wood suggested Bliss head the Army War College and that
Wotherspoon be appointed assistant chief of staff to help
Bell.10 The acceptance of both appointments by Taft
strengthened Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in the War Department
and underlined the influence Root, Lodge, and Wood,

still

wielded over promotions.
In mid-August Wood implemented joint manoeuvres with
regular army troops and National Guard forces from
Massachusetts,

New Jersey, New York, and Washington D.C.

The plan was to defend Boston from attack. Over 15,000
troops were involved with Bliss the main commander and
Wood chief umpire. The exercise cost $500,000, and
indicated Taft's willingness to support some NeoHamiltonian ideas.11
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1909, relations
between Wood and Adjutant General Ainsworth remained
cordial. Wood's own command headquarters was Governor's
Island in New York, but frequent meetings brought him to
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Washington. Ainsworth often met Wood at the station,

and

Wood regularly stayed at Ainsworth's home. The Adjutant
General suspected Wood would replace Bell as chief of
staff, and sought to ingratiate himself, to a possible
superior and rival.12 In early November Wood was appointed
deputy chairman on the selection board for general staff
officers, with Major General Bell presiding.13 The
appointment increased the suspicion that Wood was to
replace Bell.
On December 7 Taft,

in an address to the nation,

announced stringent fiscal measures to promote government
economy. The announcement highlighted the views of a
president and cabinet that believed in the efficiency of
big business and distrusted big government. All federal
departments were required to cut expenditure, the War
Department from $210 million to $165 million.14

Neo-

Hamiltonian Republicans were appalled at the proposed
defence cuts. A week later, however,

Taft silenced some of

the criticism from Root and others when he announced Wood
to be appointed chief of staff. The appointment was a
major victory for supporters of military reform and
imperialism.15
Ainsworth was one of the first people to congratulate
Wood, and he took the opportunity of their first meeting
in the War Department,

to present his ideas on Army

reorganisation. The Adjutant General,

suggested great
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savings could be made in the army budget by placing the
Inspector General's Office under his control. He reminded
Wood of his abilities as an administrator, and his
reputation for providing a better service at a lower
cost.16 Roosevelt, Taft, and Root all originally impressed
by the apparent organisational efficiency of big business,
found many of Ainsworth's ideas attractive. His proposal
to amalgamate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector
General's Office typically mirrored the latest ideas in
business of amalgamating departments to cut costs.

In late

1909, however, Roosevelt no longer viewed big business
organisation as an unqualified success, while Root
concluded Ainsworth's organisational brilliance did not
outweigh his misuse of power. Both men warned Wood to
treat any ideas from Ainsworth with caution. Taft, and
many in his cabinet, however,

still held both business

organisation and Ainsworth's ability to implement business
measures in high esteem.
Wood refused to accept Ainsworth's ideas, and after
gaining support from Root and attorney general Wickersham,
he announced his determination to oppose the planned cuts
in the defence budget.
Carter as his deputy,

Senator Root pressed Wood to accept
but Wood was reluctant to accept

Carter and indicated his preference for Bliss.17 Carter
supported the concept of a professional army, but rejected
the reliance on militia forces, which Wood's proposal for
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military preparedness required.18 In a letter to his
British friend, John St.Loe Strachey, Wood reaffirmed his
belief in volunteer forces:
I want to congratulate you on your new book: "A New
Way of Life." I have read it with the greatest
amount of interest .... We, like yourselves, are
much dependent on volunteers, and anything which
serves to arouse the interest of the people in the
necessity for a reasonable amount of preparedness
for trouble is doing work in the right direction.
I am anxious to see your Territorial Forces and
hope I shall have time to drop in at some time at
some of your manoeuvres ....19
Despite Wood's preference for Bliss, Taft announced in
late December that Carter was promoted to major general
and assistant chief of staff. Wotherspoon was appointed
head of the Army War College. Bliss,

furious at being

passed over, was sent to command the Department of
California.20 Wood was disappointed by these decisions but
was soon occupied with mobilising opposition to Taft's
defence cuts. On New Year's Eve Wood dined with Root and
Admiral Mahan and all three agreed to oppose Taft's
policies of defence cuts and appeasement towards Japan. A
strong American military presence must be maintained in
the Pacific to deter Japan. They remained certain of
future military conflict and that military preparedness
was essential.21
In early January,

Bell the chief of staff, was

hospitalised due to complications caused by his
diabetes.22 Although not due to take office until April,
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Wood became acting chief of staff.

In his new office he

continued to warn colleagues of the danger posed by Japan,
criticised Taft's determination to improve relations with
Japan, and claimed the Japanese had sponsored an antiAmerican movement in the Philippines. He pressed the
President to give greater priority to the Panama Canal,
which he claimed would provide America with flexibility in
deploying its naval forces.

In a typically forthright

interview with George Eriswold Hill, he summed up his
distrust of international agreements:
.... Until international law and justice have
advanced far beyond their present state of progress,
a purely neutral [Panama] canal, in the sense of an
unfortified waterway, must remain a utopian dream.
The body of international law on which even the
leading powers of the world are agreed is extremely
limited and as for a means of enforcing it, it does
not exist. When two nations have exhausted the
resources of diplomacy ... treaty obligations are as
ropes of sand and there has never been a time when
non-belligerents, unless impelled by self-interest,
have been willing to interfere to enforce the
provisions of even the most important international
conventions. . ..
He reminded his readers that, without the Canal,
13,000 miles separated the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of
the United States. The General outlined the dangers to
American defence posed by modern technology. Advances in
shipbuilding techniques,

steam power, and electrical

equipment had ended American immunity to foreign invasion.
Wood warned of the dangers of surprise attack, noting the
Japanese assault on Port Arthur, which had destroyed the
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Russian Pacific Fleet in one shock attack. A small
professional army provided no defence against these
threats. Only his policy of military preparedness, which
created a European-style citizen army, provided adequate
security.23
A few days after this extensive interview,

the new

Chief of Staff, again emphasised his opposition to Taft's
policies:

". .. . Japan is going ahead in a perfectly

methodical way to dominate the Far East and as much of the
Pacific and its trade as we and the rest of the world will
permit. When she has a good excuse she will absorb the
Philippines

. ,.."24 The President, who placed great faith

in the rule of law and international cooperation,

rejected

Wood's views. Wood had no more success in his attempt to
convince Taft not to appoint Carter as his deputy.

Senator

Root and Secretary of War Dickinson were both friendly
towards Carter and convinced Taft to ignore Wood's
request.25 Regarded as an author with powerful political
friends,

Carter remained an unpopular figure within the

army earning the nickname,
On April 21,

"fire side willie."

1910 Bell officially retired as chief of

staff. He had tried his best to implement Root's army
reforms, but was undermined by Ainsworth and an
unsympathetic Taft, who remembered Bell's opposition to
his reform program in the Philippines.

Isolated and in

ill-health, he was delighted to leave Washington D.C. and
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its scheming War Department for a new posting as army
commander in the Philippines.26 The new Chief of Staff
left Washington almost immediately for a tour of Latin
America. Taft appointed Wood and Bliss as presidential
envoys and instructed them to encourage closer U.S.-Latin
American relations. At the end of this six-week tour, Wood
went to London and spent a week discussing Japanese and
German expansion in the Pacific and Latin America with his
British colleagues: Lord Cromer, J. St.Loe Strachey,
Arthur Lee, and others.27
While Wood was abroad the philosophy of Taylorism was
popularised in America.

Championed by Frederick W. Taylor,

who claimed scientific management would increase business
efficiency,

it was popular among people who

believed

business organisation could provide government with the
example of how to achieve maximum efficiency. Taft's
administration, dominated by corporate lawyers, responded
favourably to "Taylorism" and considered implementing its
ideas in government departments. The new ideas promised to
save money and challenged those who rejected business
organisation as inefficient. Taft considered creating an
efficiency commission to review federal government
departments.
After an absence of almost two months, Wood returned
to Washington. He remained opposed to Taft's attempt to
gain greater government efficiency, which he feared might
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lead to even greater defence cuts. The policies of the
President were temporarily forgotten, however, when he
discovered Carter had authorised staff appointments during
his absence. He informed Carter bluntly that he had not
wished him to be his deputy, and that he, not Carter, was
chief of staff. The two men continued to work together but
Carter,

once the leading army reformer, discovered that

his opposition to any reliance on volunteer forces set him
against Wood's policy of "military preparedness."28
Throughout August, Wood, Carter, and Captains Hagood and
Hanna worked on a new general staff structure.29 They
presented it to the President in early September, he
approved it within a few days. The reform eliminated
general staff sections.

Four new organisational divisions

were created:

a Mobile Army Division in charge of rapid

mobilisation,

a Coastal Artillery Division,

a Division of

Militia Affairs responsible for joint reserve-regular army
actions,

and the War College Division responsible for

strategic planning.3 0
Wood and his colleagues also sought to improve the
militia system. The Swiss militia system attracted the
most attention,

since Switzerland was a republic with a

locally organised militia and small professional army
capable of mobilising 240,000 trained volunteers in less
than twenty-four hours.31 Wood ordered several reports to
be commissioned on the Swiss system and its relevance to
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America.32 By late autumn of 1910, these measures had
become the foundations of Wood's new military system.
The policy of reconciliation with Japan continued to
be unpopular in the army. Wood, Root, and other senior
figures remained convinced American economic growth
depended upon controlling Far Eastern trade. Taft's faith
in international agreement was ridiculed by Wood, and he
ordered all military attaches in Latin America and the
Pacific to report on any Japanese economic or military
activity.3-3 The President, worried over internal party
division, was aware of Wood's opposition to his foreign
and defence policies.
Internal Republican party division between
progressives and conservatives increased with Roosevelt's
return from Africa.

In May the former President told his

friend Lodge that his support for Taft had been a
mistake.34 A few weeks later he delivered his own policy
speech at Ossawatomie, Kansas. The "Square Deal," speech
did not criticise Taft by name, but it challenged the
President to support a graduated income tax, government
control over big business,

stronger labour protection

laws, and a larger defence budget. The promise of more
defence expenditure did not impress Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans,

because they feared Roosevelt was splitting

the party. The mid-term congressional results confirmed
their apprehension. On November 8, 1908 the Democrats had
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gained control of Congress for the first time since 1894.
The Republican Party theoretically still held a
comfortable majority in both houses, but Progressive
Republicans, disillusioned by Taft's policies, voted with
the Democrats to give them a majority.
Hay, Democrat,

In the House James

became chairman of the Military Affairs

Committee. A staunch supporter of Jeffersonian and
Jacksonian principles, Hay distrusted strong centralised
government,

opposed Root's army reforms,

supported locally

controlled volunteer forces, and was a close friend of
General Ainsworth.35 This appointment did not endear
Roosevelt to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who blamed the
former president for the division within their party.
Wood was annoyed by the election results and by
Taft's decision to create a War Department Board on
Business Methods. Ainsworth had convinced the President to
create this board as the military review body for the new
Efficiency Commission on Government Performance. The
Adjutant General was appointed chairman. Wood,
predecessors,

like his

found his authority undercut by Taft's faith

in Ainsworth.36 The Chief of Staff's difficulties
increased with a revolution in Mexico. The dictator
Porfirio Diaz was challenged by the liberal reformer
Francisco I. Madero.
threat to 40,000 U.S.

In Washington, Taft worried over the
citizens and over $100,000,000 of

investment in Mexico.37 The President feared Diaz's fall

339

might cause political chaos. Wood was ordered to prepare
contingency plans for military action.38
Relations between the President and the Chief of
Staff remained difficult, despite their close working
relationship on the Mexican crisis.
had passed the McLachlan Resolution,

In Congress, Democrats
instructing the

secretary of war to report to Congress on national
defence. Democrats hoped to use the opportunity to
discredit ideas of military preparedness and demand
defence cuts. Ainsworth,

advising important congressmen,

hoped to reduce general staff authority over staff
bureaus.

Dickinson allied with Wood, allowed the chief of

staff to appear before Congress.

In an effective speech,

Wood claimed the army suffered from badly organised supply
departments,

insufficient artillery,

ineffective reserve

forces and too few personnel for current defence needs.39
The speech annoyed Taft,

since he had not authorised it

and because it discredited Taft's attempt to reduce
military expenditure.

To avoid causing a scandal, which

would add to internal party division, Taft decided to
discipline neither Wood nor Dickinson.
In January 1911 the War Department introduced Wood's
plan to achieve military preparedness by increasing the
efficiency of the militia. Wood advocated a new two-year
enlistment period in the army to replace the current fiveyear term. Under the new scheme, after two years service
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men would be liable for call-up for the next eight years.
The Chief of Staff hoped this would provide a large
trained reserve. The bill re-asserted the right of the
President to use the National Guard abroad.40 A separate
measure,

introduced days later, suggested commissioning

500 new regular army officers to allow the professional
army to expand rapidly in time of war.41 Both measures
were opposed by Democrats and Progressive Republicans.

In

the War Department Wood discovered Ainsworth had passed
information on to opponents of the new measures,

and a

serious row errupted over the powers of the adjutant
general.42 Thereafter the two men were bitter enemies.
Ainsworth continued to provide information to opponents of
military reform,

especially to his friend, House Military

Affairs Chairman Hay.43
The Mexican crisis distracted Wood from his attempt
to pass new army legislation. A border incursion from
Mexico left two U.S. citizens dead and eleven injured in
Douglas, Arizona. The President was reluctant to act,
preferring to trust international agreement rather than
any hasty use of force.44 The demands for action from
worried businessmen, Roosevelt,
increased.

and from the army

In early March public pressure forced Taft to

order an army mobilisation in Texas, with Major General
Carter in command. The plan was to rapidly deploy 2 0,000
troops on the border.45 The troops were not to enter
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Mexico. The mobilisation was a failure. By the end of
March, the U.S. force numbered less than 20,000 and was
critically short of supplies. The struggle to assemble
20,000 troops in America gave credance to Wood's comments
on the continued inadequacies of the army.
The political fight to achieve army reform took on a
new urgency in the wake of the Mexican trouble.

In

Washington, Wood was frustrated at opposition to his
reforms and openly described his opponents as "stupid
fools."46 In the Senate, Root and Lodge announced their
support for Wood's plans although it did not weaken Taft's
continued refusal to support Wood. The Chief of Staff's
reforms,

like those of Root, required strong support from

the executive if they were to succeed. Wood and Taft
continued to disagree on the benefits of international law
and better relations with Japan with the Chief of Staff
persisting in encouraging the army to ignore Taft's
policies. He ordered Bell,

commander in the Philippines,

to plan U.S. defensive strategies in response to a
Japanese attack. Bell happily complied. He disliked Taft,
and,

like most senior officers, he scorned any willingness

to trust in international agreements.47 Aware of
increasing party division, his declining stature in the
army,

and increasing opposition in Congress the President

decided to replace Secretary of War Dickinson. He offered
Henry Lewis Stimson the post.

Stimson was regarded as a
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Progressive Republican and one of Roosevelt's closest
friends,

so Taft hoped that this appointment might reunite

an increasingly divided Republican Party.48
Henry Lewis Stimson was born in New York on September
21, 1867. A graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School, he
was admitted to the New York Bar in 1891. In 1893 he
became a member of Root's law firm in New York where he
soon became a close friend of Root and full partner in the
firm in 1897. Over the next few years, Stimson became
friendly with Roosevelt, Wickersham, Gifford Pinchot and
other leading Republicans. Between 1906 and 1909 he served
as U.S. Southern District Attorney for New York.49
Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were delighted
by Stimson's appointment as secretary of war. On May 12,
1911 Dickinson retired as secretary of war and Stimson
formally took charge. The new Secretary,

like most of his

predecessors, was ignorant of army matters and War
Department personalities.
dinners,

In a series of meetings,

and a week-long fishing trip, Wood, Root, and

Roosevelt sought to educate Stimson. Their plans for
military preparedness and the likely opposition in the War
Department and in Congress were discussed with the new
Secretary.50 On his return from his fishing trip, Stimson
immediately faced various demands from opponents of army
reform.
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In Congress, Hay introduced a bill inspired by
Ainsworth. The bill revived Ainsworth's suggestion to
consolidate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector
General's Office, proposed to cut the number of General
Staff officers,

and suggested promoting all members of the

Adjutant General's Office one grade upon retirement.51 The
last measure ensured Ainsworth would retire as a
Lieutenant General. Wood opposed all the measures
suggested. He approached the President and demanded that
he denounce the bill and reassign Ainsworth to a
departmental command. Although Taft agreed to consider
these matters, he decided to leave Ainsworth as adjutant
general and ignore the implications of the Hay Bill.52
Ainsworth submitted his views to Stimson,

reminding the

new Secretary that the Record and Pension Office was
exempt from General Staff control under the original act
of Feb.

14, 1903. He claimed that Taft, as secretary of

war, had supported this interpretation of the Act when he
wrote:

"The Chief of Staff is charged ... by law with the

duty of supervising, under the direction of the Secretary
of War,

all troops of the line and various staff bureaus."

On the basis of these claims, Ainsworth asserted Wood had
no legitimate control over his office.53 Stimson rejected
these assertions. He indicated to Ainsworth his support
both for the authority of the General Staff over all staff
bureaus,

and for Wood's policy of military preparedness.
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Throughout the autumn of 1911 the War Department
suffered continual bickering among leading officers. Wood,
Carter, and Ainsworth all sought to influence War
Department policy in different ways.54 Wood and Carter
challenged Ainsworth's right to reassign officers to new
posts. The issue caused such acrimony between the Adjutant
General and the Chief of Staff that communication between
the two men could only be conducted through notes passed
by third parties.55 The President tried to avoid becoming
embroiled in these arguments among senior Army officers,
but his decision not to support Wood only encouraged
further adverse comment upon his leadership,
policies.

abilities and

Colonel John G. Harbord summarised this anti-

Taft feeling in the Army when he wrote:
.... I have heard no good words out here for the
President's peace-at-any-price policy .... If Mr.
Taft and Carnegie succeed in abolishing war, my
father-in-law says he supposes all the army we
need will be Archie Butt [the President's Military
Aide] and an attending surgeon or two. Bishop
Brent in his sermon this morning referred to the
President as an Idealist whose dreams might many of
them not come true in our day, but might become the
platforms of practical politicians in another day.
You can never expect any initiative from Congress
unless pushed from behind. To tell the honest
American voter that he is worthless as a soldier
without training does not win him votes like letting
him know that the citizen soldier of America can win
over the brutal hirelings of any other land with or
without training. . . .
Harbord continued,

suggesting Wood establish an army

league to promote public interest in military
preparedness.56 The Chief of Staff required no prompting
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on this issue.

In Great Britain he had discussed such a

planned organisation with his British friends.
Senator Root did all he could to get Wood and
Stimson to become firm friends. The new Secretary of War
proved eager to learn. He agreed that international
conflict was inevitable and that Wood's proposal to ensure
military preparedness was the best guarantee for future
security.

Stimson supported American expansion overseas,

believing colonial possessions were vital for American
business and defence.

In October he rejected a proposal

for Puerto Rican statehood and suggested that American
colonies should aspire to British-style Dominion status
with the United States.57
Taft's attempt to placate Roosevelt by appointing
Stimson secretary of war failed. On December 23, 1911
Roosevelt wrote to William B. Howland announcing his
intention to challenge Taft for the Republican
presidential nomination.

In late February 1912 Roosevelt

publicly declared his intention to recapture the White
House.58 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were dismayed by
Roosevelt's action. Root, Wood,

Stimson,

and others were

sure he would split the party and thus allow a Democratic
victory.59 Such a victory would endanger Root's military
reforms and prevent the implementation of Wood's plans for
military preparedness.

They regarded Roosevelt as

unelectable and rejected much of his domestic platform as
too radical.

Supporters of Taft and military reform,
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continued to believe in the efficiency of big business and
free market capitalism. Roosevelt's policies threatened
judicial freedom, private property, military reform, and
business interests.60 Stimson, the most progressive member
of Taft's cabinet, rejected Roosevelt's "progressive
policies" outright and endorsed Taft. In a letter to Otto
T. Banard he summarised the faith many Republicans still
had in business organisation as an example of efficiency:
.... We have reached the stage of big business, but
not of monopoly, but that which exists for the
economic purpose of saving the wastes of production
and lowering its costs have come to stay and should
not be interfered with. Possibly sometime in the dim
future we may in some industries as we have already
in railroads, reach the stage of regulated monopoly,
but we have not done so yet and it is not a practical
question.
He further claimed that market competition was an
effective regulator which guaranteed efficiency and
confidently concluded:

"under normal conditions our big

corporations will be regulated and controlled as to their
prices by potential competition. "61
Unlike Roosevelt, Taft's cabinet refused to accept
that business organisation was inefficient and required
government regulation. The former President was
increasingly regarded as a dangerous interloper with a
shallow commitment to true Republican Progressivism.62
Roosevelt's plans placed Root, Lodge,

Stimson, and Wood in

an awkward position. They did not wish to speak against
him, yet his actions threatened the

Republican Party,
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military reform, and big business. None of these leading
Neo-Hamiltonians believed Roosevelt could be elected; his
actions only seemed to guarantee a Democratic victory in
November.63
Throughout the spring, Wood continued to promote his
military reforms. The Chief of Staff confronted growing
opposition in Congress, both to further army reform and to
measures already enacted.

Congressional Democrats,

encouraged by a divided Republican Party,

introduced their

own bill to challenge Wood's ideas for military
preparedness. The legislation recommended longer army
enlistments, the disbandment of the Militia Division
responsible for army-militia cooperation, the end of line
officer appointments in the General Staff, the return of
coastal artillery to local regiments,

and Adjutant General

Ainsworth's right to control the Inspector General's
Office.64 These proposals reflected the
of local control, volunteerism,

continued appeal

and international

isolation to many Americans. The fear remained that a
centralised professional army, and colonial expansion,
threatened the American republic.
In Congress, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans attacked the
changes proposed by Democratic legislation, but many of
Roosevelt's progressive supporters endorsed the attempt to
weaken American military power. Taft joined those opposing
the bill. Wood and Stimson confronted further difficulties

348

when Major General Carter testified before Congress.
Wood's deputy defended the General Staff, attacked Wood's
planned national reserve, and supported the creation of a
large professional army. A staunch advocate of military
professionalism, he refused to accept that a large
volunteer reserve could be reliable in battle.65
Wood and Stimson challenged these assertions. The
Chief of Staff cited the views of economist Brooks Adams
to highlight the link between conflict and trade. An
efficient military was essential to guarantee overseas
trade and ensure American prosperity. Wood released a
general staff report on the deficiencies that remained in
the army and the ease with which America could be invaded.
He argued that the United States confronted industrial
competitors with large citizen armies and that American
security depended upon military preparedness.66 In April
1912 Wood,

supported by Root and Stimson, decided to

establish an Army League to publicise the reasons for
military preparedness. The League quickly denounced the
Democrats and Taft for pursuing policies of "retrenchment
and economy," which threatened national security and
prosperity.67
Events abroad provoked alarm from Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans as they considered the Democratic Army Bill.
Political instability in many places seemed to threaten
American trade and investment.

In Mexico virtual civil war
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continued to threaten American citizens and investment.
The Panama Canal was nearing completion and would require
a military garrison to defend it. American forces occupied
Tien tsin in China, as revolution inspired by provincial
army units threatened American nationals, property,

and

trade. Japan continued to expand its military forces and
to extend territorial control over Manchuria, Korea, and
Formosa. Many in the army

believed the Philippines

remained in danger and that American trade in the Pacific
was under threat from Japan. Nicaragua, Honduras,

and the

Dominican Republic all required American troops and custom
officials to maintain economic and political stability.

In

Europe, the naval arms race between Germany and Britain
intensified after the British launched the first modern
battleship, H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1906. For NeoHamiltonians the international scene in the spring of 1912
provided proof of political instability abroad,
accompanying threats to American investment and exports,
and thus the necessity for American military preparedness.
In Washington the army remained under pressure from
Taft to produce defence cuts.

Stimson and Wood

commissioned a report on closing posts as a way to cut
costs,

organise larger army units, and reassign their

limited forces to more strategically important areas. Many
of the fifty-two military instillations in America had
been built in response to the Indian Wars and were no
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longer required in the twentieth century. The report
recommended closing eighteen forts and provoked outrage in
Congress from representatives of the states affected. The
majority of the closures were in Texas, Wyoming, Michigan,
and New York.68 Congress rejected the post closure plan,
and relations between supporters of military reform and
Congress reached a low-point. This failure to close posts
encouraged Stimson to introduce the ideas of Taylorism and
scientific management into the army to reduce costs. The
introduction of Taylor's ideas emphasised the continued
confidence many Republicans had in business organisation
to achieve efficiency.

Stimson,

like Root, believed army

and business organisations were similar in structure and
problems faced. The introduction of Taylorism did produce
considerable savings but was dropped after strikes
occurred at army arsenals in protest against the
rigourously enforced time allotment for each task.69
The failure of plans to reduce expenditure
discouraged the already reluctant Stimson and Wood from
pursuing Taft's defence cuts. In the early spring,
however, the General Staff recommended abolishing the
muster rolls held by the Adjutant General's Office. The
muster rolls, which listed individual members of a unit,
could be replaced by a descriptive list which would save
money. Wood wrote to Ainsworth for his opinion. After
three weeks Wood still had received no reply from the
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Adjutant General. The Chief of Staff sent a further querie
to Ainsworth,

asking for his comments on the suggestion by

the General Staff. Four days later the Adjutant General
sent a reply. He accused Wood of arrogance, questioned the
objectivity of the proposal,

and criticised the Secretary

of War for bias against his office.70 A further inquiry
from Wood demanding an opinion elicited a sarcastic reply
to Stimson:
.... Life is too short to permit of wasting any
portion of it in discussion with, or for the
benefit of, any one whose conception of the
underlying principles of military administration is
so hazy that he can advocate such a proposition
seriously.... A proposition of this kind would be
remarkable if advanced by a state militiaman and it
is simply amazing when put forward by an officer in
the regular army, even though his connection with the
military side of that establishment be so remote as
to be merely nominal . ...71
On February 10, Wood met Judge Advocate General
Crowder,

War College President Crozier,

and his assistant

Carter. These senior officers unanimously recommended
disciplinary action against Ainsworth for
insubordination.72 Five days later Stimson relieved the
Adjutant General of his command. The following day,

faced

with a possible court martial and public disgrace,
Ainsworth announced his retirement.73 Colonel Hall, the
deputy adjutant general,

replaced Ainsworth. James Hay and

other prominent Democrats were indignant that their friend
had been forced to retire. The attempt to close army
posts,

continued assertion of presidential authority over
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the National Guard, and the Ainsworth affair created a new
determination in Congress to remove the Chief of Staff and
rescind the General Staff Act of 1903.
Wood and his Neo-Hamiltonian supporters needed
allies. President Taft, confronted by a strong
presidential challenge by Roosevelt, also needed support.
The result was a new alliance between conservative Taft
Republicans and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The
President, previously reluctant to support American
intervention overseas, began to solicit Neo-Hamiltonian
support.

In early June the President authorised the use of

American Marines in Cuba to maintain the pro-American
administration. A few weeks later Marines landed at
Managua,

capital of Nicaragua, to help the pro-American

president remain in power.

In August Taft signed the

Panama Canal Act and indicated his willingness to consider
fortifying the canal,

as Wood, Root, and others wished.

In Congress the Democrats,

advised by Ainsworth,

introduced an amended Army Bill. The Bill proposed a forty
percent cut in the number of General Staff officers,
disbanded five regiments of cavalry,

limited the role of

the secretary of war on post closures,

and narrowed the

choice of chief of staff open to the president in an
attempt to exclude Wood.74 These measures,
progressive Republicans and Democrats,

supported by

easily gained a

majority in the House of Representatives.

In the Senate,
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Root and Lodge worried that Taft might not veto the bill.
Both senators worked with Stimson to prevent its passage.
In the Senate Francis E. Warren of Wyoming,

Chairman of

the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee,

led the

fight to pass the bill.75 Wood and Stimson had recommended
Wyoming lose four posts in their report on post closure.
On June 11 the bill passed the Senate by one vote.76
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unsure whether
Taft, a man who opposed military preparedness, would veto
the bill.77 The President, however, required support at
the forthcoming Republican National Convention. Roosevelt
had compiled impressive victories in many Republican
primaries including the important states of Illinois,
Pennsylvania,

and Taft's home state of Ohio. The President

had won only Massachusetts, where the party organisation
was controlled by Senator Lodge. At the convention
Roosevelt needed only eighty more votes to defeat Taft.78
To win the nomination, the President required the support
of Lodge,

Stimson, Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonian

Republicans. On June 18 Taft vetoed the Army Bill. The
presidential veto included the annual army budget and,

in

a rare display of support for the army, Taft defied
Congress to leave the army unfunded.79 That same day the
Republican National Convention began in Chicago.
The Republican convention lasted four days. Root was
appointed chairman of the convention,

and Neo-Hamiltonian
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support gave Taft majorities on the Republican National
Committee, the platform committee,

and the credentials

committee. These committees and Root's chairmanship
ensured Taft controlled who spoke to the convention, what
policies were adopted, and which Roosevelt delegates were
accredited to replace Taft delegates. Roosevelt and his
supporters found the convention determined to nominate
Taft, who secured the nomination with 561 votes to 107 for
Roosevelt. Over 300 delegates refused to vote in protest
at Taft's managing the convention.80 Roosevelt was furious
and never forgave Taft, Root, and Lodge for denying him
the Republican nomination. Root, once a close friend, was
singled out for particular vilification by Roosevelt and
his supporters.81 In a letter to his uncle,

Stimson

stressed his disappointment at Roosevelt's actions and
underlined how meaningless the term "Progressive" had
become:
.... I am much disheartened over the performance in
Chicago. But I place the original responsibility for
it upon Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers. You remember
I prophesied at Chicago that his entrance into the
contest would disrupt the real progressive party and
probably throw the election into the hands of the
reactionary Democratic Party. Events have moved
exactly along these lines. His efforts have thrown
Taft who is not a reactionary, apparently into the
hands of the reactionaries ... at the same time,
defeating himself T.R. and crippling his efforts
toward good. He is the last man in America to lead a
progressive party as a candidate for president,
because he inevitably brings with in with his
personality the third term issue ,...82
Roosevelt ignored pleas not to further split the
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Republican Party and in August at an alternative
convention, the Bull Moose Party nominated Roosevelt and
Hiram Johnson as its candidates. The split in Republican
ranks was complete. Confident of victory in November, the
Democrats nominated Woodrow Wilson the governor of New
Jersey and Thomas R. Marshall from Indiana as their
presidential ticket.
In Washington Stimson attended a conference with
leading Democrats to design a new army bill. The
conference reported its findings to Taft in August.
Democrats agreed to remove the provisions from the bill
which disqualified Wood from office and prevented the
secretary of war from recommending post closures. A new
suggestion to amalgamate the three supply bureaus into one
department was accepted.83 Wood and Stimson reluctantly
accepted a cut of one third in General Staff officers and
abandoned Wood's planned shorter enlistment periods.
Ainsworth advised Democratic congressmen to denounce
Wood's plans for national preparedness during the
compromise debate, and many did.84 At the end of August,
the compromise bill was presented to Taft, who quickly
signed it into law.
The debate on army reform again emphasised the
influence and respect which business organisation still
commanded among army reformers. Throughout the spring and
summer of 1912, Wood and Stimson held a series of
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conferences on the future organisation of the American
army.85 A feature of these meetings were large tables,
which compared the organisational structure of two
principal railroads, the Pennsylvania and New York
Central, with the command system operating in the American
army.

Extensive use was made of these diagrams during

discussions on how to achieve coordination among staff
bureaus; army-National Guard cooperation; and supervision
of strategic planning in the field.86 The use of these
diagrams demonstrated that the business analogies used
during debates on military reform amounted to more than
rhetoric designed to impress Congress or the newspapers.
Wood continued to persevere with his policy of
national preparedness.

In early September he sent copies

of the War Department's conclusions on how to achieve
efficiency to Taft, Mahan,

Choate, Root,

and other

prominent public figures.87 Increasingly, however, the
upcoming presidential election distracted attention from
Wood's proposals.88 Stimson advised the Chief of Staff to
concentrate his attentions on preserving the General Staff
and army educational reforms already in place. The
Secretary of War, warned Wood that Taft's administration
would not tolerate another Ainsworth controversy before
the election.

In September, despite

opposition from Wood,

Ainsworth's friend James Buchanan Aleshire was appointed
head of the new consolidated Supply Department.

Stimson
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advised Wood to cultivate good relations with this new
bureau chief.89 The approaching election deeply depressed
Root, Stimson, and other Republicans as most senior
Republicans were reluctant to speak for a divided party
apparently bound for defeat. Root, who hated speechmaking,

confided to a friend that he pleaded illness to

avoid Taft's requests.90 Taft was bitterly disappointed
and angry at the lack of support from Root, Wickersham,
Knox,

Stimson, and many other senior party members.
Wood continued to worry about American military

failings. The international situation seemed highly
unstable. Japan was exploiting the Chinese civil war to
improve its Pacific trade and to gain more territorial
concessions in China.

In Mexico political instability

continued to threaten American lives and investment.
German arms sales and exports to Argentina and Brazil
challenged the American determination to uphold the Monroe
Doctrine.91 The Chief of Staff was concerned by the threat
these problems presented to the American attempt to
achieve economic supremacy in the Pacific and Latin
America. Wood kept Roosevelt fully informed,

as the former

president seemed more likely to be elected than Taft.92 On
November 5, 1912 the election result was announced: The
electoral vote gave Wilson 435 votes, Roosevelt eightyeight votes and Taft eight votes. Roosevelt and Taft split
the Republican popular vote. Wilson received over

358

6,000,000 votes, against over 4,000,000 for Roosevelt,

and

nearly 3,500,000 for Taft. In Congress the Democrats
achieved a fifty-one to forty-four majority in the Senate
and a 291-127 majority in the House.
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans responded quickly to the
defeat. They were determined both to protect Root's
General Staff Act and to ensure that Wood's ideas on
national preparedness received consideration from the new
administration.

In Cambridge, Massachusetts,

just six days

after the election, Wood again outlined his ideas:
.... Every man of ordinary common sense knows that
wars, however much we strive to avoid them, will
come and only those who have failed to gather
anything of wisdom from the past can object to
reasonable preparation for the future. If we wish
to avoid war against this country, it will be
necessary to be reasonably prepared to meet them.
A simple declaration that wars are not coming, and
a failure to make reasonable preparation for
possible difficulty, is distinctly an ostrich
policy, and those who preach it are responsible for
disaster and bloodshed than any other class of men
93
• • • •
In the War Department Stimson attempted to rush
through several administrative reforms before the new
administration took office in March 1913. Suggestions made
by the Cleveland Commission on Economy and Efficiency were
rapidly implemented. The new measures reduced army paper
work by one third and produced annual savings of
$300,000.94 Stimson also sought to convince Wilson,
incoming president,

the

of the value of army reforms already

in place. He used his friend, New Jersey lawyer William
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Osborn, to present his views to Wilson. Osborn was a
friend of Wilson's, and the President-elect listened to
his advice on matters of defence policy.95
Wilson appointed Lindley Miller Garrison secretary of
war. Garrison, a native of New Jersey, was a lawyer and
former vice-chancellor of New Jersey and would serve as
secretary of war from March 7, 1913 until February 10,
1916.96 In the weeks before he took office, Wood and
Stimson sought to influence Garrison.97 The new Secretary
became increasingly sympathetic to Neo-Hamilitonian ideas
and ultimately left office convinced that Wilson's
opposition to military preparedness was wrong.
In February 1913, violence in Mexico required the
mobilisation of American troops and in the process
vindicated the Stimson-Wood reforms which consolidated
army command.
20,000

In one short telegram,

Stimson mobilized

fully equipped soldiers, who were quickly deployed

along the Texas-Mexico border. Garrison observed the
success of this operation and realised that the
mobilisation had succeeded because of forward planning by
the War College and the organisational skills of the
General Staff. The new Secretary was suitably impressed.98
Garrison agreed to continue Wood-Stimson policies of
closing small western outposts, defending army reform,

and

consolidating scattered army units through creating
brigade and divisional commands.99 Stimson was delighted
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with Garrison's promised support for the army. Wilson
provided further good news to supporters of military
reform when he announced that Wood would serve out his
term as chief of staff. This decision allowed Wood to
remain chief of staff until April 20, 1914. The continued
influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas on defence policy was
assured.
The struggle to preserve the professional army led by
a general staff and presidential control over the National
Guard continued for many years. The passage of National
Defence Acts in 1916 and 1920 rekindled debate on the army
best suited to the American republic. The experiences of
World War One convinced all but a small minority in
Congress to accept Neo-Hamiltonian ideas. The ideas of
Root,

Stimson, Wood, and others radically altered American

defence and foreign policy. These men,
depression of the 1890s,

confronted by the

large European colonial Empires,

and expanding industrial capacity, were convinced American
freedom and security depended upon economic expansion
abroad. To encourage American exports, the acquisition of
colonies and a strong military were essential. War with
Spain provided the opportunity to extend American
influence in the Caribbean and Pacific.
An agrarian, demilitarized state was transformed into
an interventionist world power. American relations with
Japan and Germany increasingly deteriorated. A new
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informal Anglo-American alliance, based on free trade and
a belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority,

emerged. Neo-

Hamiltonian policies ensured all future American
governments faced large overseas commitments. This NeoHamiltonian victory over the ideals of Jefferson and
Jackson had fundamentally altered American foreign and
defence policy for the rest of the century.
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APPENDIX ONE

The Armv Command Structure in th e 1890's

The P re sid e n t
C o m m a n d e r in C hief

C o m m a n d in g
G e n era l of the Arm y

S ecretary
of W a r

C h ie f S ignals
O ffice r
Judge
A d vo ca te
G e n e 'a l

Inspector
G enerals
Office

C hief of
E ngineers

R e co rd s and
P e n sio n s

O rdnance
D epartm ent

The V a rious A rm y
Com m ands

D erived fro m O tto, L. N elson N a tio n a l Security and the General S taff W ashing ton, In fa n try jo u rn a l Press: 1946, p. 21
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APPENDIX TWO

The Army Command Structure in th e A utum n o f 1903

The President
C om m ander in Chief

Secretary of W ar

Chief of Staff

G eneral Staff

S ubsistence
D epartm ent

O rdnance
D epartm ent

In sp ecto r
G e n era ls
O ffice

C hief of
A rtillery

A d ju ta n t
G enerals
O ffice

M edical
D epartm ent

Judge
A d vo ca te

Pay
D ep a rtm e n t

Records and
Pensions

C h ie f
S ig n a l
O ffice r

General

C hief
E ngineers

Q ua rte rm a ste r
G e n era l
The Various Arm y
Com m ands
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APPENDIX THREE
SOME SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE FIRST
GENERAL STAFF.

Purchase of land for new forts.
Prevention of cruelty to animals in time of war.
Revision of infantry drill regulations.
Supply of travel rations for the militia.
Detail of student officers at the General service and
Staff College.
Pensions for Macabebe Scouts.
Water system for Fort McKinley, Manila.
Compostion and pay of army bands.
Preparation of various maps.
Inspection of seacoast defences.
Reorganisation of field batteries.
Militia organisation in Alaksa and Puerto Rico.
Appointment of a board to consider fire control and
searchlights.
Instruction of Cuban artillery corps.
Railroad through the Vancouver military reservation.

Information compiled from the Annual Report of the
Secretary of War June 30, 1903 H.Doc. 58th Cong., 2nd
sess. Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903), p . 69.
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APPENDIX FOUR
COMMANDING GENERALS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY 1864-1918

NAME
Commandincr General

FROM

TO

Grant U.S.,'

Gen.

. March

9, 1864

March

4, 1869

Sherman W . T . ,

G e n . . March

8, 1869

Nov.

1, 1883

Sheridan, W.T.,

Gen.

. Nov.

1, 1883

Aug.

5, 1888

Schofield, J . , L i e u . Gen.

. Aug.

14, 1888

Miles, N . A . , Lieu.

Gen . . O c t .

Sept.

29,

1895

Aug.

5, 1903

1903

Jan.

8, 1904

9, 1904

Jan.

14, 1906

5, 1895

Chiefs of Staff
Young,

S.B.M.,

Chafee, A .R . ,

L i e u . Gen.

Aug.

Lieu.

Jan.

Gen.

15,

Bates, J . C . ,

Maj . G e n .

Jan.

15,

1906

April 13,

1906

Bell, J.F.,

Maj . G e n .

April 14,

1906

April 21,

1910

Wood, L,

Maj . G e n .

April 22 , 1910

April 20,

1914

Wotherspoon, W. , Maj . Gen.

April 21,

1914

Nov.

15,

1914

Scott, H . L . ,

Maj . Gen.

Nov.

16,

1914

S e p t . 21,

1917

Bliss, T . H . ,

Maj . Gen.

Sept.

22,

1917

May

19,

1918

March, P.C.

Gen.

May

19,

1918

June

30,

1921

•

•

•

«

Derived from William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the
United States Armv (New York: D .Appelton-Century, 1924),
p . 532.
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